Customary Law and the Nation: The Significance of Kanun in the Emergence and Development of Albanian Nationalist Discourse by Burda, Ervis
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Customary Law and the Nation: 
The Significance of Kanun in the Emergence and Development of Albanian Nationalist 
Discourse 
 
 
 Ervis Burda 
 
 
University of Michigan 
Russian and Easter European Studies 
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 
   
Acknowledgements 
With the completion of this project, I would like to acknowledge and thank all those involved in 
this effort for their help and support. Many thanks to Professor Tatjana Aleksic for her advice, 
guidance and most of all, her unrelenting patience, in what turned out to be a surprisingly long 
and involved project. The Russian and Eastern European Studies department staff for their 
helpfulness and accommodation. Last, but certainly not least, my dear friends Michael Migliore 
and Maria Sumina for their invaluable help in editing and revising. Working on this project has 
been a great experience and I hope it will at least prove mildly interesting for those who read it.
  2 
   
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction 
 The Image of Nation        3 
Part I: Albanian Customary Law       12 
 The Kanun and Its History       13 
 The Practice of Kanun       15 
 The Structure and Mechanisms of Kanun     17 
 Reflections         24 
Part II: The Nation         26  
 Narrative of the Nation       28 
 National Rebirth        33 
 The League of Prizren       35 
 Modernity and Albanian Nationalism     37 
Part III: Sami Frasheri, Nationalist Discourse and the Kanun Symbolic  41 
 Sami Frasheri and the Identity Polemic     45 
 National identity and Late Ottoman Pluralism     47  
   
 Ottomanism and the Albanian National Narrative    52 
 
 Besa: The Pledge of Honor and Loyalty to an Oath    55 
 Customary Law as a Unifying Cultural Signifier    63 
 Reflections on Besa        67  
 Turbulent Times: From Ethnie to Nation     69  
 A Nationalist Manifesto: From Golden Past to Meager Present  72 
 Nations and Albania According to Sami     82 
 The Future Albanian nation       87 
 The Manifesto, Customary Law and the Albanian Nation   101 
Concluding Remarks         111 
  3 
   
Introduction: The Image of Nation 
 Fourteen years after that fatal night which left Harry Potter an orphan and stripped 
Voldemort of his human life, leaving behind a mere spirit, the Dark Lord is brought back to 
physical form by his servant Peter Pettigrew. Summoning the Death Eaters, his loyal followers, 
Voldemort reveals the story of his fall and the misery of survival as a parasite inhabiting foreign 
bodies in a faraway land: 
And then, not even a year ago, when I had almost abandoned hope, it happened at last... a servant 
returned to me. He sought me in the country where it had long been rumored I was hiding...a 
place, deep in an Albanian forest...where small animals...met their deaths by a dark shadow that 
possessed them. (Rowling 654-655) 
 
Throughout the seven part series, the Dark Lord's exile in that Albanian forest is of minimal 
importance to the plot, yet for a scholar of the Balkans, even such brief attention proves 
indicative of a larger pattern of Western fascination with the region. Maria Todorova identifies 
this process as “Balkanism.” 
Geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally constructed as “the other,” the Balkans 
became, in time, the object of a number of externalized political, ideological and cultural 
frustrations and have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and 
self-congratulatory image of the “European” and “the West” has been constructed. (455) 
 
In the specific case of viewing Albania as the West’s “Other,” such constructions are evident 
beginning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when claims for an independent 
nation first enter the international political stage through the emergence and rise of an Albanian 
nationalism. Confirmations of this chauvinism abound in various fields, but one need only look 
at the Western press of the time for a glimpse. 
  A New York Times article from October 1913 titled “Europe's 'Autonomous Albania' 
Absurd” states: “Part barbarian, the Albanian threatens to block all plans for settling the 
Balkans—Land has never been reduced to order—The men are used to being armed and 
untaxed.”  From the same publication, a March 1914 article titled “Albania as little known as 
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Africa” describes the newly formed nation as “a primitive land that has so far produced little 
more than hardships, dangers and troubles.” One finds numerous articles employing similar 
rhetoric when surveying archives from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
Throughout these pieces, the region and its inhabitants are portrayed as the West’s cultural 
“other” and Todorova’s theory of Balkanism is, in essence, confirmed. 
 The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan wars that followed gave wide 
expression to the “Balkanism” of the early twentieth century. Entry of new Balkan nations into 
the international political arena during this period brought the region to the forefront of Western 
attention and a body of knowledge was needed to situate these new players and explain their 
turbulent affairs. “Balkanism” as a discourse served precisely this purpose by offering totalizing 
“truths” of the region’s innate violence and barbarism. It sought to make simple sense of 
numerous complex political and social issues that confronted the region at the turn of the 
nineteenth century. 
  In a period where eugenics was an explicit policy and exploitative colonial Empires 
constituted international strategy for the Western powers, such rhetoric is hardly shocking. One 
might argue that it is nevertheless part of our past and that today we live in a different world, one 
that is more ‘rational’ and ‘just.’ ‘Post-modern’ tendencies, detached from metanarrative, oust 
objectivity for subjectivity and decry the aforementioned attitudes. Surely, essentializing claims 
like those above cannot have much influence today? 
 Nearly a century after the Balkan wars and the early struggles for nationhood, the 
collapse of Communism and the resulting political vacuum plunged the Balkans into ‘ethnic’ 
conflict once more. Yet again, the region was brought to the forefront of Western media 
awareness. These developments at the turn of the twentieth century provide an excellent 
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opportunity to revisit Todorova's “Balkanism” and examine its part in this latest trend of Balkan 
fascination. One is compelled to ask: what defines this renewed attention and how does it relate 
to that of a century prior?  If outright labels of a barbaric and uncivilized people are no longer 
acceptable, what might take their place?    
 In the political turmoil of the early 1990s, as liberalizing reforms were opening an 
isolated Communist Albania to the rest of the world, a New York Times book review of Ismail 
Kadare’s Broken April (the country’s lone internationally recognized author) states:  
It is doubly fascinating to read a novel by Albania's most popular writer when 34 nations -- 
including every European country except Albania -- have just signed the Charter of Paris for a 
New Europe. For what Ismail Kadare's powerful novel clearly shows is that Albania, the most 
closed of all Eastern European societies, is still haunted by the deadly traditions of an Old Europe. 
 
The article in question is titled “An Albanian Tale of Ineluctable Vengeance” and the “traditions 
of an Old Europe” are a reference to blood feud and Albanian customary law. When examining 
latent aspects of “Balkanism” in discussions of Albania, blood feud is important for two reasons: 
a persistent fascination and extensive engagement with the topic outside of the country and, 
closely related, the common use of this subject matter to define Albania as a whole.  
Blood feud and customary law have brought notable attention from outside audiences, 
especially in the post-Communist period. The subject has been addressed in media ranging from 
newspapers to radio and television programs. For instance, a New York Times headline from 
April 1998 proclaims: “Feuds Rack Albania Loosed from Communism.” More than a year later, 
in December 1999, an article from the same publication titled “The Curse of Blood and 
Vengeance” offers a twelve-page exposé of the topic, beginning with the claim that “in remote 
Northern Albania, communal life is governed by ancient codes of honor unchanged by modern 
notions of rights or the rule of law.” Other outlets have also investigated the topic; among them 
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the National Geographic Channel in 2003 and the BBC World Radio Service in 2008. What 
underlies this fascination with the Albanian blood feud and how might it be understood?  
In his essay “Blood Feud and Modernity,” Sociologist Jonas Gruztpalk notes that “Blood 
feud is regaining some interest in the social sciences after about half a century of little 
consideration.” (115) He attributes this renewed interest to late twentieth century global trends: 
“migration, internationalization of ethnic conflicts, and the growing concurrence between 
traditions and religions,” otherwise explained as “the phenomena of globalization.” (115) 
Gruztpalk suggests that “globalization has brought to light blood feud as an existing legal and 
cultural phenomenon that cannot be overlooked.” (115) His essay’s primary aim is to reexamine 
blood feud and situate the phenomenon in a broader framework that appreciates customary law 
as a complex and cohesive system of social organization. Thus, he seeks to undermine 
approaches that construe the blood feud mechanism in customary law as barbaric and anarchic.  
 Gruztpalk argues that violence is intrinsic to all forms of social organization; thus, there 
is no inherent madness or inhumanity in customary law, only a variation in the particular 
mechanisms through which violence is applied and controlled. Thus, the central concern is not 
the use of violence, for its exercise is ubiquitous in any social order, but rather the instruments 
through which it is applied. He addresses the historical presence of blood feud in Northern 
Albania specifically and advises that an accurate understanding of this feature of customary law 
requires that one evaluate the phenomenon within the functional framework of the society and 
time where it originated. While contemporary perspective might easily dismiss blood feud as 
mere anarchy, Gruztpak suggests that this understanding cannot be attributed to any inherent 
meaning of customary law, but rather to the historical position and framework of observation.  
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 Accordingly, in considering reemerging interest in the Albanian blood feud, we will 
henceforth proceed under the contention that the knowledge and meaning fashioned from 
renewed attention is a product of a specific historical period and the power politics therein. Our 
endeavor thus concerns the various social, political, and ideological mechanisms that inform 
one’s view of the world, a process that French philosopher, sociologist, and historian Michel 
Foucault terms discursive formation. From this framework—where various institutions engage in 
the production of knowledge—the nation would perhaps prove the most salient and pervasive of 
all such apparatuses. One can affirm this assertion when considering that today, no single 
category better informs our knowledge of a people than the Nation with which they identify.   
 However, in thinking about the nation’s role as a cultural signifier in contemporary 
engagements with the Balkans, it is also necessary to consider certain political developments of 
the late twentieth century – specifically, the collapse of the Communist Bloc. The fall of 
communism (and the subsequent breakdown of the East-West ideological divide) rendered much 
of the dominant political thought of the post-WWII era inadequate. A discursive vacuum 
emerged from this momentous event, one that necessitated new narratives to qualify a vastly 
different political reality. But what mediated and replaced the East-West binary? Various 
perspectives can address this complex issue but one development that undoubtedly makes a 
significant imprint on the post-communist political and ideological stage is the re-emergence of 
nationalist discourse and the nation-state.  
 The reemergence of the nation-state in the post-communist political arena compels us to 
investigate a possible correlation with the reemerging interest in blood feud during this same 
period. Thus, we ask: does the renewed focus on blood feud stand outside the discourse of the 
nation or does nothing evade it?  
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 Given the historic presence of customary law in Albania, the country has been a central 
focus for much of the renewed attention on blood feud. One might even say that blood feud has 
proved a key referent for constructing an image of Albania. Indeed, references to blood feuds 
abound in much of the outside attention on the region, and this pattern can be traced as far back 
as the nineteenth century, when Western travelers and intellectuals, including such renowned 
figures as Lord Byron, made the Balkans a locus of their curiosity. This long history of 
Orientalist fascination with the Albanian blood feud tempts one to declare that perhaps there is 
nothing significant about the “renewed attention.” However, such a position would be imprudent 
because it ignores that differing historical circumstances give rise to this attention and thus the 
discourse facilitated also changes.  
  In the post-socialist context, with globalizing trends moving towards a more 
interconnected world, the circumstances and implications of fascination with Albanian 
customary law, specifically the blood feud, differ notably from previous episodes and thus 
deserve a more nuanced reflection. One must consider that cultural exchange in this period 
ceases to be unidirectional, as was the case with curious Western travelers and their Orientalist 
inclinations. The collapse of the communist government in the early 1990s, and the devastating 
domestic situation it left behind, prompted waves of Albanian refugees to flood Western 
countries in search of better opportunities. In many instances, the realities these people faced 
were very different from their idealized visions and expectations of prosperity. These early 
refugees experienced firsthand the problems of immigration, including though not limited to: 
institutionalized barriers to employment, blatant discrimination through social as well as 
government institutions, and treatment as second-rate citizens. Under these circumstances, 
representations of Albanians as blood-thirsty, vindictive, and barbaric “Others” governed by a 
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completely different moral code and, additionally, as unable to integrate into civil “Western 
society” certainly provided justification for conservative anti-immigrant sentiment in countries 
that experienced massive Albanian immigration.  
 On the international political stage, a weak post-communist Albanian state, riddled by 
corruption, only served to fuel images of the country and its people as inherently backward and 
incapable of ‘rational’ self-governance. The mafia networks that emerged as a result of this 
fragile government and the 1997 economic crisis, which was followed by massive internal social 
upheaval and the collapse of the state, ultimately brought Albania to complete social anarchy and 
further added to the country’s negative image by reaffirming prejudice. These circumstances and 
the stereotypes they perpetuated undoubtedly affected Albania’s post-Communist transition by 
driving away potential foreign investment and exacerbating a cycle of economic and political 
troubles, further isolating the country. 
  It would be a great exaggeration to claim that the difficulties faced by the Albanian state 
and its citizens in the post-Communist transition were a direct result of essentializing stereotypes 
which legitimized the country’s image as Western Europe’s “Other.”  However, a mechanism 
becomes apparent wherein manifestations of these prejudices, by isolating the country and its 
people from the European community, could act as a self-fulfilling prophecy contributing to the 
affirmation of that chauvinism. In brief, we wish to note that with the fast pace of globalization 
and a more interconnected world, a nation’s image and the extensive apparatuses that facilitate 
the information and legitimize the knowledge propagating that image can and do have real and 
practical implications for the way we understand and treat the world around us. 
 Thus far we have only considered the use of customary law to construct an image of 
Albania from an external or outsider’s gaze, but internal discourse on customary law is also 
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important and thus requires attention. The latter point, hitherto eschewed, will be the main 
inquiry and central focus of our project. Closer examination of this matter reveals that 
engagement with customary law, known locally as Kanun, figures prominently in Albanian 
nationalist discourse and the late nineteenth century movement for Albanian nationhood. The 
trope of customary law to construct an image of Albania was an important instrument for 
nationalist forces in their efforts to legitimize a national identity and promote a unified Albanian 
nation. The Kanun, in its rhetorical capacity, was employed as a means to extend and apply the 
greater nineteenth and twentieth century paradigms, which had established nation-states in 
continental Europe, to the question of Albanian nationhood.  
This last claim will be a guiding framework for our project; by examining internal 
discourse on Kanun during the period of national rebirth, we will seek to understand its 
significance and role in establishing an Albanian nation. Our endeavor will seek to address the 
following questions: What is the Kanun and what is known about its origin and history? What is 
its relationship with the region and peoples in question? More specifically, what role, if any, does 
it play in the political and social developments which lead to the emergence of an Albanian 
nation? 
 I will trace the emergence of nationalist discourse in the late nineteenth century (the 
historical period that laid the fabric for an Albanian nation-state) and examine the role of Kanun 
in this phenomenon. Specifically, I will consider the work of Sami Frasheri – a central architect 
of Albanian nationalist claims – in order to examine the role and function of customary law on 
his contributions to Albanian nationalist discourse. In doing so, I suggest that customary law, in 
its rapport with Albanian nationalism, transcends the modern/pre-modern dichotomy commonly 
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applied to explain the role of the Kanun. Through an analysis of Sami’sI work, I argue that the 
Kanun becomes intrinsically entwined with nationalist discourse and thus proves a significant 
conduit through which paradigms of Eastern European nationalism are extended and selectively 
refashioned to construct and legitimize a unique Albanian national narrative as well as a national 
identity.  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
I We will refer to this figure by the first name Sami, as the work and fame of his two brothers, Naim and Abdyl, 
makes the convention of using last names ambiguous. 
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The Kanun and Its History 
 Before we can consider the interaction of Albanian nationalism with Kanun discourse and 
its imprint on the knowledge imparted, it is important to provide a general overview of the 
Kanun’s history, its application within Albania, and the mechanisms that give this body of law 
its power. A logical place to start would be the Albanian name given to customary law: the very 
word Kanun.  Albanian sociologist Fatos Tarifa, who has produced several works on the topic, 
suggests that “Kanun, deriving from the Greek ‘kanon,’ signifies ‘norm,’ ‘rule,’ and ‘measure’.” 
(Tarifa 18) Thus, he traces its etymology to ancient Greek influence in the region. In contrast, 
Grutzpalk, in “Blood Feud and Modernity,” comments on the word’s “obvious similarity to the 
‘canon’ of Roman law,” (117) attributing its development to Roman rather than Greek influence. 
Additionally, anthropologist Stephanie Schwander-Sievers traces the word to more recent times, 
citing Ottoman influence. She notes that under the Ottoman administration system, kanun was a 
“term for local customary self-governance,” used to differentiate local law from Islamic law, 
Shariah.  (Enacment 101) On the other hand, Leonard Fox’s English translation of the “Kanun of 
Lek Dukagjin”, states: 
The word kanun is derived from the Greek kanon, which originally meant ‘a straight rod or bar,’ 
but which later came to be used metaphorically to mean ‘a rule or standard of excellence.’ 
According to this version, by Byzantine times, it had acquired a legal significance, and the word 
passed into the Albanian language most likely through Ottoman Turkish. (xvi)  
 
These varying accounts suggest that it is difficult to provide an accurate etymological account of 
Kanun’s place in the Albanian language. Indeed, accounts of the word’s origin are as numerous 
as they are murky, suggesting no compelling reason to favor any one above another. The word’s 
complicated etymology notwithstanding, it is important to recognize that Kanun refers to a 
common practice in the areas inhabited by Albanian speaking peoples long before any semblance 
of a unified Albanian nation-state existed. 
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 Regrettably, it is not only the origin of the word Kanun that proves difficult to situate 
historically; the manifest/material origins of Albanian customary law itself are equally hard to 
place. While the practice of customary law surely predates the Middle Ages,II the historical 
resources available for analysis are of relatively recent origin; at the earliest, they date from the 
nineteenth century. The documents and references available are noticeably tinged with the 
particular ideological bias common to the time, further complicating an accurate account of 
Kanun’s already intricate history as social practice.  
 Despite these issues, there are several features of Kanun that can be illuminated with 
certainty. For example, Kanun practice in areas occupied by Albanian-speaking communities 
predates the Ottoman invasion and the Middle Ages. Furthermore, prior to the twentieth century, 
when the Franciscan priest Shtjefen Gjecov compiled a written version of Kanun as practiced in 
parts of Northern Albania, the code was transmitted orally from generation to generation and 
mediated by a hierarchy of elders deciding specific details of practice. Interestingly, the 
documented practice of Kanun in the nineteenth and twentieth century inevitably differed from 
its earlier applications. On the latter point, Fatos Tarifa argues that Kanun “surely had 
‘spontaneous development’” and that “it has also changed purposefully by human agency ‘to suit 
the purposes of those who transmitted the oral law.’” (23) Of course, this becomes self-evident 
considering that parts of Kanun regulating vengeance must have undergone significant changes 
due to the introduction of firearms by the Ottomans, as Tarifa explains: “because firearms made 
murder easier than before, new rules must have been adopted to prevent the great loss of life 
inflicted by their use.” (Tarifa 24) Recognition of Kanun’s propensity for evolution and 
reinterpretation is especially important for understanding its so-called revival in the post-socialist 
context. During this period, there are constant references to Kanun law in the resurgence of 
                                                             
II This is verified by its documented practice during the Ottoman invasion in the fifteenth century.  
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honor killings and vengeance, and yet differences in intent and application are so great that one 
cannot ascribe these late developments to the same tradition. 
 
The Practice of Kanun 
In considering the practice of Kanun, it is important to note that the general mechanism 
and structure of the law was similar across regions that practiced it, but specific aspects and 
details of the code’s application varied:   
In Albania, various bodies of customary law are known, each with its own name: “The Kanun of 
the Mountains” (Kanun i maleve) in the country’s north west region, the Malsi e Madhe district; 
“The Kanun of Skenderbeg” (Kanun i Skenderbegut) in central Albania, linked with the name of 
Albania’s renowned national hero, Gjergj Kastrioti Skenderbeg; “The Custom of Mus Ballgjini” in 
the valley of  the Shkumbin river; “The Mandate of Idriz Suli” in Laberi, the country’s 
southwest…Scholarly findings assert that Kanuns from the country’s north, center and south, are 
very similar in their core. Some variation between them can be attributed to the particular 
historical developments of each given region.III (Ivanova 7)1 
 
Various manifestations of customary law were at one time present throughout the region, but by 
the late nineteenth century (and certainly the early twentieth century, when outside interest in 
customary law became very pronounced), the Albanian north remained the main area where 
strict adherence to oral law persisted.   
 The reasons for the codes’ persistence in the north are difficult to determine with 
complete accuracy, but various authors writing about Kanun seem to suggest a similar answer. 
To explain both the Kanun’s diminishing power in the south and the north’s continued adherence 
to the practice well into the twentieth century, scholars often refer back to the regions’ social and 
political organization in the Middle Ages and their subsequent transformations after nearly five 
                                                             
III Note: All translations that follow are my own with the original text provided in the end notes.  
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hundred years of Ottoman rule. Customary law as embodied in Kanun was a framework for 
regulation and self-governance in feudal communities that lacked a unified state apparatus. 
“Before the Ottoman Turks invaded Albania in the fifteenth century, the country was split up 
into numerous principalities, none of which was strong enough for long to subject a neighboring 
territory to its rule.” (Tarifa, 18)  Hierarchal family, clan, and village loyalties regulated the most 
important aspects of life during this time. Kanun provided order within this social framework 
and as such, its mechanisms and applications were intrinsically tied to specific structures of 
feudal Albanian communities. In the aftermath of the Sublime Port’s invasion, with the advent of 
time, Ottoman powers were able to transform this fabric in many of the Albanian speaking 
communities through various administrative and integrative pressures.  
 There is a diverse body of literature concerning the specifics of Ottoman administrative 
policy and its implications for the occupied areas. For our purposes, it suffices to note that these 
policies, due to various political and economic reasons, were applied differently in diverse 
regions. George Gawrych, in his essay “Tolerant Dimensions of Cultural Pluralism in the 
Ottoman Empire: The Albanian Community,” explains that amongst Ottoman subjects, 
Albanians became adequately integrated within the administrative system. The mountainous 
northern regions however, were the exception; proselytization did not occur with the same 
degree of influence in these remote and often inaccessible areas.  
 The regions currently recognized as northern Albania, “despite Ottoman control … 
retained a large degree of autonomy due to their relative inaccessibility and the inability of 
Turkish troops to subdue them.” (Fox xvii) Thus, local practices of governance, such as those 
embodied in customary law, were largely allowed to persist. Moreover, due to the inability of the 
Ottomans to completely subdue the region, certain compromises were permitted. The specific 
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details of these compromises are not certain, but domestic Albanian scholarship claims that 
changes were made to the Kanun’s hierarchal structure, specifically with the introduction of the 
“Bajraktar.” The Bajraktars were leaders chosen from within each community in recognition of 
military achievement. They held a social rank comparable to that of the elders; in times of war, 
they were responsible for recruiting and mobilizing soldiers for the Ottoman Army:  
With the introduction of the Bajraktar post, northern Albanian society simultaneously underwent 
two models of organization: the hierarchal model imposed by the Kanun and the center/periphery 
model imposed by the Ottomans. Through the Bajraktar, Istanbul could oversee its will and 
reforms in the mountainous regions of Albania… The Ottomans were not interested in changing 
the laws and customs of the northern Albanian as long as the latter agreed to participate in 
Istanbul’s battles, against Albania’s neighbors.2 
 
Clearly, the integration of Bajraktars into the Kanun was invariably complex and specific details 
of the process, at least currently, cannot be discussed with much certainty. Nevertheless, even if 
we cannot specify differences in administrative policy between the north and south, several 
sources confirm the existence of this schism, suggesting a contextually relevant explanation for 
how and why the practice of customary law continued to exist in northern Albania even as it was 
concurrently destroyed by the Ottoman administration in the south.   
 
The Structure and Mechanisms of Kanun 
The brief historical excursion above necessitates an examination of the mechanisms 
underlying the code’s authority in order to ascertain a comprehensive depiction of the Kanun. 
Although several variants of customary law were practiced throughout the region, they were 
transmitted orally; they were not written down or recorded and thus remain inaccessible. The 
only exception is the Kanun of Lek Dukagjin. This particular Kanun—practiced in parts of 
northern Albania—was documented by the Franciscan priest Shtjefen Gjecov between 1910 and 
1925. He traveled the region and recorded the practice of customary law by consulting with 
chiefs, elders, as well as other inhabitants living under the code’s authority. 
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Gjecov was the first to make a systematic field study of the laws of a relatively circumscribed area 
of Northern Albania, and also the first to put them into writing, after many centuries of oral 
transmission. (Fox xix)  
 
He systematically compiled and organized his results in a document containing 1,263 written 
articles, which were posthumously published in 1933 under the title Kanun i Lek Dukagjit.   
 Gjecov’s record of the Kanun is the most significant source for scholarship concerning 
Albanian customary law, despite its limited geographic focus.  As previously discussed, practice 
differed by area, and Kanun i Lek Dukagjit presents observations of customary law in the north 
region of Dukagjin. However, since the code’s fundamental structure was similar throughout all 
regions of pre-unified Albania, Gjecov’s work provides ample evidence for investigating the 
general mechanisms and structure of Albanian customary law as a whole. 
   “The Kanun was about all aspects of life of northern Albanian society and the relations 
among its members” (Tarifa, 29). Accordingly, Gjecov’s articles are meticulously categorized to 
correspond to the various aspects of life as governed by the Kanun. They are arranged into ten 
books as follows: the Church, the Family, Marriage, House Livestock and Property, Work, 
Transfer of Property, the Spoken Word, Honor, Damages, the Law Regarding Crimes, and 
Judicial Law. (Fox) Gjecov’s records confirm the code’s omnipresence in all parts of life. 
However, our primary focus will concern the articles on the Family, the Spoken Word, and 
Honor; it is these parts that best reveal the Kanun’s most pervasive structural mechanisms. The 
remaining articles, although fascinating in their own right, are not as significant for our purposes 
because they address specific details that likely varied among regions and over time.  
A central facet of the feudal societies governed by Kanun was the structure of family and 
much of the code’s power rested on its significance in familial relations. For instance, the code 
demanded a rigid social hierarchy based on kinship and geniture, and aspects of this hierarchy 
were reflected throughout family life:  
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Anthropologically, families in northern Albania were strictly patriarchal, patrilineal (wealth was 
inherited through a family’s men), and patrilocal (upon marriage, the woman moved into the 
household of her husband’s family) (Tarifa, 50).  
 
Thus, customary law was extremely misogynistic, and brutally repressed the lives of females. 
Family in the Kanun was not defined in the sense of immediate and distant, but rather by 
complex structures such as formative clans, villages, banners, and beyond. On the concept of 
family, Gjecov’s Kanun i Lek Dukagjit states the following:  
The family consists of the people of the house, as these increase, they are divided into 
brotherhoods [vllazni], brotherhoods into kinship groups [gjini], kinship groups into clans [fis], 
clans into banners [flamur], and all together constitute one widespread family called a nation. (14)  
 
While customary law had a long history in the region, the concept of “nation(s)” was a fairly 
novel development, entering the Balkans only in the late nineteenth century and Albania 
particularly in 1912. Hence, the concept of nation is most likely a late development in Kanun 
genealogy; its inclusion in Gjecov’s recordings could be due to rising Albanian nationalism in 
the early twentieth century when he complied his data. Regardless, the position of nation will be 
explored in greater detail later when we consider the Albanian National Rebirth of the late 
nineteenth century. 
 Returning to Gjecov’s data, the second book, “The Family,” specifies in great detail the 
relationships between various members of the family, their duties towards one another and to the 
group as a whole. Although the particular details of these groupings and their features warrant 
attention, it is the role of the collective (the insistence on community and networks of allegiance, 
as well as individual loyalty to these allegiances) that will be the most significant aspects of 
Kanun discussed here. Notably, many of these structural features resemble, or at the least are 
relatable to, the nationalist programs introduced in the Balkans in the late twentieth century. 
Therefore, they were easily applicable to the nationalist project.  As will be illuminated when 
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investigating Kanun discourse during the Albanian National Rebirth, I argue that this is precisely 
what occurs.   
 In addition to family relations and the role of the collective, the categories of Honor and 
The Spoken Word occupy an equally important role in the Kanun. However, they are 
substantially more difficult to investigate because they rely not on tangible and manifest 
elements, but rather on symbolic and/or subjective ones.  Nonetheless, it is crucial to attempt a 
consideration of these aspects of Albanian customary law. Before doing so, however, both 
concepts must be situated within a broader context of social organization.  
 Unlike modern systems of social organization, where power is monopolized and exerted 
by a unified political apparatus such as the state, in customary law this power is diffused among 
all subjects and participants. In “Blood Feud and Modernity,” Grutzpalk uses this distinction to 
explain customary law according to Max Weber’s and Emile Durkheim’s theories of social 
order. He contends that both customary law and the modern state apparatus rely on violence as a 
means of control; the difference between them concerns only issues of agency. While modern 
society relegates these duties to a central apparatus – the state – pre-modern societies employed 
customary law and its social code to place this responsibility on individuals. In the former, 
individuals forego anxieties related to social order by conceding the power to establish and 
maintain this order to the state.  Accordingly, in a modern system of central state governance, an 
act violating the individual is considered an infringement on the contract between the individual 
and the state. The state is thus responsible for “righting the wrong” and seeing to retribution. In 
contrast, pre-modern societies, allocate responsibility for maintaining order to the respective 
members of a community. Here, individuals are the primary agents sustaining order when 
questions of violation arise. Although this framework does not fully explain the persistence of 
  21 
   
customary law in Albanian society—especially after national independence and the 
establishment of central governance—it is a useful, albeit general, framework, for understanding 
the role of customary law in earlier forms of social organization. 
 Thus, in the absence of a developed state, Albanian customary law relied on certain non-
centralized methods to oversee social cohesion and control. To return to the topic at hand, these 
mechanisms are most accurately identified in the Kanun’s conception of ‘honor’ and ‘the spoken 
word’.  Remarking on their significance, Tarifa explains that “the cornerstone of the Kanun was 
the concept of Besa—the Oath or the Word of Honor—as was honor the primary and most 
important cohesive institution of Albania’s social fabric.” (29) Ideas such as honor and oath are 
easily romanticized and mythologized, to the extent that one must be wary of engaging only a 
metaphysical morass. In evaluating their importance in Kanun, the concepts of honor and oath 
must be situated within the context of their practical sociological functions. Thus, they will be 
evaluated not as traits and virtues defining individual character, but rather as discursive systems 
relying on symbolic configuration to construct a comprehensive worldview for their subjects 
while concurrently administering societal cohesion and control. 
 Gjecov’s Kanun i Lek Dukagjinit reports that “the Kanun of the Albanian mountains does 
not make any distinction between man and man. “Soul for soul, all are equal before God.” 
Additionally, it states: “Every man’s honor is his personal affair and no one may interfere with or 
constrain the defense of that honor in any way. Almighty God has touched the center of our 
forehead with two fingers of honor.” (Gjecov 130) In the Kanun, honor serves as a social 
equalizer, a medium guaranteeing each involved member an equal place in the affairs and 
relations of the community. Thus, the concept of honor is central because it is the referent 
qualifying and sorting violations that might arise in the everyday workings of society. It 
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guarantees that a member of the community thought to be wronged or victimized can cite 
infringement of honor in order to lodge a complaint and demand retribution.   
 Gjecov explains that “[t]here is no fine for an offense to Honor. An offense to Honor is 
never forgiven… An offense to Honor is not paid for with property, but by the spilling of blood.” 
(130) Honor is the Kanun’s zenith; this social primacy is firmly supported through structures of 
collective discipline and liability which ensure compliance from the whole community. The 
blood feud, or “the spilling of blood,” is one device of customary law directly linked to the 
concept of honor. However, it is important to note that the “spilling of blood” is not governed by 
frenzied tempers or spontaneous eruptions of violence. The Kanun’s honor system is firmly 
integrated within its social frameworks of family, clan, and village; infringement upon an 
individual begets infringement upon the entire community. Thus, the Kanun constructs a system 
of incentives that involve and oblige the whole community to oversee justice and order: claims 
of violation are made on a public stage in the presence of elders and other members of the 
community. The accused wrongdoer must either publicly admit his guilt and negotiate a pardon 
through reparations, or deny his role and risk blood feud. Denial of wrongdoing, however, does 
not immediately incur feud; instead, it calls into action a process of witnesses and oaths to 
arbitrate the situation.  
 The concept of ‘Spoken Word’ enters the realm of customary law in procedures of 
witness and oath.  The responsibility of naming violations rests with the individual and 
consequently, a mechanism ensuring that such responsibility is not taken lightly or abused for 
personal gain is necessary; the ‘Spoken Word’ serves this purpose. Fatos Tarifa, on the rationale 
of violation and punishment, uses the work of Emile Durkheim to argue that: 
Punishment is a social reaction to crime. It serves not simply the obvious functions of retribution 
for the criminal and general deterrence of crime; it also fulfills the generally unrecognized but 
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critical function of maintain the intensity of collective sentiments, or what modern functionalists 
call ‘shared values.’ (37)  
 
Similarly, the concept of the ‘Spoken Word’ uses the primacy of honor and the Kanun’s complex 
networks of social allegiances to construct a system of oaths that bind the individual’s grievances 
to the community and ensure justice through recourse to shared values.  
In the Kanun, the ‘Spoken Word’ and the system of oaths are known as Besa. While honor is 
the mechanism that symbolically links all members of the community and in turn makes them 
equal before one another, Besa is the schema that oversees adherence to honor and holds 
individuals accountable. The Kanun i Lek Dukagjinit particularly, states the following about 
Besa:  
The oath is a religious utterance, by means of which a man, wishing to exculpate himself from a 
shameful accusation, must touch with his hand a token of faith while calling upon the name of 
God in testimony of the truth…This sort of oath is acceptable by the law of the mountains of 
Albania in order both to clear oneself of accusations and to make pacts binding. (Gjecov 120) 
 
Besa establishes a socially binding pact between the agents involved and its usage extends across 
many aspects of life; from contracts on the usage of private and common property, to its function 
as a means for proclaiming one’s innocence or guilt.  
 The above synthesis, while illuminating, doesn’t fully express Besa’s significance, 
for the communities in question, both as idea and institution. Customary law in these region 
allowed for numerous types of oaths, each applicable to a specific situation, and each requiring a 
specific ceremony to legitimize them.  For example, Gjecov’s Kanun I Lek Dukagjinit alone 
specifies five different kinds of oaths: “The Oath taken upon a ‘Rock’ and the Oath Taken upon 
a Cross and the Gospel, The Door-to-Door Oath, The Oath on the Head of One’s Sons, The Oath 
of Ignorance.” (Gjecov 120-126) Specific details concerning each type of oath are intriguing, but 
a comprehensive examination of the intricacies of this system is not primary to our endeavor. 
Thus, ensuing parts of this project, in examining the ideas of Honor and Besa, will not center on 
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issues of procedure and application within customary law. Rather, we will explore these concepts 
in their transformative function as discursive and ideological apparatuses whose signifying 
elements are incorporated by the nationalist project to legitimize national unity through reference 
to a shared memory in Kanun.  
 
Reflections 
 We began this inquiry by briefly arguing that in the framework of globalization and 
ever increasing networks of exchange spanning the globe, one can expect the knowledge and 
information disseminated through these networks to be implicated by the power politics and 
discourse of its particular historical context. Specifically, we argued that the nation, as the most 
pervasive political apparatus in this global system of exchange, is inherently caught up in a 
process of discursive formation which legitimizes various bodies of knowledge. In the case of 
Albania and the reviving interest on blood feuds and customary law, we made the claim that 
blood feud has been implicitly and explicitly used to construct an image of this nation. It was 
argued that discourse on the Kanun is not necessarily concerned with Albanian customary law as 
a practical social reality but rather utilizes the phenomena to serve the politics involved. We 
proposed that a more nuanced analysis of customary law in the region would reveal that its role 
is invariably more complex than often supposed by popular mediums. Specifically, we suggested 
that beginning with the late nineteenth century and the advent of Albanian nationalism, the 
Kanun cannot be seen as functioning independently of the modernizing developments that saw 
the creation of an Albanian nation, but must be analyzed as finally and wholly immersed within 
them. Furthermore, reliance on customary law to construct an image of the Albanian nation is 
not only attributable to external agents; it is also employed by internal forces within the country 
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to legitimize nationalist discourse and propagate the project for an Albanian nation. A notable 
difference between these two manifestations of Kanun discourse lies in the observation that 
while external discourse focuses specifically on the blood feud, which is only one aspect of 
Albanian customary law, internal discourses utilize a wider scope of the Kanun’s mechanisms. 
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 The previous section sought to provide an introduction to customary law in Albania by 
briefly considering its known history, structural underpinnings, accounts of its practice and use, 
and the implications involved for the peoples and region in question. This approach proved 
valuable in many respects, but also illuminated the problematic that issues arise in an 
investigation of social practice such as customary law and the Kanun. The bulk of these concerns 
relate to a lack of primary sources. Furthermore, even on the occasions where primary sources do 
exist, one must account for both the historical circumstances and ideological forces in the 
emergence and production of such documents. However, such concerns are intrinsic to critical 
historical enquiry, and following the conclusions of certain theorists – most notably Michel 
Foucault and his work on the document and the archive in The Archeology of Knowledge – we 
recognize further limits to our endeavor. As such, we must abandon notions of stable and telo-
historically positioned subjects, as well as their material position and psychology, recognizing 
only discourse and shifting networks of signification. 
 We now turn to the Albanian National Rebirth in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. The discourse of modernityIV, specifically nationalism and the nation’s function as an 
encunciative position during this period, will be a main theme. However, inorder to appreciate 
nationalist discourse as the central mark of this period, it first becomes necessary to briefly 
consider how the nation is situated in nineteenth and twentieth century Europe in general and in 
its Albanian variant specifically. The works of Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson, Anthony 
Smith and other notable scholars who have contributed a tremendous amount of scholarship to 
the topic, will be used to synthesize some commonly accepted theories on nations and 
nationalism, and consider their specific applications in the Albanian case. In doing so, we will 
                                                             
IV Broadly understood as the process initiated in Western Europe—approximately in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries—which transformed feudal and agrarian societies, into industrialized and ultimately capitalist nation-
states. 
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attempt to establish a theoretical framework for analyzing the interplay of Kanun and nationalist 
discourse in the region. 
 
The Nation’s Narrative 
 Reflecting on the emergence of nations and the nationalist movements that engulfed 
Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth century, influential British historian and academic Eric 
Hobsbawm poses a question that has garnered much attention amongst historians. He asks: “Why 
and how could a concept so remote from the real experience of most human beings as ‘national 
patriotism’ becomes such a powerful political force so quickly?” (Hobsbawm 46) Numerous 
scholars have contributed to this issue and a wide-range of explanations have been offered. As a 
result, differing schools of thought employing various methodologies and conclusions have 
emerged. In brief, these schools include: “Primordialism,” which holds nations and nationality as 
intrinsic to the human condition; “Perennialism,” which sees nations as conditional entities 
which are not historically situated but can form and dissolve in any period and place by merging 
with and diverging from other forms of community as the conditions become appropriate; and 
“Modernism,” which treats nations as novel products of modernity, embodying an abrupt break 
from preceding forms of community (The Antiquity of Nations, Smith). Our investigation of 
Albanian nationalism will draw extensively on the theories and conclusions of the last school. 
 In 1983, Benedict Anderson published his seminal book, Imagined Communities, 
contributing tremendously to the scholarship of the modernist school. Anderson highlights how 
transforming networks of exchange in post-Renaissance Europe created the necessary conditions 
for novel forms of community to emerge. He places particular emphasis on two developments: 
the discovery of the New World with the subsequent quest for new material markets, as well the 
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invention of the printing press and changes in communication made possible through the 
growing use of printed material in the vernacular. Anderson calls the novel communities that 
became nations “imagined” because unlike earlier forms of social organization, they functioned 
to erode the significance of boundaries such as location and natural geographic barriers, their 
cohesion relying extensively on perceived and mutually accessible narrative instruments. 
 Another prominent scholar, Eric Hobsbawm, amongst his many contributions, presents 
the theory of proto-nationalisms. He writes: 
In many parts of the world, states and national movements could mobilize certain variants of 
feelings of collective belonging which already existed and which could operate, as it were, 
potentially on the macro-political scale which could fit in with modern states and nations. I shall 
call these bonds ‘proto-national.’ (46) 
 
Hobsbawm examines how already existing local loyalties and identities are utilized and 
refashioned by modernizing forces as instruments of cohesion that legitimize and propagate the 
concept of nation.  
  Ernest Geller provides an account that, like those of Anderson and Hobsbawm, relies 
heavily on the importance of changing social, political, and material conditions of modernity. He 
understands nationalist fervor as symptomatic of the anxiety brought on by these changes. 
According to Geller’s view, the Nation, in its various manifestations, emerged from a complex 
interplay of power conflicts and political dynamics amongst the agents involved. He explains: 
As the tidal wave of modernization sweeps the world, it makes sure that almost everyone, at some 
time or other, has cause to feel unjustly treated, and that he can identify the culprits as being of 
another ‘nation.’ If he can also identify enough of the victims as being of the same ‘nation’ as 
himself, a nationalism is born. If it succeeds, and not all of them can, a nation is born. (Nations 
and Nationalism, 112) 
 
To further this argument, Geller highlights the role of economic interests and power in the 
emergence of nations. Specifically, he considers the system of “lateral boundaries” unique to 
nations and notes their economic rationality. He emphasizes that within nations, “territorial 
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boundaries are drawn and legally enforced, while differences of status are neither marked nor 
enforced, but rather camouflaged and disavowed.” (Geller 112)  
 These three theorists commonly associated with the Modernist approach offer important 
insight for analyzing the Kanun’s role in the development of an Albanian nation. Hobsbawm’s 
work on proto-nationalism proves useful because the Kanun as a shared memory appeals to 
Albanian nationalism in this same manner. On the other hand, Anderson’s consideration of 
communication networks, specifically the role of printed material, also proves insightful, 
especially as we consider the convergence and propagation of nationalist discourse through print 
culture. Additionally, Geller’s emphasis on power dynamic provides further insight as it prompts 
us to consider the interests, aims and incentives—economic or otherwise—of the agents involved 
in forming an Albanian nation.  
 Although each theory offers important insight into specific aspects of nationalism, 
problems and inconsistencies arise with each when considering Albanian nationalism in its 
entirety. The most pressing issue is the importance these authors place on modernizing reforms, 
since for the region in question, under Ottoman rule, many commonly mentioned reforms did not 
occur. For example, Anderson emphasizes print capitalism with its role in the standardization 
and dissemination of the vernacular to transmit the conception of nationalism. However, in the 
late nineteenth century, when Albanian nationalist claims first emerge, a written Albanian 
language does not even exist, while standardization and a vibrant print culture are not present till 
the early twentieth century. Language as a basis for national unity is important in the efforts of 
Albanian-speaking Diaspora intellectuals, but it is important to note that this is a miniscule 
fraction of the Albanian-speaking population. Likewise, Hobsbawm’s proto-nationalism could 
explain customary law as a unifying experience if not for the presence of conflicting loyalties 
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and identities, religious or otherwise, which proves problematic. Geller’s consideration of 
economic interests is also problematic because while certain allegiances among class lines did 
exist, the region remained desperately underdeveloped and impoverished before during the late 
nineteenth and twentieth century. A unified class with vested economic power and interests, such 
as the merchants in Greece, was lacking. It seems that in the case of Albania, it is nationalism—
and later the nation state—that brings about modernity, rather than modernity bringing about the 
nation. Thus, the Modernist paradigm, while useful in some respects, proves unable to describe 
the more distinct features of early Albanian nationalism. 
 In order to account for these discrepancies, our theoretical framework needs further 
refinement. Thus we turn to sociologist Anthony Smith; whose work addresses many of these 
concerns. In The Antiquity of Nations (2004) Smith keeps intact useful aspects of the Modernist 
literature while concurrently providing considerations to remedy its shortcomings.  
 For Smith, the Modernist school is distinguished from other approaches to nationalism in 
its affinity to “regard nations and nationalism as relatively recent and novel” and also its 
insistence on linking the emergence of nations “to wider changes in the fabric of society and 
politics at specific junctures in time, notably the age of revolutions in the later eighteenth 
century.” (4) The Modernist view thus maintains that: 
It is because certain novel processes and ideas appeared at specific historical moments and came 
together in a certain sequence in the West, that conditions became favorable for the rise of 
nationalisms, which in turn enabled elites to construct nations. (4) 
 
Smith identifies the failures of this paradigm in its insistence on an “ideal-type” of nationalism. 
He explains: 
This conception of the nation is a product not just of the ideology of nationalism in general, but of 
a particular variant of nationalist ideology, the 'civic' and territorial version which was an offshoot 
of particular milieu and its specific history. This means, in effect, that we are using a particular 
version, or part of a general term, to stand for the whole range covered by that term - one, 
moreover, that is the product of a specific period and culture of which it bears all the signs. Hence 
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we are using a partial term for the whole, in the double sense that it covers only one kind of 
nationalism and only one particular type of nation. (15) 
 
Thus, the Modernist framework is well suited to explain the civic-model exemplified in the 
earlier nationalisms of Western Europe, but fails to accurately describe the nationalisms that 
follow, especially those of Eastern Europe.  
 Smith believes that the myopic outlook central to the Modernist paradigm, by ignoring 
that which precedes the nation, prevents us from fully understanding the emergence of certain 
nations and nationalisms that diverge from the “ideal-type” civic models of Western Europe. He 
introduces a different scheme which he terms the “Ethno-Symbolist Approach.” By eschewing 
discontinuities and analyzing the emergence of nationalism alongside other forms of community 
and identity that precede it, the Ethno-Symbolist approach seeks to overcomes the Modernist 
myopia criticized by Smith. He explains:  
Unlike modernists whose approaches to nationalism have little to say about ethnicity, and reject, if 
only implicitly, any theoretical connection between ethnic identity and nationalism, an ethno-
symbolic perspective places the link between nations and core ethnies (or ethnic communities) at 
the centre of its concerns. However, unlike perennialists and primordialists, ethnosymbolists 
refuse to conflate ethnicity and nationhood. While recognizing that there can never be a simple 
one-to-one correspondence between a prior core ethnie and a subsequent nation, ethno-symbolists 
argue that the concept of ethnie and the model of an ethnic core are crucial for the development of 
the idea of the nation, as well as for particular nations. Conceptually and historically, nationhood 
and nations are most fruitfully seen as specialized developments of ethnicity and ethnies, ethnic 
networks and ethnic categories. (18) 
 
Thus, the fundamental difference with this approach concerns the role of ethnic communities and 
identities in bringing about nationalism. 
 With the addition of the ethno-symbolist ethnie to the theoretical coffer, a sufficient set of 
tools emerge to investigate Albanian nationalism. It must be noted here that our selection of 
scholarship on the subject matter is by no means the only one suited to address the question, nor 
can it be said to be the most appropriate. However, in order to proceed, we have to make certain 
concessions, recognizing that the study of nations and nationalism offer a myriad approaches, 
some more relevant than others.  
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National Rebirth 
 Varying accounts on the emergence of nations suggest that it is impossible to designate 
any one specific date or period within which to situate this development. This is inevitable, as the 
forces responsible for the nation’s emergence on an international political stage envelop different 
geographic regions at different times. However, scholars associated with variants of the 
modernist view generally accept that the nation, as a discursive and ideological apparatus, first 
appears in Western European countries, materializing in Eastern Europe, and specifically the 
Balkans, at a later stage. Accordingly, we must recognize that the model changed and was re-
fashioned as it moved from Western to Eastern Europe. Throughout this process, the idea of 
nation is contingent upon the varying material conditions and the prevailing ideologies of 
different regions, which consequently influenced its manifestation in different ways. As Anthony 
Smith puts it, “the nation is a form that is never finally achieved, but is always being developed, 
its features are the outcome of incremental cultural, social and political processes.” (16) 
However, while the various manifestations of nationalist discourse differ in specific detail, they 
retain much commonality on a larger scale. In the Balkans this is very significant because while 
the various national narratives assert uniqueness and are constructed in opposition to rivaling 
nationalisms, they retain many common features. Thus, the development of any Balkan 
nationalism is closely related to, and dependent on, the formation and success of neighboring 
nations and nationalisms.  
In the Albanian case, this pattern is especially evident. Again, it is difficult to designate a 
specific date when claims for an Albanian nation fully materialize as the nation’s discourse is not 
temporally stable but evolves and gains prominence with transforming material and political 
conditions. While this is certainly the case, scholars of Albanian nationalism do cite a specific 
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historical period where the project for an Albanian nation moves from idea to action. This period 
is referred to as the “National Rebirth,” and is generally traced back to the mid and late 
nineteenth century. Enis Sulstarova, a scholar of Albanian nationalism, explains that “nationalist 
ideas circulated within centers of the Albanian Diaspora from the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, but the decisive moment for the National Rebirth was the formation of the League of 
Prizren in 1878.” (Sulstarova 25)3 This view is widely accepted because the League of PrizrenV 
is the earliest political organization that claims to be acting on behalf of an Albanian nation.  
 Thus, although claims for a distinct Albanian national identity were common amongst the 
Albanian-speaking Diaspora, the League represents the first instance of localized forces 
organizing around the nation’s banner. Sulstarova writes that “the three years of [the League’s] 
existence functioned as a basis for the formation of Albanian nationalist legitimacy as well as for 
formulating the Albanians’ political requests, which would remain essentially the same until the 
declaration of Albanian independence in 1912.”4 On these grounds alone, the year 1878 and the 
League of Prizren should be considered critical points for the development of Albanian 
nationalism. The League becomes even more significant when we consider that its program 
established the ideological and political framework for the emergence of an Albanian nation.  
 Post-independence, the National Rebirth period takes on mythic proportions; its 
prominent figures are designated national heroes and their activity becomes the basis for writing 
Albanian history. Although the post-independence period treats these agents and their activity as 
unambiguous and unconditionally dedicated to the national cause, a dispassionate analysis of the 
period reveals a more complex picture. It is indeed true that the National Rebirth period makes 
important contributions to the Albanian national cause; however, it does not do so by finally 
                                                             
V A political organization—established with the gathering of influential Albanian-speaking Ottoman subjects on 
June 10, 1878 in the city of Prizren—whose primary objective was to discuss the fate of their communities in 
anticipation of the Empire’s inevitable dissolution. 
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embracing the nation as a stable epistemological entity and rallying behind its cause. Instead, we 
will argue that the significance of this period primarily concerns its role in introducing the 
greater modernist discourse of nation—which had already successfully mobilized nationalisms in 
other Balkan regions—and refashioning it in a distinctively Albanian context. Thus, in 
accordance with our theoretical framework, we will view this period not as the historical junction 
at which the Albanian nation is awakened, but rather the point at which it is constructed and 
legitimized.  
 
The League of Prizren 
 On June 10th 1878, three days before the opening of the Congress of Berlin—where the 
great European powers and Ottoman representatives would meet to discuss the fate of the 
Balkans following Ottoman defeat in the Russo-Turkish War—about eighty delegates 
comprising religious leaders, clan chiefs, and other influential people from the Albanian 
inhabited Ottoman vilayets (provinces), met in the city of Prizren to discuss their fates in the 
emerging political stage, as the Ottoman Empire seemed to be nearing its end. The most 
significant result of this gathering would be the creation of the League of Prizren, a political 
organization formed from the ranks of the delegates with the purpose of addressing the fate of 
the Albanian speaking communities following the “Eastern Crisis”:VI what they perceived as the 
imminent territorial disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The League’s three years of existence 
prove crucial for the advancement of Albanian nationalist aspirations. Its political activity was 
responsible for bringing claims of a separate Albanian nation to the attention of the Western 
powers and initiating a path towards international recognition of a distinct national identity. 
                                                             
VI A term applied to the diplomatic and political problems posed by the decay of the Ottoman Empire. The events 
are usually traced back to the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish war of 1874.  
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However, in this early nationalism, internal cohesion was just as important as international 
recognition, perhaps even more so. Bringing together various agents with diverging and often 
conflicting identities and loyalties in order to facilitate an embrace of the nation and national 
identity as their highest aspiration would prove difficult, but the League of Prizren played an 
instrumental role in both these matters. 
  We are concerning ourselves with the emergence of the Albanian nation-state, but before 
there can be a nation-state, there must be a nation, and for there to be an Albanian nation, there 
must first be an Albanian national identity. National identity becomes necessary to define 
boundaries, to unambiguously identify that which belongs to the nation and that which exists 
outside it. A variety of factors, most importantly geographic isolation and Ottoman 
administrative policies, made national cohesion an obstacle for Albanian nationalist forces. Fatos 
Lubonja, an Albanian scholar, reveals that even at the turn of the twentieth century when an 
Albanian state had already been formed, social identities remained mainly localized and tribal. 
He claims that people in the region: 
Identified themselves within the limits of their village, region or bajrak and recognized, to some 
extent, the central government in Constantinople or its representatives in the provinces, but they 
had very few spiritual, economic or intellectua1 ties with one another. (Albanian Identities, 91)  
 
During the time of the League, more than two decades before the twentieth century, one 
imagines that national unity proved an even greater obstacle. As the first organization with 
enough political power to introduce and popularize arguments for a separate Albanian nation on 
both a local and international stage, the League is of central importance to the success of early 
nationalist efforts. The nation’s discourse, which was previously confined to intellectuals of the 
Diaspora, gained widespread expression through the League’s program and activity. 
Accordingly, the League played a central role in establishing the ideological framework for the 
emergence of a populist Albanian nationalism.  
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Modernity and Albanian Nationalism 
 The investigation to follow will explore specific dynamics of Albanian national identity 
during the National Rebirth using the analytical basis introduced earlier, but before proceeding, 
there is a question we must address. Our theoretical framework relies on the assertion that the 
project for creating an Albanian state along nationalist terms is a result of greater historical 
developments of the time period. As such, it is becomes necessary to first substantiate our claim 
that the nationalist paradigm in the Albanian case is not a local phenomenon, but rather a product 
of greater developments occurring during this period. 
  Does the available historical material support the above claim? Examining the League’s 
program from its inception through its subsequent evolution, one finds ample evidence to support 
this position. Although the League’s finalized program assumed a clear nationalist character, 
support for this program was not unified. Available documentation reveals that there existed 
competing factions seeking to influence and direct the League’s agenda. We will argue that the 
ultimate success of the nationalist paradigm is a result of external factors—namely, the 
international political atmosphere as well as the determination and authority of Diaspora 
intellectuals—rather than strictly local forces. 
  In the period between the Treaty of San Stefano on March 3rd 1878, when the territorial 
disintegration of Albanian inhabited land became an issue, and the Treaty of Berlin on June 13th 
1878, there emerged three ideological camps that would partake in the League of Prizren. The 
first was a reactionary camp consisting of feudal lords and Muslim clerics loyal to the Sultan and 
the Ottoman administration. The next was a moderate camp largely composed of powerful 
landowners interested in protecting their property and commercial interests in the region. The 
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third was a radical group headed by Ottoman officials and intellectuals of Albanian origin, many 
of which lived in Istanbul and were affiliated with a secret organization known as the Istanbul 
Committee.VII Members from the Istanbul Committee were the main camp explicitly advocating 
a program and vision along nationalist terms. We should also note that the Istanbul Committee is 
credited with organizing the gathering itself.  
Debate, competition, as well as contradictions in the aims and interests of the groups 
involved, meant that the League’s agenda underwent various revisions and rewritings. This 
suggests that a nationalist paradigm was by no means ubiquitously embraced at this early stage 
of Albanian nationalism. As an example, we can consider the League’s first program, known as 
the Kararname. While this early plan sought to make the League an authoritative organization 
charged with protecting the interest of the Albanian-speaking people, it recognized only the 
Sultan and Ottoman authority as the legitimate rulers of the region. Furthermore, arguments for 
treating the Albanian-speaking communities as a unified whole (with similar interests, 
aspirations, and concerns), were only incorporated into the agenda with the arrival of agents from 
the Istanbul Committee, specifically Abdyl Frasheri and Pashko Vasa. The final program to 
emerge from the gathering in Prizren was primarily dominated by the ideas of the radical camp 
supported by the Istanbul Committee. Yet even this ‘radical’ ideological camp initially called 
only for the creation of a unified Albanian vilayet and greater local participation in the 
administrative apparatus.  
The above accounts lend credibility to the claim that nationalist discourse in the region 
emerges mainly through external forces; in the Albanian case, it is through the work of Diaspora 
                                                             
VII The organization’s full name was “the Central Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Albanian 
Nationality” and it was formed in 1877. 
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intellectuals. As will be seen further on, the ideas and aspirations of these agents owe much to 
the greater ideological and discursive forces enveloping Europe at this time and are thus 
inevitably connected to them. 
  Three years after its foundation, the League finally met its end when the radical camp, 
dissatisfied with Ottoman concessions of the northern city of Ulqin, declared a provisionary 
government to replace Ottoman rule in the Albanian speaking vilayets. Sulstarove explains: 
Under Pressure from the Great Powers, the Sublime Port conceded to Montenegro the city of 
Ulqin, inhabited by Albanians. Upset by this decision, the League’s radical wing, after getting 
control of the organization, declared a provisionary government which sought to replace Ottoman 
governance in the four vilayets. The Sublime Port reacted immediately by militarily crushing the 
League of Prizren and arresting its central figures. (Sulsrova 31)5 
 
Despite its short life, the League made critical contributions to the project for an Albanian 
nation. It not only created a political apparatus able to contextualize the interests of the Albanian 
speaking people as a whole, but also a military apparatus that fought to protect the territorial 
claims of these communities. Most importantly, the League outlined the framework for a future 
Albanian nation by revealing the dual avenues through which this could be accomplished. First, 
it recognized, as well as demonstrated, that the concerns and interests of the Albanian speaking 
Ottoman subjects would only be acknowledged on the international stage through the case for a 
separate identity. Specifically, the League encouraged a national identity by positioning the 
nation as the dominant and sole paradigm to hold political sway on an international level. 
Secondly, its activity made clear that in order to be recognized internationally, this identity must 
be firmly established and embraced locally. In emphasizing and bringing awareness to external 
threats, the League made urgent a need for internal unity.  
 Following the League’s collapse, nationalist aspirations gained renewed momentum, as 
the political situation became more pressing and local forces circulated its message for an 
Albanian nation. Nationalist forces continued the League’s legacy; they sent numerous requests 
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and manifestos to the Great Powers, pleading international recognition of an Albanian identity 
and cause, while also working to rally local support in the struggle for national unification.  
 The above revelations support our claim that the project for a separate Albanian nation, 
which first began with calls for a unified vilayet under Ottoman rule and later materialized into 
demands for self-governance, was introduced and propagated by intellectuals in the Diaspora; 
specifically members of the Istanbul Committee. As such, in investigating the emergence and 
development of Albanian nationalist discourse, the ideas and activity of Diaspora intellectuals, 
and specifically leading members of the Istanbul Committee, require further consideration. Thus, 
we will narrow our enquiry to focus on Sami Frasheri, a “Father of Albanian nationalism,” as his 
work plays a central role in the formulation of Albanian nationalist claims. 
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Part III 
Sami Frasheri, Nationalist Discourse and the Kanun Symbolic 
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 We begin this next part of our project with Benedict Anderson’s claim that 
The nineteenth century was, in Europe and its immediate peripheries, a golden age of 
vernacularizing lexicographers, grammarians, philologists, and litterateurs. The energetic activities 
of these professional intellectuals were central to the shaping of nineteenth-century European 
nationalism. (71)  
 
Anderson’s thesis and Imagined Communities’ most prominent theme, hinted in the above quote, 
argues that “print-capitalism” and “national-print-languages” played a central role in the 
development of nineteenth century European nationalisms and the emergence of nations. 
Throughout Imagined Communities, Anderson provides detailed accounts of these trends and 
their specific relationship with various nationalisms. Broadly, “print-capitalism” is used to 
describe a vibrant print and media culture in nineteenth century Europe; it facilitated greater 
exchange between regions and peoples previously separated by political, geographic, and other 
factors. The term “national-print-languages” refers to the rising use and subsequent 
standardization of the vernacular as a result of this print-culture. A burgeoning capitalist spirit 
and improvements in printing technology are considered to be the main catalyst for these 
developments.   
 The coincidence of ‘print-capitalism’ and ‘national-print-languages,’ concomitant with 
the rise of European nationalisms, leads Anderson to suggest them as central factors in the 
materialization of nationalist discourse. Anderson argues that a lively print culture and the advent 
of national-print languages allowed for the emergence of a common discourse amongst peoples 
previously separated by geographic, social, linguistic, and other such barriers. This shared 
discourse would in turn serve as the basis for the creation of novel communities: nations. 
Imagined Communities provides abundant evidence to support this thesis, but nonetheless certain 
questions merit examination. Does Anderson’s analysis of print-capitalism apply to late Ottoman 
society where material and socio-economic conditions were undeniably different from other 
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parts of Europe?  A detailed exploration of this question seems to suggest that in the case of 
Albanian nationalism specifically—considering the region’s remnant feudal structure and its 
isolation from much of Europe’s modernizing trends—Anderson’s thesis seems inadequate.  
 In the late nineteenth century, when Albanian nationalist aspirations first find local 
expression through organizations such as the aforementioned League of Prizren, a common 
written Albanian language did not exist, let alone a standardized one. Thus, it seems that an 
emphasis on “print-capitalism” and “national-print-language” might not be applicable in this 
case. However, the section to follow will argue that the emergence and propagation of Albanian 
nationalist discourse owes much to the role of print capitalism. It will be elaborated ahead that in 
this instance, nationalist discourse need not, and indeed does not, coincide with the advent of a 
national print language; the belated emergence of Albanian nationalism and its origins as 
Diaspora nationalism can account for the apparent discrepancy. 
 The last section sought to illuminate the difficulty in designating a beginning of Albanian 
nationalist discourse as we lack the necessary historical sources to do so. More importantly, even 
if one ignores the scarcity of material and issues of access, such an endeavor is ultimately futile 
because nationalist discourse is not static or temporally stable. Of course for the sake of 
argument it is necessary to designate a starting point, and the so-called “Albanian-national-
rebirth” period of the late nineteenth century is most appropriate. Specifically, we focused on the 
League of Prizren, which represents one of the earliest and best-known instances of local forces 
organizing around a political program with explicitly nationalist aims.VIII  
 The League’s activity established an agenda that would be the foundation for the 
subsequent development of Albanian nationalism and we stipulated that this development cannot 
                                                             
VIII  The category of “local forces” may appear to be ambiguous and somewhat arbitrarily, but here it is mainly being 
using it to distinguish the League of Prizren from various earlier nationalist endeavors of the Albanian-speaking 
Diaspora. 
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be attributed to internal or populist forces. This claim is easily supported by noting that the 
nationalist program ultimately adopted was introduced, propagated, and defended mainly by the 
Diaspora intellectuals. In contrast, the local agents, consisting mainly of religious leaders and 
powerful landowners, rejected an outright nationalist course and preferred a conservative 
approach that sought to maintain the relationship with the Sublime Port. Based on this reading of 
the League’s activity, we were able to conclude that the Albanian national rebirth, which marks 
its “beginnings” with this event, should not be understood as the period when Albanian 
nationalism was awakened. Rather, it should be viewed as the juncture when nationalist 
discourse, which by this point had successfully introduced the nation in other Balkan regions, is 
applied to “the Albanian question” through the activities and works of Diaspora intellectuals 
acquainted with concepts of nation and arguments for national identity.  
 The League’s greatest legacy was its dual emphasis on the need for international 
recognition of an Albanian identity and internal unity through this national identity. Diaspora 
intellectuals were essential in introducing this paradigm and Albanian-speaking Ottoman 
intellectuals associated with the Istanbul Committee were especially influential. The sections to 
follow will place further stress on Diaspora nationalismIX by arguing that the national identity 
that materialized during this tumultuous period is based almost entirely on the ideas and 
scholarship of this group. Our primary focus will be on Sami Frasheri, a member of the 
Committee considered a principal architect of Albanian nationalism. Understanding the role and 
significance of customary law in Frasheri’s presentation and promotion of an Albanian national 
identity will be our central aim in examining his work.  
 
                                                             
IX Historical sources trace the existence of nationalist discourse in Albanian speaking Diaspora communities as far 
back as the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The Arberesh community in Italy is perhaps the most 
salient example of such early Diaspora nationalism. 
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Sami Frasheri and the Identity Polemic 
 Sami Frasheri, along with his brothers Naim and Abdyl, “are often referred to as the 
fathers of Albanian nationalism.” (Sugarman, 427) To this day, their biographies, ideas, and 
writings are central elements of primary school curriculum. This has certainly been the case as 
far back as the mid-twentieth century with the Communist system, but the trend can be traced to 
even earlier periods. It is standard for the rhetoric in these curriculums to present the Frasheri 
brothers as loyal patriots who dedicated their entire lives to Albania and the national cause. 
  Upon closer scrutiny, such a stance reveals an inevitable ideological bias proving 
problematic on empirical grounds, but such bias is intrinsic to all national narratives and it is by 
no means unique to Albanian historiography. With the older brothers Abdyl and Naim, one 
might be tempted to make a concession. Examining them removed from the realm of nationalist 
mythology, one discovers that most of their energy, both in political and artistic activity, is 
indeed dedicated to the Albanian national cause. However, for the youngest brother Sami, whose 
work we will focus on, this is absolutely not the case. 
 Who is Sami Farsheri and what separates his legacy from that of his brothers’? This 
seems like a natural place to start, but unfortunately, with Sami, answering this question proves 
difficult and insufficient. To see the complexity of undertaking this task, we need only consider 
the following: in Albania, Sami Frasheri is considered a father of Albanian nationalism. 
However, in Turkey, the same figure is known as Semssedin Sami and is considered a father of 
Turkish nationalism. (Bilmez) A contradiction seems to arise. How could someone have a claim 
to both Turkish and Albanian identity when national identities, in their very nature, exist and 
gain meaning in opposition to other national identities? In the framework of nationalism, one can 
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claim to be Albanian precisely because he is not a Turk or Turkish because he is not an 
Albanian, but surely one cannot be both? 
 What of this contradiction and how is it reconciled? Whether we call him Sami Frasheri 
or Semssedin Sami, this individual existed and he left a strong legacy in both Albanian and 
Turkish history. Traces of his scholarship remain and are widely available in both languages to 
this day. Numerous historical sources document his life and surely one must be able to gain some 
insight into the life of this complex figure.  
 Revisiting our initial question and placing it under further scrutiny reveals that insofar as 
a contradiction exists, it arises not from anything ascribable to the agent or his life, but from the 
very framework we are applying to understand identity.  
 “National identity” is principally supposed in the historiography to be singular – one for each 
person – and developed in reaction to “other” (constructed) national identities. In Sami's case, 
however, while he was a part of the Albanian “we-group”, one of his “other” collective identities 
was Turkishness. (45, Bilmez) 
 
Thus, if we take the nationalist paradigm as valid then we are required to accept only one 
national identity. However, our whole project has sought to qualify that national identity is a 
political and ideological construct that arises and gains wide application as a result of 
modernizing developments in nineteenth century Europe, and as such, we should not expect it to 
be a stable category. Identity as a social and cultural signifier—national or otherwise—is fluid, 
malleable and a function of numerous power structures; this conclusion has been borne out by 
anthropological research and is observable in our everyday lives. Accordingly, the instability of 
national identity as a political, ideological and discursive construct has been the driving point of 
this project and from this perspective, the polemic of revealing Sami’s identity on nationalistic 
terms provides further justification for our theoretical framework.  
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 Sami’s scholarship propelled and contributed significantly to both Albanian and Turkish 
nationalism. Furthermore, through his work, Sami makes claims and appeals to both a Turkish 
and an Albanian national identity. These facts, which will be verified in the ensuing section, 
justify our decision to not treat nationalism on its own terms by accepting nationalist dedication 
as claims and utterances ascribable to stable, psychologized, and historically positioned subjects, 
but rather as a discursive process. Through Sami’s work, we will analyze nationalist claims as 
discursive formation with a complex yet undeniable relationship to other European nationalisms 
of the period. We will approach national identity as something of an ennunciative modality, a 
discursive position from which meaning and knowledge is legitimized; an arena which 
simultaneously allows for both the production and understanding of nationalist rhetoric.   
 Having disentangled the contradiction of attempting to explore Sami Frasheri through a 
strictly nationalist framework, it now remains to examine what is known about his life and 
activity so as to better understand his rapport with nationalism in general and Albanian 
nationalism in particular. 
 
National Identity and Late Ottoman Pluralism 
 Sami was born on June 1st, 1850, to an Albanian Muslim landowning family in the 
Frasher village, located in present-day southern Albania. His education started early in his home 
village and in 1865 he continued his studies at the prestigious “Greek gymnasium, Zossimea, in 
Janina, a town located today in northwestern Greece.” (Gawrych 523) He finished the 
gymnasium having learned Ancient and Modern Greek, Italian, and French; additionaly, he was 
fluent in both Albanian and Turkish. “Semsettin Sami, reportedly a brilliant student, finished the 
eight-year school in seven years.” (523) In 1872, having completed his schooling, he initially 
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established himself in Istanbul by taking a position as a scribe in the Ottoman government. 
Shortly thereafter, he found himself a role in the Ottoman press. “Sami joined forces with a 
wealthy Greek merchant named Papadopoulis to found the newspaper Sabah (Morning), the 
longest-lived daily of the Empire (1876-1914).” (523) He stayed with Sabah for eleven months, 
working to promote the newspaper’s mission of tolerance and diversity in the Ottoman press.  
 After this brief experience with Sabah and the Ottoman Press, “Sami Bey returned to 
government service, a profession which provided him with a steady income to support his 
prodigious research on Turkish and Albanian studies.” (523)  Research completed in his early 
career as an Ottoman official would later serve as a basis for Sami’s numerous publications and 
his emergence as a prominent Ottoman intellectual. Particularly important here are his 
contributions to the debates on Ottomanism and the complex interplay between Ottoman and 
national identity for subjects of the Sublime Port.  Polemics of identity in a multi-ethnic and 
multi-lingual society became a major theme of both his political and scholarly activity, and thus 
his intellectual contributions to these debates played a key role in the emergence of both a 
Turkish and an Albanian nationalism. We will now turn our attention to his ideas and position on 
the question of Ottoman identity in order to better understand the role of this scholarship on 
nationalist discourse in late Ottoman society.  
First, a brief consideration of the institutional and ideological framework of life in late 
Ottoman society is necessary, since these particular circumstances both gave rise to and allowed 
for the formation of the Sami’s weltanschauung. George Gawrych, with his work on late 
Ottoman society, provides an in-depth treatment of these issues in his 1983 essay “Tolerant 
Dimensions of Cultural Pluralism in The Ottoman Empire: The Albanian Community,” and will 
be a main source in this related endeavor.  
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 Gawrych begins his study by revealing that “Ottoman and Turkish specialists have tended 
to exhibit a similar penchant for an ethnocentric perspective on Ottoman history; they have been 
concerned mainly with the rise of Turkish nationalism.” (519) He argues that such trends, while 
useful in certain respects, are complicit in presenting an inadequate depiction of late Ottoman 
society. Particularly: 
They have also left for the historical profession a distorted picture of a politically polarized and 
culturally exhausted Ottoman society. This society appears as a nebulous entity composed of 
many disparate and estranged cultures which received their separate cultural nourishment and 
ossification through the existence of seemingly hermetic communities defined by national and 
religious criteria. (519) 
 
Gawrych seeks to complicate this picture by emphasizing aspects of Ottoman solidarity and the 
various collaborative mechanism of cultural exchange in late Ottoman society. He explains that: 
While tensions, and even armed conflicts, along communal lines existed in Ottoman society, there 
was also a substantial degree of harmonious social inter-action between individuals which 
transcended any religious and national boundaries. (519) 
 
Gawrych highlights numerous successful cases of institutional mobility and participation for 
members of the Albanian speaking communities, even in the highest levels of governance. He 
reveals that the inclusion of minorities in the Ottoman administrative apparatus was common 
throughout much of the empire’s existence but became especially important and widespread 
during late Ottoman rule, with an empire in the throes of reform. Particularly, Gawrych assigns a 
key role to late Ottoman intellectuals like Sami, who successfully integrated themselves in the 
administrative apparatus and were able to influence the development of the empire’s political 
culture. Gawrych’s scholarship chiefly concerns itself with the role and dynamic of cultural 
pluralism in late Ottoman society, and this aspect of his work is best understood within the 
historical context of the reforms undertaken by the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century.  
 To centralize authority and secure territorial integrity in the face of rising nationalist 
tensions and aggressive foreign ambitions, by the early nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire 
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began a campaign of modernizing reforms intended to reinvent and reinvigorate its decaying 
feudal structure. Reforms were introduced and developed in stages; generally, they were aimed 
towards integrating the various ethnic communities within the Ottoman Empire by granting 
larger civil liberties, promoting equality, and, especially, cultural pluralism. Gawrych 
illuminates: 
Ottoman reforms of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, by seeking both to increase 
central authority in the provinces and to further political integration of all peoples, made 
imperative the need to affirm, define, and foster this tolerant feature of the cultural pluralism in the 
Empire. First came the political and then the cultural aspects of the imperial doctrine to create a 
new order. In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) 
developed the seminal idea of Ottomanism (Osmanlilik) which evolved into official government 
policy in the Tanzimat period (1839-1876). (521) 
 
Under the 1839 policy of Tanzimat, the long-standing Millet system – which regulated social 
status and privilege on a religious basis – was replaced by a European-minded system that 
promoted equal rights and egalitarian principles for all Ottoman citizens. Political and legal 
reforms were accompanied by ideologically symbolic concepts to promote Ottoman solidarity 
amongst the Empire’s subjects. The aforementioned idea of Ottomanism which encouraged 
harmony across cultural and ethnic lines was one such concept. Gawrych argues that “given the 
government's drive to integrate politically all subjects under the principle of Ottomanism,” the 
end result of reform “represented a natural extension from religious to cultural tolerance as a 
doctrine.” (523) 
 Understanding the particular applications and effects of the numerous reforms in different 
regions of the Empire would inevitably prove very complex. However, our purposes are best 
served by focusing on the transformative effect of these reforms on networks of identity 
signification and the political implications for the Ottoman subjects involved. Under this lens, 
most noteworthy would be the Sublime Port’s move to recognize subjects on civic rather than 
religious grounds. Gawrych explains how: 
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This secular orientation in turn demanded a reevaluation of the nature of Ottoman society and 
culture. By mid-century, Ottoman Muslim writers began to sacramentalize cultural as well as 
religious pluralism as a salient feature of the imperial system. (523) 
 
Sami Frasheri emerged as an Ottoman intellectual under this pluralistic political and cultural 
atmosphere reflected in the policy of Ottomanism. Gawrych reveals that “Semsettin Sami Bey 
Frasheri … devoted his life to encouraging cultural tolerance and diversity in the Ottoman 
Empire.” (523) Furthermore, one imagines that ideas from the European scholarship Sami 
translated into Ottoman Turkish also played a role in his intellectual ripening.  
 Attempting to investigate Sami Frasheri’s work, one is immediately forced to confront a 
dilemma of selection.  
It is very well known that, as a novelist, journalist, lexicographer and self-taught linguist, Sami 
was one of the most productive intellectuals of the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and has been praised both in the Turkish and Albanian historiographies in the 
twentieth century for his contributions to Turkish or Albanian nation-building respectively. 
(Bilmez, 19) 
 
Given the sheer volume of Sami’s scholarship, such a problem appears to be inevitable. 
Although our primary focus is Albanian nationalism and this does narrow the choices, we are 
nevertheless left to choose from an assortment of newspaper articles, encyclopedia entries, 
literary works, and political manifestos. It is important to look at those works that proved 
widespread and influential so as to give our project the strongest foundation; however, one must 
concede that a degree of arbitrariness is inevitable in making this judgment. 
 Sami’s 1874 play Besa will be the first work considered. It is here that Sami first makes 
the case for a culturally separate and historically unique Albanian identity to a wide Ottoman 
audience, thus making it worthy of attention. The early nationalist tendency present in Besa, 
which proves to be relatively mild and complacent, will be compared with the more virulent 
expressions found in Sami’s later work, specifically in his widely influential 1899 political 
manifesto Shqipëria ç'ka qenë, ç'është e çdo të bëhetë (Albania - What it was? What it is? And 
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What will become of it?).  In examining these works, our primary objective will be to consider 
how representations of a national identity change and develop throughout. 
 
Ottomanism and the Albanian National Narrative 
 Originally written in Ottoman Turkish in 1784, Besa is a work dedicated to, and 
emblematic of, the concept of Ottomanism, an ideology intended to mediate and support the 
Porte’s modernization of its administrative apparatus. Gawrych explains that “as a political 
ideology, Ottomanism came to mean that all subjects of the Empire, regardless of origin and 
religion, were Ottomans (Osmanlilar), united by their equality before the law and by their 
common citizenship.”(522) Further developments to this paradigm by Ottoman intellectuals gave 
rise to the idea that multiculturalism was the Empire’s most unique and important feature. The 
influential historian and Islamic jurist Ahmet Cevdet Pasa for example, writing in 1854, 
popularized the argument that  
The strength of the Ottoman state lay in its diverse cultural heritage. For [him], the "Ottoman 
nation" (Osmanli milleti) was a great society because its people spoke many languages and 
because it selected the best talents, customs, and manners from among its "various nations" (milel-
i mutenevvie). (522) 
 
Twenty years later, when Besa was first published and performed in Istanbul, these ideas still 
held much influence in Ottoman intellectual debate; Sami’s play is most accurately understood 
as targeting Ottoman high culture. 
 Throughout his career and especially his early Istanbul years, Sami was sympathetic and 
committed to the ideas of Ottomanism. Gawrych maintains that Sami “devoted his life to 
encouraging cultural tolerance and diversity in the Ottoman Empire” precisely for this reason. 
(523) Written under the ideological sway of Ottomanism, Besa was one of Sami’s main 
contributions to this paradigm. Here, we need to clarify: if Besa is to be understood as a work 
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emblematic of Ottomanism’s lofty ideals of cultural tolerance, does a contradiction not arise in 
considering it as a nationalist text?  
 Ottomanism and nationalism can be regarded as contradictory concepts if we recognize 
nationalist discourse only in its later manifestations. Although some variants of this discourse 
recognize nations as ethnically and culturally homogenous communities in opposition to one 
another and hold national self-determination as the only legitimate form of governance, we have 
already established that nationalist discourses are hardly stable entities and are frequently 
adapted to the conditions at hand. While a certain flavor of nationalism is indeed contradictory 
with the idea of Ottomanism, we seek to approach Besa as a nationalist discourse that follows a 
different dynamic. 
 To go one step further, nationalism and Ottomanism are not contradictory concepts, but 
they in fact complimentary ones. This leads to an important point: if we are to understand 
nationalism as symptomatic of manifest political and ideological transformations of modernity 
experienced in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe, then we must conclude that in the 
Ottoman Empire, these conditions are largely introduced from the top down through central 
reform. The later statement merits consideration as it offers further refutation to nationalism’s 
self-proclaimed dogma of populism and indubitable authenticity. Determining causality from 
reform to national sentiment on empirical grounds is complex and would remain a speculative 
venture, as a multitude of mechanisms could be involved. In accordance with our outline of 
nations and nationalism, we will propose and consider that the Tanzimat reforms and ideological 
schemes like Ottomanism, in seeking to promote equality and tolerance along ethnic lines, allow 
and in fact compel subjects of the Sublime Port to see themselves along such boundaries. Thus, 
in thinking about nationalism as a discursive process rooted in modernity, we can see that the 
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Empire itself is a catalyst for the development of nationalist discourse within its territories, and a 
central force in the Albanian case.   
 In an introduction to Besa, written in 1875, one year after the play’s first performance in 
Istanbul, Sami writes: 
For a long time, I have dreamed of writing a literary piece in order to depict some customs and 
morals of the Albanian people (Arnavut kavmi), not because I am one of their members, but 
because I have witnessed [their] patriotic qualities which perhaps are suitable for [presentation] on 
stage, such as patriotism, sacrifice, fidelity, oaths, and low esteem for [one's own] life. (524) 
 
This declaration attributed to the author is crucial to our analysis; if one accepts Besa as tribute 
to the spirit of Ottomanism in general—as argued in Gawrych scholarship—Sami’s introduction 
suggests that it is a tribute to an Albanian identity in specific. It is important to note that this 
introduction was written in 1785, preceding the Eastern Crisis and the gathering of the League of 
Prizren by three years. Hence, Besa, as a part of Albanian nationalist discourse, corresponds to 
the trend of Diaspora nationalism. 
 Early in the play’s history, the author states its function as a narrative of a people. Claims 
of a separate Albanian nation are not present because the play addresses a broad Ottoman 
audience and is intended as an affirmation of Ottomanism; however, assertions of an Albanian 
people with a unique and separate culture abound and define the play’s structural and ideological 
underpinnings. Thus, if the nation’s discourse begins with assertions towards a separate ethnic 
polity with a unique identity and a unified body of cultural signifiers—values, traditions, 
folklore, and beliefs as maintained by the modernists—then Besa marks the early claims for an 
Albanian identity to a wide Ottoman audience.  
 How exactly, then, is Albanian national identity understood and revealed through Besa? 
According to Sami’s 1875 introduction, a common Albanian culture exists in the values of 
“patriotism, sacrifice and fidelity.”  How and why does Sami choose these specific traits as those 
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most representative of “Albanian identity,” and more importantly, what does he use to ground his 
claims? We return to our starting point: Albanian customary law and the Kanun. Through Sami’s 
play, we will see that customary law serves as the basis upon which early claims of Albanian 
identity are constructed and legitimized. In this framework, however, customary law is not used 
to realistically document a cultural experience, but rather to mythologize and selectively 
represent aspects of Kanun to construct a cohesive national narrative.  
 
Besa: The Pledge of Honor and Loyalty to an Oath 
 Besa’s prominent motifs, particularly the heavy reliance on certain late Romantic 
dichotomies, warrant specific attention in examining the play’s structural and ideological 
underpinnings. Two prominently figured themes concern dualities of the natural and organic in 
opposition to the degenerate/contrived, and also the native and folk, in conflict with the 
foreign/untraditional. Binaries in Besa are present throughout the entire play and their 
manifestation is a central impetus for narrative development. They underly and define the 
actions, motivations, and dramatic function of all agents and are primarily revealed through 
characters and topography. Oppositions inherent in these binaries engulf the main characters and 
their respective worlds in power struggles, where adherence to traditions and honor, as embodied 
in the native land’s customs and unwritten laws, become the play’s ideological pillars, as well as 
a means for constructing a pure, reputable, and uniquely Albanian identity. Notions of folk and 
native in conjunction with discourse on matrimony and fertility are employed throughout the 
play to construct and legitimize arguments on ethnic and cultural preservation and continuity. 
Through this narrative and ideological structure, Sami Frasheri’s Besa is able to achieve a subtle 
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balance between narrating a people under the umbrella of Ottomanism and the larger project of 
narrating the nation. 
 The diegeses concerns seven main characters and a few minor ones. The play is set in an 
Ottoman ruled Albanian-speaking region in the south, and the action alternates between the 
village Prognat in the mountains and the administrative city of Tepelene below. Early 
representation of conflicting worlds and value systems begin with the dichotomy of village and 
city life. The village inhabitants consist of Zyber, a shepherd; Vahide, his wife; their daughter 
Mirushe; and their adopted son, Rexhep. Their way of life is organic, self-sustaining, and 
honorable. They earn their living through the land and are both practically and spiritually 
connected to nature. In the plays opening soliloquy the daughter Mirushe reveals: 
I was happy because that’s how I relaxed. 
When I would take the flock to a good pasture 
I would sit happily under the shade of some tree 
and I did not know worry. 
The singing of the birds, the sounds of the sheep 
assuaged my mind and rejuvenate my soul.6 
 
The village inhabitants live in harmony with nature, rejoicing in the fruit of their own labor. 
Contrawise stand the city and its inhabitants, embodied by the character Selfoja and his group of 
friends. In opposition to the productive and organic villagers, city dwellers are degenerate and 
destructive. They are only interested in weapons and spend most of their time maintaining their 
guns or using them in hunt. The father Zyber denounces the degenerate ways of Selfoja and his 
friends, telling his wife Vahide:  
You know that those from Borsh, 
neither work nor have any craft. 
They always stay with arms in hand, 
waiting for a war to start so they can join.7 
 
While the villagers’ loyalty lies with the land and nature, the city inhabitants are connected with 
the state, bureaucracy, and the political apparatus. Zyber complains that the city lives on the hard 
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work and labor of the villagers, robbing them through taxes and duties. They infringe on the 
villagers’ purity and honor. The village and the city signify not only to the play’s setting, but its 
opposing social poles, as well.  
 The narrative’s driving force is a conflict that arises between Zyber and Sefolaj over 
Mirushe’s marriage. Sefolaj has seen Mirushe while hunting in the mountains and has become 
obsessed with her. He declares that he will stop short of nothing to have her. Mirushe is not 
interested in Sefolaj and considers his numerous approaches whilst she shepherds the flock in the 
mountains rude and undesirable. Mirushe, however, is embroiled in an affair of her own. She is 
deeply in love with her adopted brother Rexhep.  She believes her father would disapprove of 
this and is not sure of Rexhep’s feelings toward her. She is thus tormented that she must keep her 
love hidden.  
 The first part of the play is primarily concerned with Mirushe’s dilemma, but it is quickly 
resolved. Mirushe and Rexhep reveal their love for each other. The father Zyber, upon 
overhearing their passionate confessions to one another, gives his blessing and approval for a 
future union. With both a son and a daughter ripe for marriage, Zyber has long been concerned 
with the need to arrange suitable futures for his children. He wishes them both to continue to lead 
a life true to their humble village ways, a life of honor and duty.  However, he is worried that 
sending his daughter away (especially to the city) could prove devastating to these plans. Thus, 
he welcomes the union between his children. He proclaims: 
Don’t worry my children, it will be as you want, 
I will marry you because this is what I want as well. 
Rejoice my children, rejoice! (Raises his hands about and prays to god) 
Glory to you o great lord! Now there is a wife for my son 
and a husband for my daughter as my heart desired. 
Daughter, I did not want you to leave this house… now you won’t. 
You won’t leave these mountains, 
now and onwards you will live here as you have. 8 
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Zyber, in his patriarchal authority, symbolizes a guardian obligated to the continuance and 
survival of a pure and honorable family. This purity and honor is signified by the traditional and 
native elements embodied in the village. Here, marriage and the family functions as the means 
for the maintenance of virtue and tradition.  
 Upon hearing that Sefolaj has sent a messenger to ask for Mirushe’s hand, Zyber 
immediately protests. He maintains that the loyalty of Sefulaj and his kind lies not with their 
families, but with the State and war. He recalls the case of Sefolaj’s father Fetah, who went to 
serve with the Ottoman army and has been away from his family for fifteen years. Zyber believes 
that Fetah has neglected the upbringing of his son and has abandoned his family. They still don’t 
know whether he is alive or dead. Zyber tells his wife Vahide that he could never allow such a 
fate for his daughter.  
 Sefolaj, however, will not relinquish his claim to Mirushe. Upon finding out that Zyber 
refuses to give his daughter but will instead marry her to his adopted son, Sefolaj becomes 
furious. He appeals to the local bey, with whom he has a close relationship, and pleads him to 
make the shepherd give him the daughter. The bey attempts this, but Zyber refuses to comply. 
For Zyber, this is an issue that concerns the family and not the state. Yet again we encounter the 
illustration of conflicting forces vying for control of lineage and family. Here, Zyber emerges as 
the defender the wholesome family, firmly rooted in tradition and a pure life preserved through 
nature and the native land. 
  In a dramatic and sentimental fashion, characteristic of late Romanticism, Sefolaj, with 
his group of friends, go to the shepherd’s home, kidnap his daughter and mortally wound the 
father as they exit. This becomes a critical point in the plot where the play takes on a different 
dynamic as its guiding forces undergo an ideological and structural transformation. The 
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village/city duality recedes and a new value system relying on honor and the land’s unwritten 
law become the plot’s main focus.  
 With his dying words, Zyber beseeches his wife to save their daughter and make sure she 
marries no one other than Rexhep. Her husband’s dying wish transforms Vahide and 
consequently she takes on a completely different role in the remaining narrative. Before this, her 
voice was limited and she served her husband’s will. Now, she must assume his position and take 
upon herself the sacred duty of preserving the family and its honor. Zyber’s unjust death gives 
Vahide clarity of purpose and an unrelenting determination. Defending the family’s honor by 
obeying the land’s unspoken law and avenging this injustice becomes her main duty. In a 
soliloquy, she reveals: 
They killed my husband and kidnapped my daughter. 
There is two things to do: take blood for my husband 
and rescue the girl from the hands of the enemy. 
Who will do this? I don’t have anyone 
and Rexhep is young… No ,no. This duty belongs to me, 
this work will be done by my hands.9 
 
Placing revenge for her husband’s death ahead of her daughter’s rescue further testifies to a 
transformation in the play’s driving ideological force. Taking blood, as mandated under the 
land’s unwritten law, becomes Vahide’s utmost purpose and the narrative’s driving force.  
 On the way to avenge her husband, Vahide encounters a traveler who is about to be shot 
by a past foe. Finding the weary traveler asleep on the road, the foe waters his weapon, making it 
unusable, and plans to kill him in the most dishonorable way. Witnessing this, Vahide decides to 
shoot the adversary. She allays the traveler’s thanks claiming that she acted not out of concern 
for him, but because of the adversary’s dishonor. Killing a man in such a shameful way goes 
against the native code of honor and it was this infringement of the land’s sacred law that 
prompted her to action. Yet again, Vahide reveals that the narrative’s ultimate force is that of 
honor and adherence the law of the land. The traveler wishes to repay his debt to Vahide, 
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recognizing that a bond of honor has now formed between them. Upon learning that she is out to 
avenge her husband’s death, the traveler asks to perform this duty on her behalf. He gives Vahide 
his besa, swearing an oath to take upon himself the duty of restoring her family honor. He 
explains:  
This duty you will bequest to me. 
I will see to this work before I see my mother, 
before kissing my son, 
and before fully seeing my motherland again. 10 
  
The traveler whose life Vahide saved is revealed to be Fetah, the father of Sefolaj, who 
has been away for fifteen years. The long absence from his homeland has awakened in Fetah’s a 
longing for her beauty and ways. He reveals: 
Glory to you o god! Today, after twenty years of absence 
from my home and  people, I have arrived  in the motherland. 
Honorable motherland, after twenty years I see you again. 
Oh how I longed! 11 
 
While in the beginning of play, Fetah’s absence represented an element of degeneracy, his return 
and his reawakened love for the motherland become a reaffirmation of the virtues of the native 
land. By taking an oath to preserve honor and justice, he regains his agency in the preservation of 
the local laws and traditions.  
 When Fetah learns that it is his own son that has wronged Vahide, a new dilemma enters 
the play. Fetah is placed in a very difficult situation. He must choose between his immediate 
family interests and the life of his son, or the oath he took to uphold the honor and code of the 
land. This dilemma explores the margins of an individual’s devotions to his personal interests 
and those of the native land. With a heavy heart, Fetah decides to kill his son and stay true to the 
oath. In doing so, he affirms his duty to uphold the sacred law, revealing that for an Albanian, 
loyalty to the native land and adherence to its customs supersedes even the most intimate 
personal interests. The play does not end here as further developments in the last two scenes 
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reveal the plot’s climax and its resolution. Although the events in these last two scenes comprise 
only a small fraction of the play, they prove to be the most important. 
  Having killed his son to uphold the oath to Vahide, Fetah turns the gun around and 
mortally wounds himself to avenge his son’s blood. He tells Vahide: 
Fetah: (Secretly pulls out the pistol and lifts it up) 
I have completed the duty: I took blood for your husband, 
I rescued your daughter, and now I will take blood for my son! 
(Turns the pistol on his chest and unloads) I, my son’s murderer. (Falls)12 
 
Fetah’s decision holds a key symbolic significance for the play’s conclusion. By killing himself 
to avenge his son’s death, Fetah acts not only to uphold the land’s sacred law but also to bring 
his son within its signifying realm. He honors his land as well as well as his son by killing 
himself and redeeming his family honor. Fetah takes upon himself the wrongs of his son and, 
through self- sacrifice, redeems the infringements resulting from his absence. Thus, he completes 
those sacred duties to family and the land by upholding the values and traditions praised by 
Zyber at the beginning of the play.  
 Fetah’s dying words are directed at his mother Durija. She has been waiting fifteen years 
to see him, only now she finds him dying. In the final scene, he reveals to his mother his dying 
wish: 
Durija: 
O wretched me … in one day I am losing two sons! 
Fetah… where are you leaving me? 
 
Fetah: (in his dying breath) 
For you… three sons and daughters… I am leaving!.. I am … 
intrusting …. them to you. This… is… my sister.. 
they are my children.... mine.. all three … of my house. 
The girl needs to be married to the son. You should stay with them… 
at times .. here.. at times in Progonat. Don’t separate… from them… 
Mother this is my last word… you … lost two sons… but you have gained three… 13 
 
He tells his mother that her new family is with Vahide and Mirushe because a union based on 
honor, the bond of the oath, and the land’s sacred law has now formed amongst them. Thus, 
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Fetah oversees Zyber’s original wish to marry his children and he completes the mission of 
preserving the family. Sacrificing himself and his son, he allows for the creation of a greater 
family, one established on the sacred code of honor and besa.  
  If we read the play’s beginning as a world in conflict with contradictory and opposing 
forces and value systems, then the end provides the resolution of this opposition. Resolution, 
however, is not achieved by mediating the differences between these worlds, but rather by the 
triumph of one set of forces over the other. The opposition between the native and traditional 
with the foreign and degenerate is resolved only by the violent expulsion of the latter by the 
former. Similarly, the family is preserved in its native and traditional ways only through the 
destruction of the stray elements contaminated by the outside. Furthermore, it is important to 
note that conflict arises from the abandonment of the motherland and a negligence to teach and 
preserve her ways (represented through Fetah and his absence). Accord is achieved by a return to 
the motherland and an unrelenting adherence to her ways. Note that the traditional and native are 
able to prevail because the unassailable righteousness of the land’s customs and ways is 
understood and upheld above all else. Thus, the narrative comes full circle: from division and 
contamination arise unity and purity. Unity, however, comes at a great price; for creation, there 
must first be destruction.   
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Customary Law: A Unifying Cultural Signifier 
 The cultural pluralism of late Ottoman society, the very essence of Ottomanism, was 
introduced as a key factor for the emergence of Besa. This institutional framework, investigated 
Gawrych’s, initially appeared contradictory to our examination of Besa as early Albanian 
nationalist discourse, but we are not countering Gawrych’s study and conclusions in introducing 
our own. In certain ways, we seek to further the study under the contention that although 
Ottomanism emerges as an ideology to counteract nationalist sentiment, it can be seen as having 
unintended consequences that ultimately work contrary to this aim. On the one hand, by 
undertaking reforms and replacing the millet system with a European-inspired system of civic, 
ethnic, and cultural equality, the Sublime Port is able to undermine and counteract arguments of 
central oppression fueling the Empire’s early nationalisms. However, by introducing 
modernizing reforms and consequently validizing the cultural and ethnic divisions within its 
borders, the Sublime Port itself implicitly sowed the seeds of nationalist paradigms that later 
flourished into struggles for full-scale national self-determination. 
 This reading of Ottomanism can be established through the scholarship on nationalism 
introduced earlier. In Nations and Nationalism, Ernest Geller writes: 
In most of the closed micro-communities of the agrarian age, the limits of the culture were the 
limits of the world, and the culture often itself remained unperceived, invisible: no-one thought of 
it as the ideal political boundary. Now, with mobility, it has become visible and is the limit of the 
individual's mobility, circumscribing the newly enlarged range of his employability; and thus it 
becomes the natural political boundary. To say this is not to reduce nationalism to mere anxiety 
about the prospects for social mobility. Men really love their culture, because they now perceive 
the cultural atmosphere (instead of taking it for granted), and know they cannot really breathe or 
fulfill their identity outside it. (111) 
 
Geller connects nationalist sentiment to a changing material base and the institutional 
transformations that it brings. This argument holds an implicit recognition that a changing 
institutional framework necessarily leads to changes in the way individuals and communities 
understand their identities and roles within these structures. Similarly, Hobsbawm, Anderson, 
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and Smith all insist on modernity and changing networks of signification to explain the 
emergence of nationalism. Their perspectives only differ on the weight ascribed to this 
phenomenon and the exact apparatuses through which it acts. Thus, relying on these conclusions, 
one can rationalize an argument that the modernizing paradigm introduced by the Ottoman 
Empire—more intrusive administrative and tax policy in particular—created, or at the very least 
legitimized, the framework necessary for the appearance of the ethnic nationalisms that emerge 
from its collapse.   
 Our reading of Besa reveals that the play lacks any mention of an Albanian nation. In 
fact, the word Shqiptar, meaning Albanian, appears in the text only a few times, and so one does 
not see explicit nationalist claims in this work. Nonetheless, the aforementioned theories on 
nations reveal many similarities between the ideological and discursive mechanisms of 
nationalism and the themes, ideas, and patterns uncovered in Sami’s play.  
 One need not have an extensive understanding of the Albanian speaking communities and 
their history to realize that Sami’s play relies on the region’s experience with customary law to 
distinguish this “Albanian” identity. The very title, BesaX, is the key concept that defines the 
ideological and structural foundations of the Kanun. As for the reasons behind Sami’s choice of 
customary law to embody an Albanian identity, one can only speculate. The division of the 
Albanian speaking communities into separate provinces with limited exchange, differing rates of 
administrative assimilation, and other diverging loyalties meant that outside of language and 
Ottoman rule, a distinct unifying experience would have been difficult to select. However, 
common cultural signifiers, accessible and acceptable to all members, are essential to the 
                                                             
X In the Albanian language, this word carries a range of meanings: promise, pledge, pact, contract, oath, faith, trust, 
fidelity, word of honor. 
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cohesive fabric of a community. On the relationship of shared memory and the nation, Anthony 
Smith writes: 
Memory, which is so vital to the sense of identity, is also central to both the individuality and the 
unity of nations. That means that the members' sense of their own history, their 'ethno-history', the 
memories that they share and the myths that they narrate, are crucial to the particular fabric and 
profile of the nation. (Smith, 3) 
 
Customary law embodied through the Kanun would have been accessible as something of a 
shared memory or experience for this region and peoples; perhaps this consideration guided 
Sami’s choice.  
 Through themes such as honor, loyalty, and vengeance, customary law allows much 
opportunity for glorification and mythologization. While such presentations of the Kanun neglect 
the sociological and historical reality of its function in the region, they definitely allow for a very 
fascinating and unique narration of common Albanian identity. Common symbols and myths are 
intrinsic to communal identities and national narratives. Anthony Smith writes that: 
A second concern of ethno-symbolists is with the myths, symbols, memories and values of ethnic 
communities and nations. These are the main elements of collective continuity and cultural 
distinctiveness. (19)  
 
Thus, Sami’s choice could just as well have been motivated by the sheer narrative possibilities 
available through customary law. The claim here isn’t that Sami consciously chooses customary 
law to characterize Albanian national identity because he foresees a propensity towards 
mythologization that would later prove useful for a nationalist project. One need only recognize 
that regardless of the author’s intent, this choice would prove very useful for future 
developments of the nationalist paradigm. 
  Our analysis of the play noted that late Romanticist dichotomies concerning conflicting 
worlds and value systems are vitally important to its structural framework. Particularly 
emphasized were the conflicts of a natural and pure world with a degenerate and contaminated 
one. This dichotomy, present from the very beginning, is extended to describe a clash of the 
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native elements (embodied in the village life and the adherence to the sacred law and honor) with 
the foreign ones. The two worlds are presented as inherently contradictory and incapable of 
unification; thus, resolution only comes through the violent expulsion and recuperation of the 
degenerate elements by native ones. This conflict is present through all aspects of the play. 
However, the utmost point of contention concerns the family and its preservation; the continuity 
of a “pure” and “honorable” Albanian lineage, distinctly untained by the foreign element. Thus, 
the characters are not simply involved in a material conflict, but a fight for the preservation and 
continuation of their way of life. There is a striking similarity between this theme and the 
assertions of culturally and ethnically pure communities in various Balkan nationalisms. Ernest 
Geller writes that: 
Nationalism - the principle of homogenous cultural units as the foundations of political life, and of 
the obligatory cultural unity of rules and ruled - is indeed inscribed neither in the nature of things, 
nor in the hearts of men, nor in the pre-conditions of social life in general, and the contention that 
it is so inscribed is a falsehood which nationalist doctrine has succeeded in presenting as self-
evident. (125) 
 
The play’s resolutions follows from the conjecture that the native elements must prevail because 
they are natural and pure and thus, the only legitimate force for the people and region involved. 
Yet again, one can see a relationship between this idea and the brand of nationalist rhetoric that 
insists the world is naturally split into ethnically and culturally separate communities and that 
consequently, self-governance is the only legitimate and natural outcome for these communities.  
Our aim in establishing this correlation between Besa’s ideological and structural 
framework and nationalist discourse is to show that while the play is intended as a tribute to 
Ottomanism, the discourse initiated through this ideology inevitably parallels a framework 
intrinsic to the nationalist paradigm. This recognition underscores our assertion that the 
development of Albanian nationalist discourse in late Ottoman society can in part be understood 
as symptomatic of the reforms undertaken by the empire to modernize and revive itself. 
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Reflections on Besa 
 Before proceeding, it is useful to clarify a few points. We assigned Besa a place within 
Albanian nationalist discourse by noting its role in introducing and legitimizing claims for an 
Albanian identity within late Ottoman culture. However, we are not making any claims about the 
mechanisms through which such a process could or would occur. Certainly, we are not 
suggesting that by being exposed to Besa, the Albanian-speaking subjects of the Sublime Port 
suddenly started imagining themselves and their place in the Empire among nationalist lines. 
This would prove ridiculous on many grounds, but it suffices to mention that the play was 
written in Ottoman Turkish and mostly performed in the Empire’s major cities and cultural 
centers. An Albanian translation of the play did not emerge until 1901.  It follows that the play 
would have been inaccessible to the majority of Albanian speaking subjects due both to language 
barriers and literacy rates, as well as logistical issues of access.  
 Thus, Besa best corresponds to late Ottoman high culture or intellectual debate and not a 
populist engagement with the question of Albanian identity. However, our consideration of 
Albanian nationalism concerns discourse, not agency, and so establishing a link between the 
work and its reception, or otherwise the network through which it is propagated, is not a central 
concern. Even if we cannot prove the specific means through which Besa is introduced to the 
Albanian speaking communities at large, we can certainly claim that members of the Diaspora 
communities—especially the Istanbul intellectuals who maintained close contact with one 
another—had both the means and tools (linguistic, logistic or otherwise) to encounter Sami’s 
play and the ideas it introduced. Bulent Bilmez’s essay “Sami Frasheri or Semseddin Sami?” 
reveals that: 
An Albanian translation of his play Besa was published by A. Kolonja in Sofia already in 1901 
and discussed in the Albanian press of that time and later. Since the subject of this drama was 
Albania, it was published several times in Albanian. (36) 
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Bilmez is describing a time after the Besa’s emergence, when nationalist activity had gained 
significant ground and so it does not specifically address its role in early nationalist 
engagements. Nonetheless, evidence of active discussion about Sami’s play in this later pre-
independence period further corroborates its importance. Moreover, many of the intellectuals 
who initially propagated nationalist ideology in the aftermath of the Eastern Crisis were still 
involved in these later efforts. Thus, while we cannot make definitive claims about the 
importance of Sami’s play to the activity of these agents, one can at least accept that Besa’s 
message would have resonated with their beliefs and aspirations. 
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Turbulent Times: From Ethnie to Nation 
 We now turn our attention to a different phase of Sami’s scholarship with his 1899 
political manifesto Shqipëria ç'ka qenë, ç'është e çdo të bëhetë, translated in English as  Albania 
- What it was, What it is and What it is going be. This work proves less ambiguous to situate and 
it makes a different case for Sami’s contribution to Albanian Nationalist discourse. It is 
important to examine the role of this manifesto in the National Rebirth movement and also to 
consider how it relates and differs with Besa. 
 Published in Bucharest in 1899, Albania What It Was, What It Is and What Will Become 
of It? is without a doubt Sami Frasheri’s most significant contribution to Albanian nationalism. 
Unlike earlier works, it is not intended for the Ottoman public at large. It is written in Albanian 
and is thus aimed explicitly at an Albanian-speaking audience. This manifesto, unlike Besa, is 
not intended to support the Sublime Port’s policy, but rather to thwart and subvert it. It gained 
wide circulation, but not through the Empire’s official networks of exchange. Instead, the 
manifesto was spread by secret nationalist societies working against the Port and thus, the 
original publication does not bear the author’s name. On these and numerous other grounds, 
Albania, What it Was, What it Is and What Will Become of It, stands in direct opposition to the 
play Besa and thus represents the opposite spectrum of Sami’s involvement with Albanian 
nationalism. 
 How does one explain this radical change in Sami’s position? Myriad factors could be 
emphasized to explain this change, but the most important would be the radically transformed 
political landscape from which this later work arises. The Russo-Turkish wars of 1877-1888, the 
Eastern Question, and the political developments that followed are of primary importance. These 
events were discussed earlier, but one need only recall that the ultimate result of these 
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developments was to disturb a long-standing relationship between the Albanian speaking 
communities and the Sublime Port.  
 The Empire’s looming decay meant that Albanian-speaking subjects, who until this time 
had enjoyed safety and protection within its borders, had to confront questions of their continued 
survival as neighboring nationalisms and aggressive forces threatened the region. This turbulent 
and uncertain atmosphere allowed Albanian nationalist claims to materialize, initially, through 
the activity of Diaspora intellectuals and later, through a wider involvement of the local 
populations. The League of Prizren, organized through the efforts of the Diaspora intellectuals, 
played a central role by initiating a nationalist movement and outlining a path towards national 
self-determinatio, and its eventual suppression by Ottoman powers demonstrated a need for 
further action by the nationalist forces.  
 Many of those involved with the League continued and intensified their efforts after the 
organization’s failure. Sami Frasheri was one such individual. As the situation became more 
pressing and threats to the region accumulated, the Sublime Port stood intent on suppressing the 
growing nationalism in these communities. Agents of Albanian nationalism nevertheless proved 
relentless, and so by 1899, when Sami published his manifesto, nationalist forces had broad local 
support on their side; support they lacked during the League’s formation in 1878. 
 It is difficult to distinguish whether greater local engagement was a result of increasing 
national sentiment or a reaction to the Empire’s escalation of military and economic intrusion in 
the region.  Most likely, both played a role. However, the important point is that circumstances 
had changed drastically since the gathering of the League twenty years earlier. These different 
circumstances demanded different tools. A common opposition to the Empire’s dealings and 
rising nationalist sentiment facilitated cooperation among the Albanian-speaking communities 
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and so, uniting them was no longer the main task. Turbulent and uncertain times, along with the 
Sublime Port’s aggressive stance, had already established a unified cause. Nationalist forces now 
needed a cohesive narrative behind which these sentiments could unite and materialize into a 
truly populist nationalism. The range of tools employed towards this purpose constitutes what is 
considered the Albanian National Rebirth and Sami’s 1899 manifesto is one of the most 
important amongst them. 
 In Antiquity of Nations, Anthony Smith distinguishes three routes towards nationalism. 
The one most applicable to the Albanian case: 
Involves the development of a 'vertical', demotic ethnie into a politicized ethnic nation through a 
process of vernacular mobilization, a trajectory common to many communities in Eastern Europe 
and parts of Asia. (22) 
 
Smith relates this course towards nationalism with Eastern Europe, and the prototype indeed 
closely parallels the efforts of Sami and his contemporaries. Here, 
Smaller, often subject ethnies, in which a single culture permeates all classes, have been 
incorporated into far-flung empires, and are now mobilized by an intelligentsia that seeks to return 
to its 'roots' by rediscovering its ethnic history and culture. (22) 
 
The Albanian National Rebirth represents a similar episode where the intelligentsia, in this case a 
Diaspora intelligentsia, mobilizes the ethnie and seeks to reawaken the nation by rediscovering 
its history and culture and returning to its lost roots.XI  
                                                             
XI Given geographic barriers, varying degrees of assimilation, differing religious loyalties and the Port’s overt policy 
of dividing the Albanian speaking communities into separate vilayets, the condition of “a single culture permeating 
all classes” might seem problematic. However, Smith’s criteria for ethnies are as follows: 
1 self-definition, including a collective proper name 
2 a shared myth of common origins and ancestry 
3 shared memories of past communal events, places and personages 
4 one or more elements of shared culture 
5 some sentiments of solidarity, at least among the elites 
The above standards allow us to conclude that the Albania-speaking communities do constitute a core ethnie 
according to Smiths framework; they exhibit several shared ‘cultural’ elements and thus justify the application of his 
theory. 
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 Of the methods and tools employed for mobilization Smith, emphasizes the selection of 
shared myths, symbols, and memories, and their dissemination through education. He argues 
that: 
By educating the people of the designated nation in selected native myths, symbols, traditions and 
memories, and in their vernacular codes and customs, the returning intelligentsia mobilizes and 
politicizes all classes of the demotic ethnie, thereby developing it into an ethnic nation able to 
claim independence. (22) 
 
Thus, the intelligentsia’s efforts cumulate in a narrative project affirming the ethnie’s common 
past, present, and future through a conscious and selective application of the shared memories, 
myths, and other cultural signifiers. Acceptance of this unified narrative serves as a basis for 
propelling the ethnie towards its ‘natural’ destiny of nationhood.  
 
A Nationalist Manifesto: From a Golden Past to a Meager Present 
 Albanian national historiography recognizes Sami as a father of the Albanian nation, but 
thus far, our examination of this complex figure has not justified this status. With his manifesto 
Albania, What It Was, What It Is and What Will Become of It?, the case for this reputation 
becomes abundantly clear. Enis Sulstarova writes that: 
Sami’s work, for the erudition and rigor of its arguments in support of the national cause, 
especially in Albania, What it Was, What it Is and What Will Become of It, has been regard as “the 
utmost synthesis of Rebirth ideology.”14  
 
The development of Albanian nationalism reveals a close correspondence with Smith’s model of 
Eastern European nationalism. Applying Smith’s prototype to Albania, What It Was, What It Is 
and What Will Become of It?, we will argue that Sami’s manifesto legitimizes and appropriates 
the ideological and discursive mechanism common to Eastern European nationalisms to present 
an Albanian national narrative and promote an Albanian nation. 
 The manifesto is divided into three chapters or parts, each addressing one of the questions 
posed in the title. The first part, titled “What Was Albania?” (C’ka Qene Shqiperia?), gives a 
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mythologized historical account of Albania and the Albanian people since their arrival in the 
Balkan Peninsula. Sami traces this history from pre-Antiquity, through the Roman and Ottoman 
invasion, and up until the time of Tanzimat. The second chapter, titled “What is Albania?” 
(C’Eshte Shqiperia?), addresses the post-Tanzimat situation and compares the decay and 
wantonness of the present with the lost days of glory and freedom. A large component of the 
second part is committed to revealing the numerous threats to Albania’s survival. The third 
chapter concerns the nation’s future and is thus titled “What Will Become of Albania?” (C’Do te 
Behet Shqiperia?). This last part offers an analysis of the political situation at hand, poses 
questions about Albania’s continued existence, and reveals a plan for national preservation and 
self-governance. In the concluding segment, Sami reiterates the dire need for self-determination, 
making a final passionate call for national unity and action to reclaim Albania’s due place among 
the world’s nations. 
Alongside Sami Frasheri’s mammoth Ottoman scholarship—most notably “a 1,630-page 
‘Kamûs-u fransevî, fransizcadan türkçeye lugat’ (French-Turkish Dictionary), and a monumental 
six-volume Turkish-language encyclopedia of history and geography, ‘Kamûs al-a'lâm’ 
(Dictionary of the World),”—Albania, What It Was, What It Is and What Will Become of It 
seems barely significant. (Elsie) At best, one can describe it as a booklet; the whole text amounts 
to less than one hundred pages. Nonetheless, it’s a dense work on numerous grounds: topics, 
arguments and other structural features. We will focus on the manifesto’s most dominant 
concerns, themes, and the aspects most pertinent to our specific investigation of customary law.  
 The first chapter, “What Was Albania?” is devoted to educating the audience about 
Albania’s history and begins as follows: “Albania is the name of all the land where Albanians 
live. Albanians are the oldest of the European nations.”15 These beginning remarks reveal much 
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about the manifesto’s structure and aim. The first statement gives a geographical assessment of 
Albania and exposes the objective to locate what makes up Albania. It provides physically 
definable borders, thus revealing concerns fundamental to nationalist struggles: land, territory 
and belonging. The second statement explains this Albania in relation to other European nations 
and presents a framework that will treat nations as separate historical entities contesting one 
another. It is important to note that while Albania and its people are distinguished as unique and 
separate from other members of Europe, the Albanians are still considered European people and 
their nation a part of this continent. Thus, Europe, its nations, and Albania’s place among them, 
turn out to be the manifesto’s central concerns. 
Sami traces the history of the Albanian nation back to pre-Antiquity and identifies 
Albanians as Europe’s original settlers. He further makes the claim that Albanians were 
responsible for bringing civilization to the continent: 
It appears that they were the first to arrive in Europe from the middle of Asia; and they brought to 
this place knowledge of building walled houses, as well as the knowhow of plowing planting and 
reaping, as those people present in Europe before them were wild and lived in forests and caves 
feeding on wild plants and game from hunt.16 
 
With this information, he proceeds to explain the origin of the name Albania.  
That’s why our older parents were called Arbënë, a word …we have turned into Arbërë, as it is 
used to this day.  This means that this olden nation since that time was called Arbënë or Arban, 
meaning those who plow fields, reap and plant. The Romans turned this word into Alban and 
named the land Albania as Europeans call it to this day.17 XII  
 
Sami continues this narrative, claiming that the oldest of Albania’s ancestors are recognized by 
the world as Pelasgians. He extends the Pelasgian thesis further and identifies all pre-Hellenic 
people in the region, Illyrians, Macedonians, Thracians, Phrygians and so on, as belonging to a 
single Pelasgian nation. He explains that they were separated into clans based on their particular 
locations, “but they were all one nation and understood each other’s language.” (9) Sami lauds 
                                                             
XIISami here introduce and employs a tendency common to the Rebirth period, where Pelasgian or Illyrian words are 
explained through roots of contemporary Albanian. He uses the contemporary Albanian noun arë, meaning field, 
and the verb bën, meaning to do, to provide an etymology of the word Albania.  
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the many achievements and glories of these ancient peoples and ancestors of the Albanians, most 
notably, the empire of Alexander the Great. He continues this history explaining that with new 
arrivals to the Balkan Peninsula—first the Hellenic tribes, and later the Romans and Slavs—the 
people of the Pellasgian nation one by one disappeared. Some were conquered in war, while 
others intermixed with the new arrivals. Bit by bit, each forgot their language and their ways, 
which led to the weakening and shrinking of the once great Pelasgian nation. “Thus vanished the 
Macedonians, the Thracians, the Phrygians, and other Pelasgian seeds except the Illyrians, who 
are our direct forebearers.” (10) 
 The manifesto’s target audience is the Albanian speaking public at large, attested by the 
fact that it is written in Albanian and was secretly distributed through nationalist organizations 
and networks. Given the intended audience, it might seem strange that Sami is educating the 
Albanian people about their own history. The manifesto, however, is not merely narrating this 
nation’s known history so much as constructing it. The specific elements are not necessarily 
wholly fabricated, as they rely on external sources and scholarship about the region.XIII However, 
the particular incorporation of the various ideas to construct a cohesive historical narrative 
constitutes a novel endeavor by Sami. Furthermore, this undertaking is part of a greater project 
of national myth building common to nationalist ideologues and movements in the Balkans at 
large. 
 The second chapter is titled “What is Albania?” and transitions the discussion from the 
nation’s mythical past to the experienced present. There are ten sections or subheadings in the 
second part. Section I, titled “The Borders of Albania” (Kufit’ e Shqiperise), begins with the 
following: 
                                                             
XIII The thesis of Pelasgian descent, for example, was developed by Austrian linguist Johann Georg von Hahn in in 
his 1854 work Albanesiche Studien. 
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We saw above how wide was the place that Albanians once inhabited, how dispersed our 
forefathers were and how they were divided into Illyrians, Epyrians, Macedonians, Thracians, 
Phrygians, etc. We saw how in the times of the Romans, Macedonians, Thracians and Phrygians, 
by mixing with other nations, begun to lose their language and their nationality, and from then on, 
in the times of Byzantine, a misery of Slavs arrived in the Balkan Peninsula and occupied Thrace, 
Macedonia and upper Illyria. Since that time, Albania has become much smaller than the land our 
forefathers had. 18 
 
The discussion on “What is Albania” reveals two fundamental points: the nation is depicted as a 
well-established historical entity that can be traced from the present back to antiquity and 
furthermore, while a fundamental core subsists, tying the present with past, the overall pattern is 
one of decline, with the nation moving from a prosperous whole in Antiquity to a marginalized 
and impoverished piece in the present. The Albania of the present is thus revealed to be the last 
remaining fragment of a once glorious whole. The section concludes by outlining the borders of 
modern Albania, which it traces along the Ottoman regions inhabited by Albanian-speaking 
communities.  
 The next three sections concern internal features of Albania.XIV On Albania’s land and its 
productive potential, the author emphasizes geographic diversity with beautiful scenery and rich 
nature. The central message here maintains that although only a fraction of Albania’s past 
territory remains, this nation is still blessed with many natural resources and land with much 
productive potential. Sami writes: 
In short, Albania, however small, has all sorts of climates, all sorts of land, a lot of livestock and 
many other benefits. If taken care of, it can prosper greatly and feed four times as many people as 
today.19  
 
Romanticizing and personifying the land to offer a pastoral image of the Albanian nation is a 
salient and noteworthy feature of the manifesto’s tone and style in this chapter. These narrative 
                                                             
XIV Section II, “The Land of Albania” (Vend’ I Shqiperise), describes Albania’s geography and its productive 
potential. Section III, “The people of Albania, the Albanians” (Njerezit’ e Shqiperise, shqipetaret), considers the 
people inside the nation’s borders, discussing the size of the Albanian population, their distinctions by religion, 
dialect, and location as well as their “nature” and “manners.” Section IV, “Shqipetaret jashte Shqiperise” (Albanians 
Outside of Albania), tells of Albanians living outside of the nation’s borders, their history, and their relationship to 
the Albanian nation.  
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tools function to affirm a connection between the land and the people by portraying these 
elements as a balanced, harmonious whole and thus authenticate the nation as a positive natural 
entity. 
 Sami estimates the Albanian speaking population to amount to around two million 
people. The manifesto recognizes these inhabitants as having distinctions amongst religious 
ranks and linguistic boundaries, belonging both to the Christian and Islamic faiths, as well as 
speaking the one of the two dialects, Geg or Tosk. Sami argues that while these differences do 
exist, they are minimal and not important to people’s national identity. On the Albanian 
language, he writes: 
There exists no essential difference between the Gegs and Tosks. They are all one nation and they 
speak one language with small differences.20 
 
Similarly, religious distinctions are considered irrelevant and not conflicting with inhabitants’ 
primary identity as Albanians. 
These differences in faith don’t bring any animosity or division amongst the Albanians…The 
Albanian is an Albanian before being a Muslim or a Christian.21 
 
The discussion on the people within the borders of the Albanian nation makes the argument that 
national identity overcomes all other loyalties and distinctions amongst them. Other allegiances 
can change and vary with time, but national identity is the unshakable bond that these inhabitants 
maintain and share since time immemorial.  
Through all the changes in faith, through all changes in time, Albanians are the same today as they 
were thousands of years ago; they are the Pellasgians from the tales of old, the Illyrians and 
Macedonians of ancient times, the Epirians from the time of Skenderbeg. They are an ancient 
nation which has remained until today as it was in the beginning.22 
 
National identity thus constitutes something of a natural law, a link that connects the Albanians 
of the present with their forefathers in antiquity. As history plays its course and the world 
changes through time, national identity is the only thing that has remained stable, existing 
outside of time and impervious to its effects.  
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 Extending the ideological framework from nation to national identity, the manifesto 
proceeds to reveal the particulars of Albanian identity. It declares that a central aspect of the 
Albanian’s nature that distinguishes him from the people of other nations is his bravery and skill 
in battle. On the Albanian people, Sami writes: 
They posses such bravery and strength that having less than two million people, men and women, 
if they make an effort, they can produce 300,000 or more soldiers, which equal a million of any 
other nation.23 
 
He continues to explain that the Albanian is not only distinguished by his bravery and strength, 
but just as well by his intelligence, unmatched by other peoples. In addition, he is extremely 
capable in skill and craft and can make by hand that which European factories produce with 
machines. Nonetheless, work involving nature and the land, ranging from woodwork to 
agriculture, remains the Albanian’s preferred and most common engagement. The discussion on 
the character of Albanians concludes with the following: 
In short, Albanians are brave, intelligent, hardworking and gifted in any skill. Despite differences 
in faith, they are not divided and apart but united; they have harmony amongst one another. That is 
to say they posses all that is necessary for a nation to prosper.24 
 
Throughout this section, the Albanian is characterized as capable of success in any endeavor, 
thereby building and justifying concluding claims that if united, they are capable of building a 
strong and prosperous nation.  
 The remainder of the second chapter examines the currentXV shape of Albania and its 
nationhood.XVI Sami warns that enemies are fighting to prevent the teaching and writing of the 
                                                             
XV The word current here notes Albania as understood by the author at the time of this manifesto. 
XVI Section V, “How are Albanians Today?” (Qysh jane sot Shqipetaret?), discusses the nation’s impoverishment and 
the underlying reasons. Section VI, “The Nationhood of Albanians” (Komberi e Shqipetarevet), considers what must 
happen for Albanians to keep their nationhood as the world undergoes a period of great change. Section VII, “The 
threats to Albania)” (Reziket’ e Shqiperise), reveals that while Ottoman power crumbles, the Greek, Bulgarian, and 
Serbian nations conspire to eliminate Albania and separate the territory amongst themselves. Section VIII, “Friends 
of the Albanians” (Miqt’ e Shqipetarevet), reveals that although surrounded by enemies, Albania has the support of 
the European powers, should Albanians defend their cause. Section IX, “Writing the Albanian language” (Te 
shkruarit e gjuhes shqip), argues that the foremost trait of a nation is language; its preservation determines whether a 
nation survives or fades with history. 
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Albanian language; thus, for the nation to survive, Albanians must also wage a war of the pen, a 
fight to write and teach in their native tongue. The final section, titled “The Poverty of Albanians 
and the Neglect of Albania” (Varferi’ e Shqipetarevet e pakryesi’ e Shqiperise), argues that the 
Ottoman government has betrayed the Albanian nation, robbing her people and neglecting her 
security. It laments that Albanians fight against one another but leave their nation unprotected in 
this time of great peril. The chapter closes by declaring that nations are awakening all around, yet 
Albania remains in deep slumber and is drifting towards extinction: “thus is Albania today.”25 
 Anthony Smith’s ethno-symbolism understands nations as modern constructs built on 
pre-modern ethnic foundations that are modified and adapted to the purposes of new political 
demands. Smith explains that:  
Far from inventing nations, nationalism emerged from the secularization of religious traditions of 
ethnic election and mission, sacred territory, sacrifice and destiny, and has intensified and 
politicized ethnic bonds, hastening the processes of nation formation. (22)  
 
 In this framework, nationalism and its agents are responsible for directing the process through 
which pre-modern ethnies are politicized and refashioned into nations.  
The nationalist's typical activity has been the selection of ethnic motifs (myths, values, traditions, 
symbols, rituals and memories) and their codification to create a uniform, flowing history out of 
the many strands that form the traditions of the community. By providing a set of goals and a 
global legitimation for collective political struggle, nationalism has greatly expanded the number 
and role of the world's nations. (23) 
 
The selection and codification of particular ethnic motifs to create a seamless and accessible 
historical narrative sufficient for politicizing and translating ethnic identities into a unified 
national whole is the nationalist’s utmost mission. Nationalist ideologues, thus, become the 
stewards of modernity, administering through their works and activity the process of 
secularization, homogenization/standardization, and centralization at its helm. 
 The first two parts of Sami’s manifesto serve precisely the above objectives as they 
introduce and define an Albanian nation, offering a unified narrative of its role and history in the 
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region. On the significance of shared history and common origin to nationalist fervor, Anthony 
Smith writes:  
Myths of origin have been crucial in defining and sustaining ethnies. Indeed, it was the belief that' 
'we are of one blood', because of shared ancestry, that differentiated and often mobilized the 
members of ethnic groups. Even when they diverge from what we know of the actual historical 
origins of peoples, these myths are of fundamental importance in creating a sense of common 
ethnicity. (19) 
 
Just as important, however, is the broader task of explaining nations and their role from a 
universal framework, which is also undertaken in the manifesto. Through “What was Albania?” 
and “What is Albania?”,  Sami offers a comprehensive theory explaining the evolution of nations 
from foundation to destruction. This theory becomes the basis for addressing specific issues of 
Albania’s fate.  
 As in the ethno-symbolism framework, nationalist discourse in the manifesto does not 
forge completely new political and social entities out of nothing or on its own; a myriad 
developments coincide to make nations a prevailing paradigm during this time. Ideologues of 
this paradigm, however, play a critical role in introducing and guiding the particular forms and 
manifestations of nationalism in their specific geographic and cultural domains. Accordingly, 
Sami’s work is very important because it provides a comprehensive narrative of an Albanian 
nation, but this narrative is neither unique nor novel. The ideological framework it applies 
mirrors a general archetype common to other Eastern European and Balkan nationalisms; the 
manifesto orients it in a distinctively Albanian light. The foundation for this ‘distinctness’ is 
found in the cultural and historical domains particular to an Albanian ethnie, extended and 
modified through the manifesto to support a nationalist project.   
 Throughout the text, nations and national identity characterize a natural order and are 
treated as innate entities harking back to the beginning of time. The manifesto, in this way, links 
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the modern Albanians to the ancient Pelasgians. In this construction, nations stand outside of 
time but are not impervious to history; they can become both its victims and benefactors. The 
manifesto claims that nations prosper and flourish when they are unified, free, and have self-
determination. On the other hand, they decline and disappear when members intermix with new 
arrivals in their lands. With the ancient Pelasgians, for example, the pattern reveals decay as one 
by one, the peoples of a once proud nation disappear, leaving Albanians as the sole survivors.  
 Sami’s theory makes language the central element for identifying and maintaining 
nationhood. Thus, nations fade when the native inhabitants mix with new arrivals, eventually 
forgetting their local language, customs, and ultimately, national identity. Sami writes: 
The mark of nationhood is language; every nation is maintained by language; people who forget or 
abandon their own language and speak another, in time, become members of the nation whose 
language they speak and leave their own nationhood. All those nations that have perished did not 
die off or get killed; not at all. They mixed with other nations, took on their languages and became 
indistinguishable from them.26 
 
Here the manifesto contrasts the two extreme conditions of nationhood: affluence and decay. As 
entities naturally founded on shared history, traits, culture, and language, nations prosper under 
freedom and unity in shared attributes. Accordingly, disruption of this unity and divergence from 
the common character leads nations toward decay and extinction; particularly vital in this 
process is loss of language. The conclusion that a nation’s preservation requires unification and 
self-determination inevitably follows from this outline.   
 Additionally, the concepts of progress and competition between nations are central 
features of the manifesto’s framework. In The Necessary Nation, Gregory Jusdanis argues that 
these follow from a view of history, unique to modernity, which perceives time as a linear 
sequence towards advancement and thereby allows for distinctions between advanced and 
backward or belated societies. Economic and military conquests make this aspect of modernity a 
reality imposed on other societies leading them to internalize the paradigm. Ultimately, this 
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experience becomes a driver of nationalist determination and cultural consolidation. Jusdanis 
writes: 
For, as both discourse and political movement nationalism is motivated to a large extent by 
concerns over space—concerns, however, that are related to the need to modernize. The 
importance given to territory by nationalism goes hand in hand with the emphasis on temporal 
relationships. In the competitive modern world, where cultures are threatened by extinction, where 
the challenge is to move forward with quantum speed, territory provides a sense of constancy. 
People can look into the eye of time-to-come without flinching because they stand on familiar soil. 
(107) 
 
Competition, progress and belatedness are key themes in Sami’s theory of nations and modernity 
is certainly at the helm. Thus, the manifesto proclaims:  
The world has changed, people have awakened, nations shine, each attempts to go further than the 
others; each considers how to expand and tries to swallow those who are smaller and 
weaker...Nations are like fish that eat one another. God help those that are weak.27 
 
Later on, this foundation of antagonism allows the manifesto to implore national unity and 
political action by emphasizing an Albania that is teetering on the brink of extinction. 
 
Nations and Albania According to Sami 
 Nations in Sami’s manifesto are understood and explained as natural, timeless entities 
through which mankind experiences the world. Internal order within nations is maintained and 
continued by members who share an innate national identity that is witnessed in common 
character, history, and fate. In contrast to this internal unity stands the external order, where 
nations exist in perpetual opposition with one another, competing for territory, power, and 
survival, with the ultimate result that as time progresses, nations can find themselves in positions 
of grandeur and prosperity or, otherwise, decay and extinction. This is the general view of 
nations presented in the manifesto and subsequently the basis for Sami’s narration of Albania 
from glorious Pelasgian roots to contemporary decay and Ottoman oppression. 
  83 
   
  Despite its imaginative spirit, the narrative offered through the manifesto is not unique to 
Sami, neither in broader ideas nor specific arguments. The same outline of a forgotten glorious 
past and a decaying present is employed by virtually all national narratives in the region. 
Scholarship on nationalism identifies these nearly universal themes of nationalist discourse as 
“The Golden Age” and “National Renewal.” Anthony Smith writes that: 
The theme of the 'golden age' …takes up, once again, the question of the return to 'antiquity' found 
so often in nationalisms, and the particular salience of memories of golden ages in ethno-history. 
These golden ages come in various forms and serve a variety of social functions, such as 
continuity, authenticity, dignity and a sense of collective destiny. Typically, there are rival 
interpretations and competing versions of the golden age, which the quest for an authentic 
antiquity so often encourages. (25) 
         
The opening, “What Was Albania,” designates Albanians the first and oldest settlers of the 
Balkan Peninsula. Given the prominence of territorial dispute and contentions of historical 
legitimacy amongst Balkan nationalisms during this time, this account proves valuable for a 
national history. Claims of Albanian settlement predating Hellenic Antiquity become especially 
useful in counteracting Greek national claims, which use the importance of ancient Greece in the 
European Renaissance to put forth the narrative of a Greek nation. For the latter, claims of 
contributing to Western civilization apply the dichotomy of backward versus advanced societies 
to assert a place amongst Europe’s developed nations. The thesis of Pelasgian descent employed 
by Sami attempts to counteract these facets of Greek nationalism. First, it asserts Albanian 
territorial legitimacy by pre-dating Hellenic settlement and furthermore asserts “cultural” 
contributions to Europe by holding that the Pelasgians (and thus Albanians) were the first to 
bring civilization to the continent. This point is further advanced in the manifesto with arguments 
that many triumphs of the Pelasgians and their descendants are wrongfully attributed to Hellenic 
Antiquity, Alexander the Great being the most notable case. Thus, with the thesis of Pelasgian 
  84 
   
descent, Sami argues for both a sacred ancestral territory as well as a lost golden age of triumph 
and achievement, thereby directly rivaling the claims of competing nationalisms. 
 The manifesto asserts that thus far, an Albanian nation has been preserved through the 
traits innate to its national identity; namely, unmatched skill in combat, bravery, loyalty and a 
deep connection with nature and the land. 
Albanians have maintained their language and nationhood, neither in letter, knowledge nor 
civilization, but only through freedom, by always keeping simply to each other, not mixing with 
others and not allowing foreigners in their lands.28 
 
For Sami, the utmost synthesis of these values and characteristics is exemplified in the Albanian 
national hero Gjergj Kastiroti or SkanderbegXVII, for whom history has no rival “in bravery, skill 
of battle, both in strength and knowledge, righteousness, warmth of heart and breadth of soul.”29 
Accordingly, it was dedication to these values and a longing for home that made Skanderbeg 
return and unite all Albanians under one banner and oath: to protect their motherland. In the 
manifesto, the time of Skanderbeg serves as further testament to past glory, providing a common 
sense of dignity and honor for the nation. Furthermore, Albania under Skanderbeg is designated 
Europe’s savior for having halted Ottoman onslaught into the continent. According to Sami, this 
episode of history: 
Although spent in war and blood, is the most beautiful and blessed of all times for our land 
because only then did the whole nation unite as a free state whose name was known with honor 
through the whole world for resisting the Turks at a time when even great kingdoms could not 
confront them.30 
 
The period of Skanderbeg thus becomes testament for a united Albania that can not only govern 
itself freely, but can also serve as protector to the whole of European civilization. 
 To explain nearly four hundred years of Ottoman occupation after Skanderbeg’s death, 
Sami claims that Albanians conceded to become a part of the empire because they saw great 
                                                             
XVIIMedieval Albanian prince and prominent historical figure known for abandoning high rank in the Ottoman 
military to  return to his native land and successfully oust Ottoman forces for more than two decades.  
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advantage and opportunity in joining this power. On the history of Albania and its people under 
the Ottoman Empire, he writes: 
The work sought by the Ottoman Empire benefited and corresponded with their desires. Never 
ending wars, amusement and travel on horse, raids, killings, stabbings and other such things in 
demand to the Ottomans, were also the preferred professions of the Albanians. 31 
 
Thus, a mutually beneficial relationship developed which brought Albania glory, riches and 
prosperity.  
This is the agreement Albanians forged with the Turks. Albanians would find in Turks what they 
desired: materials, honor, weapons, and horses, as much looting as they wanted and freedom as 
they pleased; the Turks as well would find in the Albanians what they desired: bravery, fidelity 
and blood spilled without reservation.32 
 
 The manifesto asserts that during this time, Albania boasted de-facto self-rule because it was 
governed by Albanians and according to its own customs. Sami claims that the nation was not in 
any way infringed upon by the Empire and the people did not pay any duties except the blood 
spilled in wars, for which they were dearly compensated. He continues, “[t]hese were the 
conditions until the times of Tanzimat; further on we will see how they changed since that time 
and until the present.”33 The manifesto’s account of Albania’s history under the Ottoman Empire 
concludes that since the Tanzimat reforms the situation has changed drastically, bringing into 
question the nation’s very survival. 
 A narrative of shared history and past grandeur is important for establishing a sense of 
authenticity and continuity within a community, but national mobilization also necessitated 
confirmation of shared present to substantiate the nationalists’ arguments of a common destiny. 
For Albanian nationalism, as with other Balkan national narratives, proof of a shared fate is 
primarily offered through accounts of struggle and victimization under late Ottoman rule. Sami’s 
manifesto locates the source of the troubled present in the Tanzimat reforms. He separates the 
period of Ottoman rule into two parts: the pre-reform period, where Albania and its people 
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prospered and shared in the empire’s glory, and the period after Tanzimat, where they are 
betrayed and wronged by the Sublime Port.  
Today Albanians are slaves, disgraced and humiliated, abused and insulted much more than other 
nations of Turkey!...Turkey has lifted the oath with Albanians, not trusting them but considering 
them enemies and betrayers instead of friends and brothers as they once saw them.34 
 
The manifesto argues that the new Ottoman order makes immense demands on the Albanians; 
taxing them into poverty, forcing them into military service without pay, and all the while 
conspiring with Greeks and Slavs to eradicate the nation and divide it amongst them.  
 Examining the role of external threats within nationalist discourse and their particular 
application in the Albanian Rebirth, Enis Sulstarova writes: 
In the development of ethnic and national identities the notion of “the other” or “the foreign” are 
of primary importance. The existence of others who are perceived as different or foreign to the 
group establishes and strengthens unity within the group. Emotional ties within the group are 
stronger when those who do not belong to the group constitute a threat for members of the group. 
Due to the political situation during the period of National Rebirth, nationalists envisioned a threat 
for the Albanian nation from Turks, Greeks and Slavs (in the latter they included Montenegrin 
Serbs, Bulgarians and Russians).35 
 
Accordingly, in explaining the changed and troubled situation facing Albania, Sami stresses 
without doubt that “the Turks with the help of Greeks and Slavs are the enemies of Albania and 
the Albanians; they try as much as they can to destroy its nationhood and language and wipe 
away the name of this nation entirely.”36 
 Thus, the nationalist paradigm, which by this time had been successfully employed to 
bring autonomous rule for other Ottoman subjects in the Balkans (Greece and Serbia in 
particular), finds full expression in an Albanian variant through Sami’s manifesto, offering a 
national narrative reaching from a golden past to the present struggle for survival. However, it is 
important to clarify that while Sami’s endeavor parallels a broader paradigm and certainly 
utilizes a widespread archetype of nationalism—its pretense of history being a mythologized 
narrative with obvious political purposes, and its general ideological framework a clear testament 
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to the influence of modernity—it would be misguided to understand it as merely fabricating or 
inventing an Albanian nation.  
 The narrative presented through “What was Albania?” and “What is Albania?” became 
this nation’s official history in the post-independence period and continues to serve such a 
purpose to this day, but this influence cannot be attributed to its imaginative and creative power 
so much as to the political and social conditions of the period with which it is inexorably linked. 
Key factors here include the nineteenth century Tanzimat reforms, which sought to centralize 
power and changed a long standing relationship between the empire and its subjects—imposing 
new demands through greater taxation, mandatory and unpaid military service, as well as less 
local autonomy, among other things—as well as changing global networks of power witnessed in 
military defeats which weakened the Sublime Port’s international authority and subsequently, its 
internal legitimacy. Enis Sulstarova writes: 
Albanians, the elite as well as the masses had ample cause for disliking the new situation…new 
uprisings against Tanzimat had taken on a broad and prominent character. The legitimacy of the 
central government amongst Albanians had been shaken and the conflict arising from the reforms 
began to be viewed as a defense of local autonomy against the intrusions of foreign functionaries 
and the central government.37 
 
Thus, the changing political framework of the time was of vital importance. Sami’s manifesto 
synthesized Albanian nationalism with a full-fledged national narrative, relying on the 
institutional and historical conditions of the time. 
The Future Albanian nation 
 The final chapter, titled “What will become of Albania?” (C’Do Te Behet Shqiperia?), is 
the longest of the three and also the focal point of the Sami’s message. The chapter is divided 
into seventeen segments and the first two are titled: “Can Albania stand as it is?” (I. A mund te 
qendroje Shqiperia si eshte) and “Are the Albanians capable of governing and defending 
themselves?” (II. A jane te zotte Shqipetarete te mbaj’ e te ruajne vetehene?). The central 
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message is twofold: First, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire is inevitable and Albania as it 
stands—its future tied fundamentally with the fate of this empire—will also disappear with it. 
Sami writes: 
Albania has not set up its own foundations nor has it laid down its roots; it persists on the 
crumbling foundation and rotten roots of Turkey. When this behemoth collapses, so too will 
Albania fall and be crushed under the heavy ruins.38  
 
The author thus argues that Albanians cannot change the fate of the empire, try as they may; they 
can only disappear alongside it. Secondly, Ottoman Turkey, unable to save itself, seeks to drag 
Albania down with it; however, the Albanians need not suffer such a fate.  
We are not Turks, and we did not arrive from the desert of Asia. We are the oldest people of 
Europe; we have a right to land in Europe more so than any other nation. Albanians are capable of 
defending and demanding this sacred right even in arms. When righteousness is combined with 
force it takes on a might which cannot be withstood. The Albanians are capable of maintaining 
and defending their rights, that is to say, their nationhood, their native tongue and their motherland 
against any foe; they need only desire it.39 
 
Sami thus argues that unlike the Turks, Albanians have both righteousness and strength on their 
side – all that’s necessary to protect and preserve their nation. 
 The position emerging from these beginning segments suggests that the two possible 
outcomes from Albania’s relationship with the Ottoman Empire are diametrically opposed. If the 
status quo is maintained and Albania remains faithful to the Sublime Port, it will vanish along 
with the empire. Alternatively, if the Albanians realize a common purpose and defend their 
nationhood by supporting this sacred cause, Albania will be preserved. Having both strength and 
righteousness on their side, they only need to unify and seek self-determination; however, doing 
so would necessarily require a break with Ottoman leadership. 
 The first two segments conclude that even in this period of turmoil, the Albanians are 
capable of preserving their nationhood and defending their motherland. Accordingly, the third 
segment is titled “The survival or loss of Albania is in the hands of the Albanians” (III. Shpetimi 
a humbja e Shqiperise eshte ne doret te shqipetarevet) and it advances this case by providing 
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additional arguments and ultimately suggesting a specific course towards national preservation. 
It begins with the query: 
Should Albania be saved from the perils that surround it and embark upon a path of security and 
well-being, it could become one of the best and fairest countries in Europe… It has everything it 
requires, as we have seen above. Albanians are very clever and intelligent people and they have 
much capacity for civilization as well as all kinds of knowledge; they are courageous and 
exceptional soldiers.40 
  
Here, the manifesto reiterates claims presented in the first two chapters and avows a latent 
potential for building an extraordinary Albania founded on the virtues innate to this national 
identity. However, Sami also adds that while the ability for creating a strong and flourishing 
nation is indisputable, whether such a nation will actually rise depends on the future actions of 
the Albanian people. “The survival or fall of Albania is in the hands of the Albanians 
themselves; if they want to, they will survive and if they want to, they will perish.”41 
 The segment concludes by arguing that an independent nation requires only that 
Albanians unite for this common purpose.  
Albanians do not need to take to arms, retreat to  mountain tops and caves, or kill and ravage as 
other nations have done to gain their freedom…They need do nothing but make a vow to each 
other, unite together, swear an oath in manly fashion, maintain their pledge unfalteringly, and 
demand their rights from Turkey and Europe. Turkey will listen and will yield to their demands, 
willingly or unwillingly.42 
 
Having already argued that national preservation requires a people’s unification, the manifesto 
here adds that for the Albanians, such unity can be easily achieved through reliance on their local 
customs of oath and pledge. Sami’s closing remarks reaffirm a belief in the power of these native 
customs by asserting that if Albanians swear an oath for national self-determination it will 
happen regardless of the aim and will of other parties. 
 The fourth segment devotes greater attention to the idea of national unity through a 
common oath and seeks to rationalize this approach. Confidence in oath and pledge as national 
attributes able to unify the Albanian people is legitimized through reference to a shared 
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experience in customary law; hence the segment is titled “Besa [the word of honor] and union” 
(IV. Besa e lidhja). It begins by proclaiming that: 
The Albanian’s word of honor (besa) is and has always been known and esteemed throughout the 
world. A besa given by an Albanian will not be withdrawn or broken, but upheld faithfully 
through the last breath and soul in his body.43 
 
Here, the besa or word of honor constitutes something of a natural law, steady and unwavering, 
an eternal truth that is and has been a cornerstone of Albanian life since time immemorial. Sami 
writes that “the word of honor which has distinguished Albanians to this day, the besa, will save 
them from all perils.”44 
 Albanians must first and foremost set up a wide reaching and all-encompassing besa that 
will unite and bind all under a common oath. Sami asks that they forgive and give up all feuds 
and conflicts amongst themselves because in such dire circumstances, there is no sense in 
wasting ancient Albanian blood. Urgent times require that they unite to spill blood against 
enemies of motherland and not their own brothers. “Albanians, united in this manner and bound 
under an unshakable oath, will exist as a single being, brave and powerful, with one desire, one 
word and one solitary aim.”45 Sami maintains that no one would dare stand against Albania 
united under such a pledge; thus, the manifesto beseeches: 
Do not see religions and belief; Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox, they are all Albanians wherever 
they are, and they are all brothers. All must unite under the sacred flag of Albania. Any Albanian 
who abandons his brothers and joins the enemies of Albania, by breaking his besa, becomes a 
traitor; an enemy of our nation and our homeland. Better that such Albanians do not even exist. 46 
  
The manifesto thus argues that if unified under besa and a league, the Albanians can take away 
local authority from the empire and give it to Albanian leaders who will perform the necessary 
duties to preserve their nation.  
 In the manifesto, customary law is used to assert a unique national identity—as in the 
play Besa—however, it is additionally applied in new ways. Customary law receives reference 
through assertions of an Albanian character, but is also extended to claims of a collective 
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national history. Moreover, the manifesto engages customary law in a direct way that is more 
assertive and noteworthy than the symbolic and narrative applications in Sami’s 1874 play. In 
doing so, it reveals a deeper rapport between customary law and Albanian nationalist discourse. 
 Sami specifically argues that by means of a besa —the word of honor described as innate 
to the Albanian national character—Albanians can forge a sacred unity that will not be broken.  
National unity and by extension sovereignty will unequivocally arise from a resort to the 
indigenous ways of oath and loyalty found in Kanun. Sami’s argument for besa asserts that 
Albanians need only call on this “innate custom” of their national character and deliverance will 
arise from the unshakable authority of their native traditions; hence the author’s insistence that 
the fate of Albania lies in the hands of the Albanian. Thus, customary law, through its institution 
of oath and honor, can become a vehicle for national salvation.   
 On the issue of oath and the Kanun book seven in Gjecov’s Kanun I lek Dukagjinit, titled 
“The Spoken Word” states the following: 
529. The oath is a religious utterance, by means of which a man, wishing to exculpate himself 
from a shameful accusation, must touch with his hand a token of faith while calling upon the name 
of God in testimony of the truth. 
530. This sort of oath is acceptable by the law of the mountains of Albania in order both to clear 
oneself of accusations and to make pacts binding. (Gjecov 118) 
 
Sami uses this framework of oath and spoken word as a sacred and inescapable binding pact to 
call for national unity. The manifesto beseeches the audience: 
Albanian men! Join with two hands in a besa, in league and in unity. This is what will save you. 
Otherwise you will be lost.47 
 
This call to unity through a pledge is certainly the manifesto’s clearest engagement with 
customary law and the most direct application of this apparatus to propagate an Albanian 
nationalism. Customary law is employed throughout the manifesto in other symbolic and 
narrative ways that are considered further on, but the uniqueness of its role here is significant for 
both directness and agency. Here, the role of oath and the word of honor are not merely 
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relational or symbolic. In calling for a besa, the manifesto is situating itself within the realm of 
customary law essentially becoming an extension and signifier of this apparatus through a 
pragmatic and genuine engagement with it.  
 The fifth section is titled “The Aims of the Albanians” (V. Qellimi I Shqipetarevet) and it 
begins with the claim that: 
The Albanians’ only aims is to protect Albania so it is not broken up by foreigners, to conserve 
their language and national identity, to withstand all enemy plots and  impede the spread of Greek 
and Serb ideas and language which are tearing down Albania’s foundations and uprooting the 
Albanians along with their nation.48 
 
Maintaining language is at the forefront of the national struggle; second is the establishment of 
an independent Albanian church separate from Greeks and Slavs. Sami concludes that these aims 
can only be achieved by removing the present Ottoman government—which prohibits the 
Albanians from writing and teaching their language—and establishing native rule with a 
government that will address issues important to the Albanian nation. On the importance of self-
determination and autonomous rule, he writes: 
Without such a government, the Albanians cannot revive and spread their language and maintain a 
national identity. Albania must secede as soon as possible in order to reveal where it is and where 
it is going. Our country must be recognized as Albania and Europe as well must recognize it as 
such. Albanians must advance and embellish their language with letters and knowledge; they must 
unite and present themselves as a single nation with the same rights as all other nations on earth. 49 
 
Further on, Sami suggests that an independent Albanian government, once it is strong enough, 
can try to help the Ottoman s if the Empire changes its ways, but while the Empire survives, it 
must not be allowed to trample on Albania or drag this nation down alongside it. Deliberating on 
the Empire’s imminent collapse, the segment closes with the following questions: “What then 
will become of Albania? It will be left alone. But how? What governance will it have?”50 
 The remaining ten segments—seven through seventeen—are used to sketch out, in great 
detail, a governmental structure appropriate for an Albanian nation. The seventh segment, titled 
“The head of Albania’s government” (VII. Krei i qverise se Shqiperise), addresses an issue that, 
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according to the author, is frequently raised by foreigners and Albanians alike, namely, whether 
Albania can find a head of state who will overcome religious, regional, and other differences 
within the populace; “if he is Geg, Tosks won’t approve and if he is Tosk, Gegs won’t approve; 
if he is Muslim, Christians won’t be pleased and if he is Christian, Muslims won’t be pleased.”51 
Sami, however, argues that Albania does not need a head of state and furthermore, that such a 
figure could possibly cause more damage than good. 
  Citing writings by Greek historian, geographer and philosopher Strabo (63/64 BCE – ca. 
CE 24)XVIII, specifically the examinations of Macedonia, Illyria, and Epirus in his Geography, 
Sami points out that these ancient tribes—ancestors of the Albanians—although divided into 
different principalities and kingdoms, upheld an olden tradition of governing through councils of 
elders called plakon. Elders judged and administered the law of the land in these ancient tribes 
and Sami argues that the plakon described by Strabo is the same convention of elders present in 
modern Albania, known as pleqesi. He continues by proposing that this institution of elders can 
and should be a basis for structuring an Albanian national government. 
Why should we abandon this magnificent and thousand year old tradition today by turning to a 
foreign entity…which would ruin all the grand attributes of our nation? We should never move 
away from Strabo’s plakon and the tradition of elders which we have preserved to this day; elders 
always rule in Albania. Let elders rule and govern everlastingly.52 
 
The manifesto’s claims on the preservation and historical significance of elders for upholding 
order in Albanian societies undoubtedly refers to the persistence of such traditions in Northern 
Albanian communities which followed the Kanun.XIX In Gjecov’s version of the Kanun of Lek 
Dukagjin, book eleven on judicial law, states: 
992. The Elders are chosen from among the senior members of brotherhoods or from among the 
chiefs of Clans [fis], and their functions supports the foundation of legal rights.  
                                                             
XVIII Encyclopedia Britannica Online 
XIX In many northern Albanian communities, Ottoman policies permitted a great degree of self-governance and 
allowed the persistence of Kanun. However, in southern Albanian communities, greater assimilation within the 
Port’s administrative system mitigated this condition. 
  94 
   
993. Without them, no new law may be instituted, nor may any trial or judgment take place which 
concerns a brotherhood, a clan, a village or a Banner.       
994. Those men who have a reputation for wisdom and who are experienced in trials and 
judgments are also called Elders. (Gjecov 188)                
 
Albanian customary law places primary importance on elders and councils of elders as rulers and 
arbitrators of the oral law, and Sami’s assertions were undoubtedly affirmed by the persistence of 
customary law in northern communities. Thus, at this juncture of the manifesto, a central 
organizational mechanism of Kanun serves as both proof for a past system of independent 
governance and a guiding framework for a future state structure. 
 The ninth and tenth segments, titled “The Elders” (IX. Pleqesia) and “The General 
Assembly” (X. Keshill’ e pergjithcime), revisit the task of creating a national government; they 
expand the concept of rule by elders as well as suggest additional institutions for building an 
administrative framework suitable for the whole nation. The main elements of the structure 
proposed in the manifesto would be a council of elders and a general assembly. Sami proposes 
that each of fifteen administrative regions elect one person to a national council of elders. This 
council could convene in the capital and choose amongst the constituent members a head of 
council and his successor. The head of the council would essentially function as a head of state, 
receiving foreign delegates, appointing worthy persons to government positions, signing and 
approving decisions, as well as gathering the general assembly and delivering the address for its 
commencement. 
That is to say, he will perform all that is done by a king or prince in other places; he will 
accomplish all of this after gathering the council of elders and taking into account the thoughts of 
the other elders; nothing will be decided solely on his judgment… he is not alone in this vocation 
and the all elders will rule.53 
 
The elders and their head would be elected every four years with half the elders rotated every 
two years. In Sami’s proposal, the council of elders would remain and convene in the capital 
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every day except for two months in the summer when members could return home in halves to 
observe the needs of their people and rest. 
 While each region would elect one member to the council of elders, each sub-region 
would elect two representatives to serve in a general assembly, amounting to around one hundred 
members in total. The general assembly would convene every year in the capital for one month 
to oversee the budget and other general issues in the nation’s interest relegated to this institution 
by the council of elders. All projects and works proposed by the committee of ministers would 
be taken up by the general assembly; once approved by the general assembly, they would be 
considered by the council of elders and once approved here they would be authorized by the head 
elder and returned to the ministries for implementation. 
 The administrative framework Sami suggests for an Albanian nation-state is yet another 
aspect of the manifesto that reveals an obvious appropriation of customary law to propagate the 
project of Albanian nationalism.  After proposing national unification through a nationwide besa, 
Sami dedicates the remainder of the final chapter to outlining a structure for a future Albanian 
government. In its entirety, the author’s proposal essentially amounts to a representative 
parliamentary republic, a bicameral legislature operating through both a council of elders, the 
upper house, and a general assembly, the lower house. Sami outlines age, property, and or tax 
requirements for the eligibility of both representatives and the electorate. While the manifesto 
does not delve into great detail about the everyday functioning and procedural aspects of this 
system, it is reasonable to claim that the framework proposed is not unique and or novel in any 
significant means. Rather, it seems to be an appropriation of established administrative systems 
already functional in various European nations of the late nineteenth century. However, the 
terminology which Sami uses to introduce this form of governance reveals further reliance on 
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local experience in customary law. Sami calls the upper house of his proposed national 
government a Council of Elders, and describes suitable members for this institution as leader 
from the respective communities who are respected, esteemed, and “figures whose word holds 
sway.”54 The manifesto again relies on aspects of customary law and the status it affords to 
elders by highlighting that candidates should be leaders of their communities whose word is 
respected.  
 The thirteenth segment, “Education” (XIII. Diturija), addresses an issue “which 
Albanians must attend to most,”55 according to Sami. He calls for free and mandatory elementary 
education for all boys and girls from seven to thirteen years of age. The author also suggests that 
a University with faculty in numerous fields should be established in the capital; a university 
should also be established in the northern regions and southern regions of the country. Another 
important aspect of Sami’s vision for furthering education and academics in Albania is a national 
print and publishing house that can produce books for the nation’s schools and enrich it with 
knowledge. Thus, Sami sees the spread of the Albanian language material and the creation of an 
Albanian education system as key to the formation and maturation of this nation. 
 The fourteenth segment is titled “General Works” (XIV. Punerat’ e Pergjithcime) and 
here the author enumerates the necessary task of modernizing and building the nation through 
various industrial endeavors. He writes that: 
After education, the next biggest task and need for the Albanians will be general works and 
projects which will bring prosperity and great riches to Albania. Roads, railroads, ports, 
developing an infrastructure of rivers and lakes, mining, forestry etc. These are the most needed 
and valuable of works that Albania will accomplish.56 
 
Thus, Sami sees a project of industrialization and modernization as vital for the economic and 
political unification necessary to strengthen the nation. He suggests that these tasks be 
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undertaken by the ministry of general affairs and considers them of great importance, placing 
them only behind education. 
 The seventeenth and final segment of the last chapter is titled “The Municipalities” 
(XVII. Katunderite) and introduces the final administrative unit in Sami’s proposal. Here, the 
author suggests that every region, town, and village be split into local municipalities which 
would connect local governance with a national body. Sami writes that: 
The happiest place in the world is that which feels the hand of the state least. The state should not 
directly deal with the local inhabitants as much as it is possible. Municipalities are need for this 
purpose.57 
 
The municipalities would be responsible for collecting revenue from the citizens and transferring 
it to the national government and they would also manage and oversee state functions on a local 
level including elementary education, local roads, markets, courts, public property and safety.   
Thus, all local concerns will be attended to by the municipalities and local inhabitants will not 
know any authorities except the municipality which they elect themselves. The state will not 
intervene except in larger and general fields; dealings which the municipality cannot address 
independently and will relegate to the state.58 
The leadership of each such unit would be elected at an annual general gathering in each 
municipality by male inhabitants that fulfill certain tax and property criteria. The municipality 
would fund and manage itself through local taxes and the resources in its authority.  
 In justifying a system of municipalities for local rule, Sami writes that the happiest 
people are those who feel the hand of the state least. According to the author, the system of 
municipalities is intended to serve this purpose; people would only be responsible to their local 
communities and leaders. This explanation also corresponds well with governance under the 
Kanun where family, clan, and village are the primary networks of governance and greater units 
such as Banners (which include larger areas), are only reverted to when the issues in contention 
are wide-reaching and cannot be solved by the local community. Experience with customary law 
can thus be used to justify and explain Sami’s proposed administrative system. However, these 
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references are merely symbolic because in substance, the institutions proposed are modeled after 
modernist European state structures. Yet again, customary law becomes a means for propagating 
a nationalist agenda by refashioning and advocating centralized governance through means 
appropriate to local cultural experience. 
 The manifesto ends by following the third chapter on “What will become of Albania” 
with a brief conclusion, reiterating key arguments and issuing a final call for all Albanians to 
take action on behalf of their motherland. It begins by asserting that: “from all we have said it 
becomes very obvious how Albania can be governed and how handsome a place it will become 
with such a government.”59 On such a path, Albania will become one of the most advanced and 
civilized nations in the world; the Albanians which now live in poverty and oppression would be 
prosper and flourish. What is necessary for this? “Very little; Only desire! Should we desire it, 
we are capable of saving and making Albania as we said.”60 Sami writes that this fate remains in 
the hands of the Albanian people; inaction would be huge mistake, paramount to destroying the 
motherland themselves. Preserving Albania must always be in their hearts and minds. 
Every Albanian that aspires to this should desire the unification of the Albanian people; all 
Albanians are brothers, the same blood flows through their veins…Every person that is born of 
Albanians and speaks Albanian is an Albanian, but a true Albanian is he who has Albania in both 
mind and heart.61 
 
When the majority of Albanians become such true Albanians, this nation will have its salvation. 
 However, currently, the majority of Albanians are not true Albanians; that is, in both 
mind and heart. There are those that don’t seek to honor their nation and language, finding 
embarrassment in this name. “But if they are embarrassed to say that Albania is our mother, 
Albania is far more shamed and hurt that she has such sons.”62  The argument continues that if 
Albania has remained backward, it is not the fault of this nation but the fault of the Albanians, 
who have neglected their nation and not written in its beautiful language. Furthermore, Sami 
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adds that those Albanians, who cannot value their nation and language and are embarrassed by 
this name, are traitors who shame their motherland. 
Their existence is a great embarrassment for Albania and for the Albanian nation. What 
unbearable shame when an Albanian, in whose veins flows the blood of Skenderbeg and his 
brethren, forsakes his nation and the language of his mother by embracing a foreign one.63 
 
He argues that the shame of such people is a shame for the whole Albanian nation and they 
should be expelled. “Every true Albanian must see that no such Albanians remain as they 
damage and bring great shame to Albania and all Albanians.”64 Every Albanian must become a 
true Albanian and make those around him true Albanians as well. They must see that their 
language is maintained and spread—written and read—such that this nation become one of the 
most civilized and prosperous. 
O men! Do not let the sleep of stagnation and ignorance seize us, for if we continue like this, we 
have already lost. O what great damage and what heavy shame to lose today—in times when even 
the weakest of nations are awakening and budding—a  nation like the Albanian one which has 
been preserved for thousands of  years under worst times.65 
 
Sami asserts that protecting this nation is an undeniable right of Albanians and all who stand 
against it, stand against justice and righteousness.  
 In the conclusion, Sami largely reiterates and consolidates the manifesto’s arguments for 
Albanian nationhood: an ancient and glorious history, a common culture and kinship, and a 
shared fate. However, a novel and noteworthy element not pursued at other parts of the 
manifesto is the proclamation of shame weighing heavily not only on the honor of this nation, 
but on all Albanians. This shame arises from those Albanian sons who have forsaken their 
motherland and her protection and also from those who have maintained their loyalty but have 
thus far neglected and failed her protection and prosperity.  
 Honor/shame and humiliation/reconciliation are themes woven throughout the 
manifesto, but the most direct and evident expression of these dualities is presented in the work’s 
conclusion.   The author here reiterates his arguments for national unity, resistance and self-
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determination but also addresses an issue that thus far, had largely been sidestepped. Namely, he 
considers the problem of internal opposition to national unity and resistance; the issue of 
Albanians who would oppose this cause. At an earlier juncture of the manifesto, Sami suggests 
that all those opposed to the national cause are traitors and should be treated as such but it is only 
in the conclusion that he explains what that entails. He writes: 
Those Albanians who do not value their nation and language, don’t like it and have no shame in 
wishing to be called Turks, Greeks, Slavs or others, they are traitors and ignorant fools. Their 
existence is a great humiliation to Albania and the Albanian nation…Such people shouldn’t exist 
in Albania, nor on the face of the earth.66 
 
The manifesto approaches the issue exclusively through rhetoric of shame and humiliation, ideas 
that are wholly tied to the Kanun’s honor/dishonor binary. In the realm of Albanian customary 
law, an infringement to honor brings shame and humiliation to the victim who must seek 
retribution and regain honor or otherwise be ostracized, losing respect and status in the 
community. Furthermore, certain violations to honor cannot be resolved short of complete 
expulsion from the community—where the whole village burns the residence of the shamed—or 
or the taking of blood. Sami in presenting his argument through rhetoric of humiliation and 
shame implies this paradigm. Furthermore, his proposal of excommunicating or eradicating such 
people regards this issue as the highest level of violation within the realm of the Kanun; in 
demanding eradication and excommunication it clearly parallels the dynamics of customary law. 
The honor/shame binary is thus projected to the nation as a whole; allowing Sami to both 
reaffirm his outline of nations as unified entities and further extend the discourse of Kanun to his 
theory of nations.  
 God, Righteousness, Nation, Language! Albania, Albanians! 
This is our aim! This is our sacred work! This is our pledge! All those who share this aim are our 
brothers! Amongst true Albanians there is no separation, no divisions and no differences! They are 
all brothers, all one body, one mind, one aim and one faith. (113)67 
 
Thus concludes the manifesto’s final passage. 
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The Manifesto, Customary Law and the Albanian Nation 
 A comprehensive analysis of the claims and arguments in Sami’s 1899 political 
manifesto requires that we situate this work within the larger context of nationalism in the 
national rebirth period. For our purposes, it is important to consider how Albanian nationalist 
discourse functions and changes from its early manifestations in the play Besa to the later work 
Albania- What it Was, What it Is and What Will Become of It?; particularly, how Albanian 
customary law is employed  in both of these endeavors. 
 Besa was intended as a tribute to Ottomanism—a Tanzimat ideology which promoted 
cultural and ethnic pluralism within the empire—therefore, it is not an explicitly nationalist text. 
Nonetheless, the play narrates an ethnic Albanian identity through an ideological framework 
inherent to models of Eastern European nationalism; we argued that it inevitably functions as a 
foundation for nationalist discourse. In Besa, the task of narrating a unique identity—openly 
proclaimed by the author in the play’s 1875 introduction—employs customary law as a primary 
signifier of Albanian national identity. If customary law and Kanun are a basis for narrating an 
Albanian identity in Sami’s play, how are they employed in his manifesto?  
 While nationalist discourse in Besa is expressed indirecty, in the manifesto, a nationalist 
mission is a clear and unambiguous feature. Robert Elise, a scholar of Albania, writes: 
Of major significance to the Albanian national movement was Sami Frashëri's much-read political 
manifesto "Shqipëria - Ç'ka qënë, ç'është e ç'do të bëhetë? Mendime për shpëtimt të mëmë-dheut 
nga reziket që e kanë rethuarë" (Albania - What It Was, What It Is and What Will Become of It? 
Reflections on Saving the Motherland from Perils which Beset It), Bucharest 1899. This work of 
Balkan pathos is indicative of the awakening of Albanian national identity at the end of the 
nineteenth century.XX 
 
                                                             
XX http://www.albanianhistory.net/texts19/AH1899_1.html 
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Through this brief manifesto, Sami accomplishes much for the nationalist cause. He provides a 
historical narrative of an Albanian nation and, furthermore, offers his audience a complete 
treatment of nations and their role in the world, from birth to extinction. Specifically, Sami’s 
manifesto introduces the model of ethnic nationalism that took root in the Balkans, relying on 
ideas of ethnic homogeneity, a common past, and a shared destiny to propagate a nationalist 
vehemence. Most importantly, perhaps, the manifesto introduces not only a specific Albanian 
nation, but also the concept of nation and nationalism in general – it thus becomes a 
metanarrative of modernity.  
 The most important task for late nineteenth century Albanian nationalism was achieving 
national unity; this message becomes abundantly clear through Sami’s manifesto. It is certainly 
the direct target of this work and, in many ways, a focal point of its structural and ideological 
framework. The manifesto’s treatment of nations is informed in every respect by the assertion 
that national unity brings salvation, while division brings decay and, ultimately, termination. 
This dichotomy is central to Sami’s discussion of the role and function of nations and in his 
treatment of an Albanian nation in particular. According to the manifesto, nations thrive when 
they are united in their purpose and native ways, but they decay and disappear as members split, 
losing their native identity and the utmost trait of nationality, language.  This dichotomy of unity 
versus separation is not a big surprise given the modernist and late Romanticist roots of the 
ethnic nationalism taken up in the Balkans; after all, our theoretical framework explained these 
intellectual trends as movements towards centralization, standardization, and homogenization, be 
it cultural, linguistic, or political.  
 A similar opposition between unity and division is of central importance in Besa as well. 
The root of the play’s problems is the separation of the family; the absence of the father has lead 
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the son astray, causing him to forget the ways of the land and dishonor the family. Resolution in 
the play only comes with the father’s return to the homeland and his atonement with the native 
ways through filicide, killing his son and then himself. More importantly, from destruction 
follows unification; the feuding families are joined under a stronger, sacred union founded on the 
native ways of honor and oath.  Thus, the unity of “native” elements, which is a central matter of 
the play Besa, is a theme revisited in Sami’s political manifesto, as well. In the latter, however, 
unity has an explicit national disposition which is the work’s central aim and also its 
indispensable ideological foundation.  
 In the play, unity and resolution result from recourse to the native ways and the unwritten 
law, specifically, through the fulfillment of the oath and the upholding of the word of honor. In 
the manifesto, Sami suggests and applies precisely the same mechanism for bringing the 
Albanian people together. In the chapter “What Will Become of Albania?”, the author dedicates 
a segment to this matter. He argues that nothing can prevail against the Albanian national cause 
if Albanians give their besa and take a wide-spanning oath to protect their nation and identity. 
Sami’s call for national unity through an oath that binds all Albanians is the most direct 
application of customary law to Albanian nationalism, but throughout the manifesto, the code is 
also employed in other ways. 
 Sami uses customary law to substantiate the narrative of the nation’s historical continuity 
and its shared golden past, as well as relying on a shared memory or experience in Kanun to 
legitimize his proposed framework for a future Albanian government. Narratives of historical 
continuity and golden antiquity are common to many Balkan national narratives and in Sami’s 
version of Albanian history, affirmations of a shared national past are twofold: a theory of 
Pelasgian descent, which is used to claim ancient presence and thus territorial legitimacy for the 
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Albanian nation, and the story of Skanderbeg, which highlights a golden age of freedom and 
national unity. Skanderbeg’s stand against the Ottoman invasion is used to confirm the Albanian 
nation’s capacity for unity and self-governance as well as the ability to fight for nationhood. The 
story of Skenderbeg is also used to assert Albania’s role in the protection of European 
civilization through this nation’s fight against Eastern invaders. Both accounts in Sami’s 
manifesto are substantiated through the presence of customary law.  
  Using writings on the Illyrian, Macedonian, and Epirian communities by ancient Greek 
historian and geographer Strabo, specifically the claim that these communities maintained 
governance through a system of elders called Plakon, Sami argues that this ancient system of 
rule by elders is the modern Albanian tradition known as Pleqesi, XXI a cornerstone of Albanian 
customary law. In Sami’s narrative of Albania’s history, the Macedonians, Illyrians, and Epirians 
all belong to a single ancient Pelasgian nation of which Albanians are the only remaining piece. 
Accordingly, by relating documented accounts of these ancient societies to experienced aspects 
of Albanian customary law, the manifesto is able to further substantiate its claims about antiquity 
and Pleasgian descent. Thus, Sami finds proof for his narrative of an Albanian nation in antiquity 
through the institution of elders found in Kanun. 
 Accounts of the nation’s golden past—which the manifesto locates during the time of 
Skanderbeg—are also substantiated by reference to Kanun and customary law. Skanderbeg’s 
desertion from the Ottoman Army and his return home to fight against these invaders fits 
perfectly with the motif of return to the native land and salvation in national unity—central 
themes in both Besa and the manifesto. Thus, Sami designates the times of Skanderbeg the freest 
and most beautiful in Albania’s history; despite this being a period of blood and war, it was a 
                                                             
XXI Pleqesi is the plural form of the Albanian word Plak, which means elder. 
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time when Albanians unified and worked together to save their nation. On the means through 
which this unity is achieved, Sami writes: 
All men and heads of Albania gathered in Kruje, vowed word and council and gave a besa to resist 
and die for the rescue of the motherland, recognizing Skanderbeg as their leader and king.68 
 
Here again, national unity is achieved through a gathering of Albanain men and the swearing of 
the sacred oath to protect the nation until death. Sami concludes that this period and event 
brought the Albanian nation fame and honor before all of Europe and the world.  
 To justify a state with of a representative council as opposed to one with a king or a 
single head of state, Sami argues that a system of rule by elders is one that is native and innate to 
Albania and its national character and so it should be preserved. However, Sami’s proposed 
council of elders is very different from rule of elders as experienced under Kanun in a very 
fundamental way. While elders do hold a high authoritative status under the Kanun, this is not 
their profession or career; they are sources to be accessed when problems and issues arise. In 
Sami’s proposed administration, the council would be a governing establishment active year 
round and the representative elders here would essentially be career politicians, very much like 
representatives in the governments of western European states. Thus, Sami’s terminology and the 
explanations he suggests for Albania’s future administrative system serve mostly as a selling 
point. The manifesto applies concepts and terminology that draw symbolically on the ideological 
and structural framework of Kanun, but the centralized modernist state propagated by the author 
is diametrically opposed to Albanian customary law, as the latter is intended for a decentralized 
pre-modern society and not a modern European nation-state.  
 These are the several notable areas of direct engagement with customary law—the 
narration of Albania in antiquity, the nation’s golden age, and most importantly the call for a 
wide-ranging besa to bind and unite all the Albanian speaking communities—but there are other 
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subtle and less direct patterns tying the manifesto with customary law that merit brief 
consideration. Two important patterns include the motifs of a warrior race and hyper-masculinity 
in the description of Albanian national identity and the honor/humiliation or blackface/whiteface 
binary which is a pillar of social structure and authority in the Kanun. Both are used in the 
manifesto to incite emotion.  
 Regarding the first pattern, we recall that Sami offers a narrative of Albania throughout 
history as a nation of warriors. In the first chapter, he writes: 
The Albanians, a brave and fighting people, have always shown a great desire for combat and have 
sought war throughout their lives; they have considered war a profession and gain for 
themselves. 69 
 
Albanians are described as a people for whom knowledge, desire and capacity for battle and war 
is an innate characteristic; such is the manifesto’s account of Albanian national identity. The 
second chapter, in explaining the Ottoman betrayal of Albania and the infringements committed 
by the former, states:  
Turkey has abandoned its assurance with the Albanians…it seeks to teach them knowledge of 
combat, that which they themselves do not know, and which the Albanian has learned from 
suckling the milk of his mother.70 
 
Notions of a warrior race are recounted yet again in the above passage, but the main element is 
the depiction of this attribute as flowing from nature and particularly through nourishment from 
the mother. The rhetoric here is very much gendered with discourse on nativity, family, and 
continuity being extended from the individual and family to a larger realm constructing and 
legitimizing a domain of an organic natural nation. 
 On the injustices suffered by Albanians, the manifesto particularly emphasizes heavy 
taxation and the confiscation of weapons; a tragedy and shame, which according to Sami, has 
befallen all Tosks and most Gegs. Of the two infringements mentioned, the possession of 
weapons is particularly noteworthy as it is a sacred right and a ritual of manhood in the realm of 
  107 
   
the Kanun. In Gjecov’s Kanun of Lek Dukagjin, book two, titled “The Family,” in describing 
“The obligations and Duties of the Head of the House” states that one of eight responsibilities is 
“to buy weapons for the young men when it is seen that they are capable of handling them.” 
(Gjecov 16) Indeed, weapons and specific rules on possession, sale, and use are of major 
importance to the Kanun. Hence, infringements in this area would resonate powerfully with 
Albanian communities, especially in those regions where customary law and Kanun maintained a 
strong presence. The regions in northern Albania that enjoyed a great degree of administrative 
freedom and maintained the oral law would be the author’s ideal audience in this regard. Sure 
enough, the manifesto warns that even in the Albanian north, where certain Geg communities 
have retained arms and thus far escaped the weight of the new order, “the Ottoman government 
is encroaching day by day, plotting to take their weapons and enslave them as well.”71 With the 
issue of arm confiscation and particularly by singling out the northern Albanian tribes where 
customary law remained strongly influential during this period, Sami is able to evidence both 
injustice/victimization and furthermore endorse the manifesto’s narrative of warrior race through 
reliance on the social role and importance of weapons in these communities. 
 The manifesto’s depiction of Albanian national identity is undoubtedly gendered through 
the rhetoric of hyper-masculinity evident in portrayals of the Albanian as a natural warrior. 
These motifs of the manifesto, authenticated through reference to customary law, parallel its 
misogynistic and patriarchal structure and are furthermore projected and applied to engagements 
with Albanian national identity as a whole. This construction, applied repeatedly throughout the 
manifesto, becomes especially valuable for supporting the author’s arguments that a path of 
national resistance will guarantee success because the Albanians are not only righteous in cause, 
but also uncontestable in combative force. Thus, motif of warrior race and hyper-masculinity— 
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common tropes strategically engaged in the manifesto’s characterization of Albanian national 
identity—are also associated with customary law. 
 A second noteworthy pattern involves the honor/humiliation motifs. These are somewhat 
more veiled than themes of hyper-masculinity and warrior race, but they are also significant to 
the manifesto’s aim and message. In our early examinations of Albanian customary law, we 
highlighted the importance of the spoken word (besa) and honor as ideological and structural 
pillars in the social function of the oral law. We revealed that within the realm of customary law 
the concept of honor—held as given by the almighty and innate to every man—symbolically 
linked the members of a community and served as a social equalizer by affording all an equal lot. 
The concept of besa, through the primacy of oath and the given word, functioned as the schema 
that oversaw adherence to the social code and managed infringements of honor. In the Kanun, 
these two elements are inexorably linked, as a besa cannot hold power without the framework of 
the honor it’s meant to preserve. Thus, the binary of honor/dishonor and the institution of besa 
are central to Albanian customary law because they guide the dynamics of status and power 
within the community by assigning social capital and access.We already examined the 
manifesto’s use of besa in its capacity as a binding oath—applied by Sami to call for national 
unity—but a complimentary element necessary to validate this function within the realm of 
Kanun is the institution of honor, particularly its violation. Accordingly, discourse on honor and 
violation plays an important role in Sami’s manifesto.  
 In the chapter on “What was Albania?”, the idea of honor is mostly used in a positive 
sense, to praise the nation’s grand past. In the subsequent chapters, which deal with the present 
and future state of Albania, honor is employed frequently, but here, the honor/dishonor duality 
has a stronger presence and there is repeated emphasis on violation. Beginning with the second 
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chapter and the segment “How are the Albanians Today?”, arguments on betrayal, violation, and 
victimization of Albania and Albanians by the new Ottoman order become central themes. The 
segment begins by claiming that “today Albanians are slaves, disgraced and humiliated, abused 
and insulted.”72 The author continues by arguing that while the Albanian continues to fight and 
honor the Turks, he is not paid in kind for his blood and service. An important feature of the 
honor/dishonor dynamic is revealed here. Claims of violation are initiated on the individual 
level—the victimization of the Albanian solider and the lack of respect for his honorable 
service—but immediately thereafter, are extended to all Albanians through reference to new 
taxes and duties imposed on the region. The manifesto thus laments: “O what great shame! O 
what great misfortune!  Don’t bear it o Almighty!”73 From this point onward, the nation stands in 
place of the individual; accordingly, discourse on honor and violation concern not the individual 
Albanian, but the Albanian nation. Accounts of victimization—intrinsic to nationalist sentiment 
and ubiquitous in other Balkan national narratives—are thus integrated into Sami’s narrative of 
an Albanian nation. Yet again, customary law becomes the means for relating and legitimizing a 
national cause. .  
 Anthony Smith’s ethno-symbolist model of nationalism holds that nationalist ideologues 
draw on pre-existing elements, symbols, and motifs of a prior ethnie, and apply them to 
legitimize a national narrative accessible to a broad base that transcends local loyalties and 
divisions. He further argues: 
To say that modern nations must have or create some elements of pre-modern ethnies if they are to 
endow their citizens with a sense of solidarity and destiny, does not mean that these ethnic 
elements remain in their pristine, pre-modern form and with their identical pre-modern meanings, 
when they are rediscovered and drawn upon by a returning intelligentsia intent on reconstructing a 
modern nation. This is where the nationalists with their peculiar myth of the nation generally make 
their most important contribution. For it is they who, in the first place, select the historical 
memories and elaborate the myths of descent of the relevant ethnie; just as they also deepen and 
extend cultural attributes like language or religion which appear to them most appropriate for 
unifying, and differentiating, the nation. (43) 
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For the Balkans, this means that while the general framework of nationalisms in the region 
remains similar, the specific details and claims of each nation vary in accordance with the 
conditions, needs and tools available to nationalist ideologues. It follows that the specific 
elements applied by different nationalists are important for understanding the particular 
ideological and discursive fabric of that nationalism. Applying this framework to Albania, we 
sought to show that nationalist discourse in the work of this nation’s key ideologue Sami 
Frasheri uses customary law as a main facet and signifier of what Smith called the “pre-modern 
ethnie”. In Sami’s work, the experience of customary law is appropriated and refashioned to 
become a central catalyst in the Albanian national narrative constructed and legitimized therein. 
The concluding remarks will further argue that the pattern of applying customary law to 
legitimize and propagate a national narrative and identity has spillover effects that allow the 
paradigm to persist well beyond the period of national rebirth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  111 
   
 
Concluding Remarks 
 Our project was initiated on the basis of two contentions: That in the context of 
globalization—with ever expanding systems of exchange and communication—nations and 
nationality, as signifying tropes, play a central role in structuring and legitimizing one’s 
knowledge of the world. Furthermore, in the case of Albania, blood feud and the region’s 
experience with customary law have been constant themes of ‘Western’ engagement with the 
nation. This pattern is particularly noticeable in the late nineteenth century with the emergence of 
early Albanian national claims, and also in the late twentieth century, with the collapse of the 
Communist bloc. Bringing these observations under further scrutiny, we introduced Maria 
Todorova’s theory of “Balkanism” and suggested that external treatments of Albanian customary 
law seem to correspond well to this pattern. The latter becomes the focus of various 
essentializing discourses that construct the region as the West’s cultural “Other”; customary law 
is used to legitimize an agenda where notions of modern versus pre-modern and backward versus 
advanced societies function as self-congratulatory claims for the Western hegemon. 
 Noting that renewed focus on Albanian customary law —both in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century—paralleled the rise of nationalist conflicts in the region, we posed questions 
about a possible interaction between discourse on customary law and nationalism. Use of 
customary law as a marker of Albanian national identity was clearly present in outside 
engagement with the subject, and so our project sought to consider treatment of customary law 
by internal forces, particularly by Albanian nationalism. We introduced popular scholarship on 
nations to offer a theoretical framework for the project and through this framework, nationalism 
itself was understood as a discursive process, and as such, an unstable, changing system of 
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signification. Consequently, we narrowed our focus to the materializations of early Albanian 
nationalist claims during the so-called national rebirth period in the late nineteenth century. 
Specifically, we focused on the work of Sami Frasheri, to examine the function of customary law 
in his engagement with Albanian nationalist discourse—both its early veiled presence in Sami’s 
defense of Ottomanism, where arguments for Albanian national identity are first introduced 
through discussions of cultural pluralism, as well in later direct and virulent arguments for 
autonomy and national self-determination. 
 Through Sami’s 1874 play Besa and his 1899 manifesto Albania - What It Was, What It 
Is and What Will Become of It?, we argued that Albanian nationalist discourse demonstrates a 
complex yet undeniable relationship with customary law. Specifically, we argued that nationalist 
discourse in Sami’s work employs the memory and experience of customary law in both direct 
and symbolic ways to legitimize and propagate a larger Eastern European nationalist paradigm in 
a uniquely Albanian light. We suggested that customary law, through its polarized structure and 
mechanisms, found easy correspondence in the model of ethnic nationalism that took root in the 
Balkans, where national identity is structured along similarly rigid dualities and frameworks of 
inclusion/exclusion. Nationalist discourse in Sami’s scholarship attests to this pattern as the 
Kanun’s underlying structural dynamic of honor versus dishonor, loyalty versus betrayal, 
domestic versus foreign, are applied and extended to legitimize nation and nationality. Thus, we 
concluded that customary law becomes a vehicle through which the modernist project of nation 
is refashioned to appeal to local forces and sentiments by drawing on the experience and memory 
of the ethnie.   
 A venture into the development of Albanian nationalist discourse beyond Sami’s work 
would reveal that the application of customary law to legitimize and propagate national claims 
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persists far beyond the period of national rebirth. Moreover, such engagement is not limited to 
nationalist efforts as similar patterns can be identified in a range of political developments 
involving the region and ethnie in question. Anthropologist Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers 
writes:  
In a diachronic perspective it can be demonstrated that from Ottoman, through Communist times 
and into the present day, the respective state organs have used and are using kanun concepts to 
maintain control, thereby generating these dualist (polar) conceptions in society which support 
regional and political clan structures, familism and patronage. (Humiliation 135) 
 
Customary law as a discursive and social apparatus has thus maintained a deep presence in this 
region both prior to and after the period of national unification 
 After the Albanian national independence, the arrival of the Communist state and its 
relentless attack on the country’s feudal structures and institution certainly mitigated, if not 
completely eradicated, the experience of customary law as social reality. However, despite this 
development, reference to customary law persisted well into the twentieth century and even 
escalated in the post-Communist period. A thorough examination of Kanun discourse in the post-
independence period would prove inexhaustible; nonetheless, a brief consideration is merited for 
a concluding reflection of Albanian customary law and its extensive relation with the region’s 
political developments. 
 The interaction of the Communist state with the Kanun is particularly interesting; it is 
fraught with contradictions and schisms, attesting to the wide capacity for engaging customary 
law. During the Second World War, when Communist forces first gained power through their 
role in the partisan resistance, customary law was appropriated by the latter to support unity and 
a national cause, similar to its function in the national rebirth. Schwandner-Sievers writes: 
Reconciliation … was achieved, for example, by gathering tribal political representatives who 
swore a blood peace aimed at a so called "unification of brothers". A main argument to convince 
the people to unite in beslidhje was the external threat by the Second World War opponents. 
(Humiliation 148) 
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The scheme was largely successful as feuds were significantly curtailed during this time and the 
region was united in the fight for national liberation through the methods of Kanun. Besa and the 
pledge, alongside other institutions of the Kanun were assimilated into the Communist program 
to legitimize its pursuit of political power. With the end of war, however, the goals and aims of 
the newly established Communist government changed, and so did its interaction with customary 
law.  
 After rising to power, the Communist government launched an intense project to 
centralize and consolidate power; it sought to modernize the country in every regard, 
economically, politically and culturally. These efforts brought customary law under direct attack, 
as the latter was a bastion of the patriarchal clan and local sympathies, whose power the state 
sought to disrupt. In practice, this meant brutal persecution of the northern regions involved, 
including imprisonment and outright executions, as well as a forceful expulsion and relocation of 
people. Through a monopoly on violence, the Communist state successfully disrupted the 
networks and social structures sustaining customary law and thereby halted its practice. 
However, on a rhetorical and ideological level, the Kanun was spared the campaign of assault 
launched on its practice.  
 The arguments for Albanian identity and the remnant nationalist paradigm of the 19th 
century rebirth period were largely preserved by the Communist government, albeit with certain 
ideological modifications. Accordingly, the function of customary law as a signifier of national 
identity was also continued. Customary law was thus engaged selectively in the Communist 
period. The parts that corresponded with the official ideology were highlighted, while those in 
contradiction were neglected and denounced. Robert Pichler writes: 
In the 1950s, Albanian historiography and ethnography begun to study ‘the cultural past’… 
exploring local customs and collecting myths, rituals and traditions of the Albanian mountaineer.74  
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Through state sanctioned projects, the Kanun continued to function as evidence of an olden 
Albanian culture that maintained it distinctiveness and fought to preserve itself, arguments first 
noted in Sami’s national narrative. Treatments of Kanun as a reflection of national identity or 
character—another reading popularized by Sami during the national rebirth—were also 
preserved, only more selectively. According to nationalist rhetoric of the Albanian Communist 
state, “the best sides of the old traditions and customs of the Albanian people were upheld. These 
were the customs of bese, manliness, hospitality, generosity etc.” (Humiliation 148) However, 
other aspect of Kanun—patriarchal family structures, primacy of clan identities and especially 
individual retribution through blood feud— were selectively combated and dismantled because 
they challenged central authority. Thus, the Albanian Communist state managed to control the 
practice of Kanun much more effectively than any previous political power in the region, but the 
means applied towards this end are noteworthy.  
 In its ‘pristine’ sociological function, customary law concerns a pre-modern society with 
a decentralized system of power—as was the case with the feudal Albanian communities where 
it was practiced—and as such, it proves inherently incompatible with modern forms of 
governance through a centralized state apparatus. Given that nation-states are modern entities 
rooted in processes of centralization and standardization, it follows that conflicts of power would 
arise among the two systems. Resolution between the modern state apparatus and the pre-modern 
institutions of Kanun—if achievable—would inevitably necessitate a transformation of the 
material and social conditions underlying the practice of customary law; economic development 
and a locally legitimate civil code would be of central importance.  
 The Albanian Communist state oversaw a complete economic transformation of the 
country through massive industrialization projects, but its fights against the Kanun did not focus 
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on the underlying material and social conditions legitimizing customary law. Instead, the 
Communist state targeted the instruments through which Kanun was manifested; thus, the 
symptoms, rather than the causes, were attacked. More significantly, the state combated the 
institutions of Kanun—elders, kin networks, blood feuds, and so forth—by applying and 
perpetuating a system of values mirroring customary law, only with the Communist party placed 
at the helm. Schwandner-Sievers writes: 
The Communist elite's political power was based on family networks and engaged in “political 
clan wars” (NZZ 1983). In official rhetoric, the whole society was classified into so-called “good” 
and “bad” families (Schmid-Neke 1993: 208f.), that is friends and foes of the Communists, 
reminiscent of the black and white symbolism of kanun. There was no alternative conception than 
judging people according to their loyalty or treachery to the system, and "treachery" was punished 
by death. Political refugees or people critical of the regime were punished through collective clan 
liability. Their entire family including their grandchildren was denied any chance of education or 
professional life. They were also deported or usually interned in distant villages… The kanun 
conceptions of collective liability and dualistic classifications which informed the application of 
violence were perpetuated. (Humiliation 149) 
 
Thus, even the system ultimately responsible for disrupting the practice of Kanun incorporated 
the mechanisms of customary law in achieving this purpose. As a result of this process, the 
underlying polarized value systems and structures legitimizing customary law were perpetuated 
and reaffirmed. Perhaps, this explains, to some degree, reference to Kanun in Albania even after 
the collapse of the Communist regime.  
 The paradoxical engagement of Kanun by the Albanian Communist state reveals a schism 
in this nation’s treatment of customary law. On the one hand, Kanun is considered proof of 
Albania’s ancient roots, mythologized as testament to the nation’s epic customs of honor, loyalty 
and the uniqueness of Albanian national character. Yet in other ways, it comes to be considered a 
national embarrassment remnant of a barbaric “other” Albania, an antithesis to the values of 
progress, enlightenment and modernization, which are supposed to moved the nation forward. 
This dilemma becomes apparent in various media and it is especially evident in the work of 
renowned writer Ismail Kadare and its exploration of Albanian national identity.  
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 Ismail Kadare, who was awarded the first Man Booker International Prize in 2005, 
engages motifs associated with Albanian oral law in much of his writing. His 1978 work Broken 
April directly addresses the practice Kanun.  In this novel, customary law becomes a vehicle for 
examining a conflicted and paradoxical national identity that places Albania in limbo between a 
mythologized Homeric past and the pursuit of a modern European future. This rupture becomes 
broadly representative of the two opposing positions from which Albanian national identity 
continues to be narrated in both the late and post-Communist period. The nation is seen either as 
propelling towards progress and seeking to join, if not surpass, its European counterparts, or 
otherwise, stuck behind and inherently incompatible with the liberal pluralistic values of a 
Western society 
 For its extensive history with the Albanian speaking people of the Balkans, the oral law 
called Kanun, as experience, memory, or myth, has maintained a deep presence in the political 
and social fabric of these communities, from feudal princedoms to modern nation states. Our 
brief excursion has highlighted a clear and evident connection between Albanian nationalist 
discourse and customary law but it remains a mere glimpse of the myriad ways in which the 
latter leaves its trace in the worlds and lives of the communities involved. 
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Endnotes 
                                                             
 
1 В Албании известно несколько правовых комплексов, каждый из которых имеет собственное название: 
"Закон гор" (Kanun i maleve) на северо-западе страны в местности Мальсия-э-Маде; "Канун Скандербега" 
(Kanun i Skanderbegut) в средней Албании, связиваемый с именем исторического героя Албании Георгия 
Кастриоти Скандербега; "Обычай Мусы Балгини" (Zakoni i Mus Ballgjinit) в долине р. Шкумбин; "Наказ 
Идриза Сули" (Sharti i Idriz Sulit) в Ляберии на юго-западе страны...Выводы ученых гласят о том, что кануны 
севера, центра и юга страны по своему существу очень близки друг к другу. Некоторые различия между 
ними можно отнести за счет особенностен исторического развития каждой данной области. (Иванова, 7) 
2 Me futjen e postit te bajraktarit shoqeria e malsoreve shqipetare perjetoi ne te njejten kohe dy modele te 
organizimit: modelin herarkik te imponuar nga Kanuni dhe modelin qender/periferi te imponuar nga turqit. 
Nepermjet bajraktareve Stambolli mund te percillte vullnetin e vet dhe reformat ne rajonet malore te 
Shqiperise…Turqit nuk ishin te interesuar te ndryshonin lighet dhe zakonet e malesoreve shqipetare per aq kohe sa 
keta te fundit pranonin te merrnin pjese ne betejat e Stambollit kunder fqinjeve te Shqiperise. (Mile 30) 
3 Idete nacionaliste qarkullonin ne qendrat e diasporas shqipetare qe nga filliment e shek. XIX, por casti vendimtar i 
Rilindjes Kombetare ishte formimi i Lidhjes Se Prizrenit ne 1878 .(25) 
4 Tri vitet e ekzistences se saj sherbyen si baze per formimin e ligherimit nacionalist shqipetar, si edhe per 
formulimin e kerkesave politike the shqipetareve, kerkesa keto qe do te mbeteshin thelbesisht te njejta deri ne 
shpallen e pavaresise se Shqiperise me 1912. (25) 
5 Nen presionin e Fuqive te Medha, Porta e Larte I dorezoi Malit te Zi qytetin e Ulqinit, te banuar nga popullsi 
shqipetare. Te zemeruar me kete veprim, krahu radikal I Lidhjes,  pase rine dore drejtimine organiates, shpalli nje 
qeveri provizore qe syonte te zvendesonte sundimin osman te kater vilajeteve. Porta e Larte reagoi menjehere, duke 
shtypur ushtarakisht Lidhjen e Prizrenit dhe duke arrestuar drejtuesit kryesore. (31) 
6 Me vintc mire, se ashtu qetesohesha. Kur i 
shpija dhente ne ndonje kullote tej mire, ulcsha e gezuar nen 
hijen e ndonje peme dhe nuk e dija fare se c'ishte brenga.  
Ligjerimi i zogjve, blegerima e shqerrave me defrenin 
mendjen, me zbavitnin shpirtin. (7) 
7 A e di ti se keta te Borshit as punojne e as kane 
ndonje mjeshteri. Ata kurdohere rrine me arme ne duar e 
presin te filloje ndonje lufte qe te shkojne.(69) 
8 Mos u hidheron.i bijte e mi, do te behet c’te doni juve, do 
t'iu martoj sepse edhe une kete dua. Gezohuni bijte e mi, 
gezohuni! (Ngre duart dhei lutet perelldise.) Oh, lavdi pac; 0 i 
madhi zotl . Ja, tani iu gjet djalit nje nuse dhc vajzes nje burre, 
ashtu si rna donte shpirti mua. Bije, nuk doja qe te dilje nga 
shtepia ... ja, tani nuk do to dalesh. Nuk do t'i lesh keto male 
dhe, ketej e tulje, do te jetosh keshtu si ke jetuar (43) 
9 Burrin rna vrane dhe vajzen rna rrembyen. Jane dy pume 
per t'u bere: te merret gjaku i tim shoqi dhe te shpetoje vajza 
nga dora e armikut. Kush do t'i beje ata? Une s'kam njeri dhe 
Rexhepi eshte i vogel... Jo, jo. Ky sherbim me takan mua, keto 
pune do t'i me duarte mia (131) 
10 Po, vetem kete sherbim 
  do te rna falesh mua. Do te zihem me punen tende pa marre 
  doren e sime rneje, pa puthur syte e djalit, pa pare mire 
  memedhene. (151) 
11 Ah, lavdi pac perendi! Sot, pas njezet vjetesh merguar 
nga shtepia e nga gjithe njerezia, rnberrita ne memedhe. I 
ndershmi rnemedhe, pas njezet vjetsh te pashe edhe nje here. 
Sa me kishte marre malli!(139) 
12 Fetahu:(Fshehtazi nxjerr koburen dhe e ngreh.) 
Une e mbarova punen: gjakun e burrit ta mora, vajzen ta 
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shpetova dhe tani do te marr gjakun e djalit! (E kthen koburen 
nga kraharori i vet dhe e zbraz.) Une, gjakesori i tim biri! (Bije.) (184 
13 Durija: 
E shkreta une ... ne nje dite po humh ... dy djem! Fetah, 
po mua... ku me" 1e ? 
  
Fethau: (Duke dhene shpirt.) 
ja, ty ... tre bij ... po te. le!. .. Keta ... t'i kam .. .lene ... ty ... 
mbi qafe! .. kjo ... eshte ... ime ... moter!. .. Ata ... jane ... bijte ... e 
mi ... qe te ... tre ... te shtepise ... I ke! .. Vajza i do ... dhene ... 
djalit... Me ta ... duhet ... te rrish ... here ... ketu .... e here ... gjithe 
... tok ... ne Progonat... te vini. .. Mos u ndaj ... nga ... keta ... (dllke 
e Zblii pitr jakp t'iimen) Ja memeze ... fja1en ... e fundiL .... kete .. . 
kam: ... humbe ... dy ... djem ... fitove ... tre” (191) 
14 Vepra e Samiut, per erudicionin dhe rigorozitetin e argumcntave te saj ne sherbim te ceshtjes kombetare, sidomos 
te Shqiperia C'ka Qene, C’eshte e C’do te Behet jo me kot eshte cilesuar si "sinteza me e larte e ideologjise se 
Rilindjes.” (Sulstarova, 12) 
15 Shqiperi i thone gjithe ati vendi, tek rrine Shqipetarete. Shqipetarete jane m’i vjeter’ I komberve t’Evropese. (5) 
16 Dukete qe keta erdhe me pare se gjithe prej mezit t’Azise n’Evrope; edhe keta prune ne kete vend ditjen e te berit 
shtepi me mur si edhe diturin’ e te leruarit, te mbjellit e te korrurit; se ata njeres, qe gjendeshin me pare tyre n’ 
Evrope. Ishin t’egere e ronine neper pyje e neper shpella duke ushqyer me pemera t’egera e me mish gjahu. (5) 
17 P’andaj prinderete tane te vjetere u quajtene Arbene, fjale te cilene na … e kethyeme ne Arbere, si Kete fjale 
Romakete e kane kethyere me Alban duke thene edhe vendit te tyre Albania, si e thone edhe sot Evropjanete.(6) 
18 Pame me sipre se sa I gjere ka qene nje here qe moti vendi, qe rrine Shqiptaret edhe sa ishine te perhapure 
prinderet tane e qysh ishine ten dare ne Ilyrjane, Epiriote, Maqedonas, Thrakas, frygas,etj. Pam’ edhe qush ne kohet 
te Romanevet Maqedonasite, Thrakasite e Frygasite, duke perzjere me kombe te tjere, zune te humbisnine gjuhen’ e 
komberin’ e tyre e qysh me pastaj, ne kohet te Byzantinjet, erdhe mizeri Shqehsh ne sinisit te Ballkanit e zune 
Thraqin’ e Maqedonine edhe Illyrin’ e Siperme. Qe m’ather’ e tehu Shqiperia eshte vogeluare shume; nga gjith’ ata 
vende qe kishine prinderit tane. (34) 
19 Me nje fjale, Shqiperia, sado q’esht e vogel, ka cdo fare klime e cdo fare dheu edhe shume bageti e shume te mira. 
Te veshtrohete mire, munt te veje shume mbare e t’ushqejne katre here me tepre njeres se sa ushqen sot. (37) 
20 Ne mest te gegevet e te toskevet nuk ka nonje ndarje me rrenje. Te gjithe jane nje komep, flasin nje gjuhe me fort 
pake te ndruare. (38) 
21 Po keto ndarje te beses nuk sjellene nonje cqim te carje ne mes te shqipetarevet…Shqipetari eshte shipetar perpara 
se te jete mysliman a I krishtene. (38) 
22 Me gjithe ndryshimet e besese, me gjithe ndryshimet e koheravet, Shqipetaret jane edhe sot c’ishin ketu e kaqe 
mije vjet me pare; jane Pelasget e koheravet te perrallave, Ilyrinjt’ e Maqedonasit e koheravet te vjetra, epiriotet’ e 
kohes se Skenderbeut. Jane nje komp shume’ i vjeter, qe ka mbeture gjer me sot si ka qene qe ne kryet. (39) 
23 Jane aqe trima e te forte sa duk me qene me pak se  2 miliune njeres burra e gra, po te shtrengohene mundane te 
nxjerrine 300,000 a edhe me tepre ushtare te cilet jane mbaras me nje milium ten je kombi tjatre. (39) 
24 Me nje fjale: shqipetaret jane trima, te mencime, punetore, te zotte por cdo pune. Me gjithe ndryshimt te beseve, 
nuk jane te ndar’ e te care pot e bashkuare; kane dashurine ne mest te tyre. Kane, do-me-thene, gjith ato qe duhete te 
kete nje komp per te vajture mbare.(41) 
25 Keshtu eshte sot Shqiperia. (64) 
26 Shenj’ e komberise eshte gjuha; cdo komp mbahete me gjuhet, ata njeres, qe harojne a lene gjuhen’ e tyre e flasine 
nje tjetre gjuhe, me kohe behene njerzit’e ati kombi q’I flasin gjuhene e daline nga komberi e tyre. Kaq kombe, qe 
jane shuare, mos pandehni se vdiqin’ a u vrane te tere; jo kurre; po u perzjene me te tjere kombe, muarre gjuhen’ e 
atyre, edhe ubene nga ata pa te cquare. (25) 
27 Bota u ndryshua, njerezit u xgjuane, kombet’ u ndrituane, sicilido perpiqete te veje me pare se te tjeret, secili 
veshton qysh te shtohet’e te madhohete dhe kujdeset te perpije ata qe jane me te vegjel’ e me te dobete…Kombete 
jane si pishqite, qe hane njeri tjatrine. Mjere kush esht’i dobete! (48) 
28 Shqipetaret e kane mbajture gjuhen’ e komberin’ e tyre jo me shkronja, as me dituri, as me qyteter, po  vetem me 
dliri, me te qene gjithnje vetem e me veteh, me te mos perzjere me te tjeret e me te mos kallur te huaj ne vendit te 
tyre.(25) 
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29 Ne trimerit, ne diturit te luftese, ne forcet si edhe ne ditjet, ne  mendimit te drejte, ne njerezit, n’embelsit te 
zemrese e ne maderit te shpirtit.(16) 
30 Sado qe shkoi e tere me luftra e me gjak, eshte m’e bukur’ em’e bekuar’ e gjithe koheravet per vendine tene, se 
vetem atehere u mbloth i tere kombi me nje qeveri te dlire e iu degjua emeni ne gjithe botet me nder te math nga te 
qendruarit kundrejt Tyrqet te cileve atehere mbreteri te medha s’u qendronin dot.(20) 
31 Puna, qe donte mbreteri’ e tyrqise, u erth mbare pas veties se tyre. Luftera te paprera, lodera e vrape me kuaj, 
rrembime, vrasje, presje e te tjera te ketilla gjerera, qe donine turqite, keto ishine punerat’ e dashura edhe te 
Shqipetarevet. 
32 Kjo eshte ngaja, qe kane lidhure Shqipetaret me Tyrqit. Shqipetarete gjenine ne tyrqit ate qe donine; gje nder, 
arme, kuaj rrembime sa te donin edhe dliri sa u duhesh; edhe Tyrqite gjenin ne Shqipetaret ate qe donine; trimeri, 
bese e gjak te derdhure pa kurcim.(23) 
33 Keshtu qene punerate gjer ne kohet te tenzimatit; do te shoheme me poshte se qysh u ndruane q’athere e tehu.(23) 
34 Sot Shqipetaret jane rober, te poshtuar’ e t’unjure, te shkelu’ e te cperndere shume me tepre se te tjerete kombe te 
Tyrqise!...Tyrqia e ka ngriture besene nga Shqiptarete, nuk i beson e veshton si anemike e si trathtore, jo si shoke e 
si vellezre, si i veshtonte qemoti.(44) 
35 Ne formimin e identiteve etnike e kombetare nocioni ‘tjetrit’ apo i ‘te huajit’ eshte I nje rendesie paresore. 
Ekzistenca e te tjereve, qe perceptohen si te ndryshem apo te huaj prej grupit, krijon edhe forcon lidhjen brenda 
grupit. Lidhjet emocionale brenda grupit jane me te fuqishme atehere kur  ata qe nuk I perkasin grupit perbejne 
kercenim per anetaret e grupit. Lidhjet emocionale Brenda grupit jane me te fuqishme atehere kur ata qe nuk I 
perkasin grupit perbejne kercenim per anetaret e grupit. Per shake te situates politike gjate periudhes se Rilindjes 
Kombetarem naconalistet perfytyronin si kercenim per kombin shqipetar truqit, greket dhe sllavet(keta te fundit atat 
futnin serbet malazezte, bullgaret dhe ruset) (Ligjerimi Nacionalist Shqipetar, 40) 
36 Keshtu Tyrqite edhe me ndihmet te ketyre Grekrete e Shqehte jane armiket’ e Shqiperise e te Shqipetarevet; edhe 
perpiqen, me sa ju vjen nga dora ta humbasine komberin’ e gjuhen e ketij kombi, te cilit edhe emenine duan t’ia 
ngrene fare.(53) 
37 Shqiptaret si elita ashtu edhe masat kishin mjaft arsye per te qene te pakenaqur me gjendjen e re…kryengritjet e 
reja kunder Tanzimatit kishin nje karakter te spikatur masiv. Legjimiteti I pushtetit qendror te shqiptaret u lekund 
edhe konflikit I shkaktuar nga reformat filloi te shihej si mbrojte e pavaresise vendore kunder nderhyrjes se 
funksionareve te huaj e te pushtetit qendror.(28-29) 
38 Shqiperia s’ka bere themel as ka leshuare renje me vetehe; ron mi themelt te gremizure te Tyrqise e me renjet te 
kalbura t’asaj. Me te rennet te kesaj stihije se madhe, do  te bjer’ edhe Shqiperia e do te shtypete nene germadhat te 
renda t’asaj.(65) 
39 Na s’jemi as Tyrqias te ardhure nga shkretetirat e Azise. Na jemi m’I vjetri komp I Evropese: kemi te drejte ne 
dhet’ t’Evropese me tepre se cdo komp. Kete te drejte te shenjtuare shqipetarete jane te zotte ta ruajne e ta kerkojne 
edhe me arme ne dore. Kur perzjehete e drejta me fuqit, merr nje force te cilese gje s’I rri dot kuntreq. Shqipetarete 
jane te zotte ta ruajne e ta kerkojne edhe me arme ne dore. Kur perzjehete e drejta me fuqit, merr nje force, te cilese 
gje s’I rri dot kuntreq. Shqipetarete jane pr ate zotte te mbajne e te ruajne te drejten’ e tyre do-me-thene kombesine, 
gjuhene e memedhen’ e tyre kuntre cdo armikut; arrin vetem te duane.(72) 
40 Shqiperia, po qe te shpetonje nga rezikete, q’e kane rrethuare e te hynje n’udhet te mbrodhesise e te mbaresise 
behete nje nga me te mirete e nga me te bukurite vende t’Evropese…Ka gjithe c’i duhete , si e pame me sipre. 
Shqipetarete jane fort te zgjuar’ e te mentcime; kane nxenie te madhe per qyteteri e per cdo fare diturije, jane trima e 
ushtare te cquare. (73) 
41 Te shpetuarit a te humburit’ e Shqiperise eshte ne doret te Shqipetarevet, ne dacine, do te shpetojne ne dacine do 
te humbasine.(73) 
42 Shqipetarete s’kane nevoje te zirene nga armete, te hiqene neper malete e neper shpellat, te vriten’ e te prishene, si 
bejne kombet’ e tjere per te fituare dlirin’ e tyre... S’kane nevoje te bejne nje pervec se te lidhine fjale ne mest te 
tyre, te bashkohene gjithe sa jane, t’apen e te marrene bese burrerisht, te qendrojne ne fjalet te patundure edhe te 
kerkojne te drejten’ e tyre nga Tyrqiea e nga Evropa. Tyrqia do ti degjonje e do t’u ape ato qe kerkojne me hir a me 
pahjir. (73-74) 
43 Bes’ e Shqipetarit eshte edhe ka qene gjithmone e ditur’e e degjuare nder gjithe botet. Besene, q’ep Shqipetari, s’e 
mer prape, s’e prish e e mban, gjer sa te kete nje reketim shpirti ne kufomet te ti. (74) 
44 Besa, q’e ka nderuare gjer me sot Shqipetare, ajo bese do ta shpetonje sot nga gjithe reziket.(74) 
45 Shqipetarete, keshtu te lidhure me nje beset e forte e te bashkuare me nje lidhje, do te jene sin je njeri I vetem, 
trim e i forte, i cili ka nje deshire, nje fjale e nje qellim te vetem.(75) 
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46 Mos veshtoni bes’ e fe; myslimane, katolike, orthodoksem githe Shqipetarete, sa jan’ e tek jane, jane vellezre. 
Gjithe duhete te bashkohene nene fjamurit te shenjtuare te Shqiperise !! Ay Shqipetar, qe le vellezerit’ e ti e ndahete 
nga Shqipetarete, per te bashkuare me armiket’ e Shqiperise, duke hequre prej bese, ay eshte dradhetor esht’ armiku 
I kombit e i memedheut. Te ketille Shqipetare me mire te mos jene se te jene. (75) 
47 O burra-ni, o Shqipetare! Zihuni me te’dy duarte ne beset, ne lidhjet e ne bashkimt! Se kjo do t’ju shpetonje! Jo po 
ne mos, ini te humbure.(75) 
48 Qellim’ i vetem I Shqipetarevet eshte te ruajne Shqiperine te mos copetohete prej te huajve, te mbajne gjuhen’ e 
komberin’ e tyre e te ndalojne te perhapurit’ e gjuhevet e te mendimevet te Greqet e te Shqehet, te cilet po I remojne 
themelete epo I nxjerine renjete Shqiperise e shqipetarise.(77) 
49 Pa nje qeveri te ketille Shqipetarete s’mundine te ngjallin’ e te perhapine gjuhen’ e tyre e te mbajne komberine. 
Duhet nje ore me pare te ndahete Shqiperia e te dihete qe kur e gjer ku eshte. Te njihete vendi une per Shqiperi, ta 
njohe edhe Evropa Shqiperi. Shqipetarete te ndritojn’ e te xbukurojne gjuhen’ e tyre me shkronja e me dituri; te 
bashkohene gjithe bashke e te tregohene si nje komp, i cili do te kete te drejtate, qe ka c’do komp mi faqet te 
dheut.(79) 
50 Ateher c’do te behete Shqiperia? Do te mbese me vetehe. Mire, po qysh? C’fare qeverije do te bejne?(82) 
51 Ne qofte Gege, s’e duane Toskete, ne qofte Toske s’e duane Gegete; ne qoft myslima, s’e veshtojne me sy te mire 
krishtenete; ne qofte i krishtene, s’u vjen mire myslimanevet.(82) 
52 Perse, pra, ta leme na kete zakon te bukure te kaqe mije vjec sot e te kerkojme nje njeri te huaj…te na prish nje 
gjithe vetiat’ e bukura te kombit? Na te mos heqim dore kurre nga plakone e Strabonit, nga pleqesija, te cilene e 
kemi ruajture edhe gjer me sot, se kurdo pleqesija urdheron ne Shqiperi. Pleqesija t’urdheronje e te mbreteronje 
gjithenje.(83) 
53 Me nje fjale, do te benje gjithe c’bejne mbreteret’ e princite ne vendet te tjere; po gjithe keto do t’i benje si t’i 
benje nje here ne kuvent ne keshillet te Pleqesise e duke marre edhe mendjen’ e te tjerevet pleq…ne pune s’eshte ay 
vetem, po  e tere Pleqesija, qe do te urdheronje.(85) 
54 njeres, qu u shkon fjala (87) 
55 per te cilene shqipetaret duhete te kujdesene me te tepre.(91) 
56 Pas diturise kujdes’ e Shqipetarevet e m’e madhe nevoj’ e tyre do te jete per punerat’  te pergjithcime, te cilate do 
te sjelline begati e pasje te madhe ne Shqiperie. Udhete, udhet’ e hekurta, limanete, te hapurit’ e lumenjet e te 
kenetavet, metalet pyjete etj. jane me te nevojshimet’ e me te vyerat’ e puneravet, qe do te benje Shqiperija.(94) 
57 M’i lumtur’ i vendevet ne botet esht’ay tek ndjehete fort pake dor’ e qeverise. Sa te mundete, qeverija te mos kete 
te benje drejt per drejt me vendeset. Per kete pune duhete te jene katunderite. (103) 
 
58 Keshtu gjithe punet’ e vendit do te veshtohene prej katunderise edhe vendesite do te mos njohine tjatre qeveri 
pervec katunderise, q’eshte e zgjedhure prej atyre vete. Qeverija do te mos perzjehete pervec se ne punerat te medha 
e te pergjithcime, ne punera, te cilate katunderija, me te mos mundure ti godinje vete, do t’ia dergonje nenqeverise. 
(105) 
 
59 Nga gjithe se thame merret vesh fort mire se qysh munt te qeverisete Shqiperia e se sa vent i bukure do te behesh 
me nje qeveri te ketille! (106) 
60 Fort pake gje: Vetem deshire! Arrin te duame; poqe te duam, e kemi ne dore ta bejme Shqiperine si thame e ta 
shpetojme.(106) 
61 Cdo Shqipetar, qe do kete, duhet te doje bashkimn’ e Shqipetarevet: gjithe Shqipetaret jane vellezre kane nje gjak 
ne rembat e tyre…Shqipetar eshte cdo njeri i pjelle prej Shqipetaresh e qe flet shqip, po Shqipetar i vertete esht’ ay 
qe ka mendjen’e xemrene Shqipetar. (107) 
62 “Po ne kane ata turp te thone qe Shqiperia eshte mema jone, Shqiperia ka me shume turp e dhune te duke te qe ka 
te tille bij!”(108) 
63 Qenj’ e tyre eshte nje turp I madh per Shqiperin’ e per combine shqipetar. Sa i madh turp kur nje Shqiptar, ne 
rembat e te cilit lecin gjaku I Skenderbeut e I shkovet te ti, te poshtonje kombin’e ti e gjuhen e memes se ti e te 
nderonje nje gjuhe te huaj. (108) 
64 Cdo Shqipetar I vertet duhete te perkujdesete qe te mos mbese as nje I ketille Shqipetar, se I sjelline dem e turp te 
math gjithe Shqiperise e shqiptarerise. (109)   
65 O burrani! te mos na mbulonje gjum’ i mefshterise e i paditurise, se ne ndenjcime keshtu, jemi te humbure. O! sa 
dem i math e sa turp i rende te humbase sot, ne kete kohe qe edhe me te dobetit’ e kombevet po xgjuhen’ e po 
lulezojne, nje kom si Shqipetarete, q’eshte mbajture qe kaq mije vjet e tehu, ne kaq kohera t’egra! (110) 
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66 Ata Shqipetare, qe s’dine te cmojne kombin’ e gjuhen’ e tyre e s’i pelqejne e s’kane turp te duane te quhene Tyrq, 
Greq, Shqeh a te tjere, ata jane trathetore te cmendur’ e te paditure. Qenj’ e tyre eshte nje turp i madh per Shqiperin’ 
e per combine Shqipetar…Te ketille njeres duhet te mos jene ne Shqiperi as mi faqet te dheut. (108-109) 
67 Perendija, E Drejta, Kombi, Gjuha! Shqiperia, Shqipetaria! 
Ja qellimi yne! Ja puna on’ e shenjtuare! Ja besa jone! Gjith’ ata qe kane kete qellim, jane vellezerite tane! Ne mest 
te Shqipetarevet te vertet s’ka nonje ndarje, nonje carje, nonje ndryshim! Jane te tere vellezre, te gjithe nje trup nje 
Mendje, nje qellim, nje bese! 
68 Gjithe zoterinjt’ e te paret’ e shqiperise u mbluadhe ne Kruje, lithne fjal’ e kuvent e dhane bese qe te perpiqene e 
te vdesine per shpetimit te memedheut, duke njohure te gjithe per krye e mbret te tyre Skenderbene. (18) 
69 Shqipetarete njeres trima e luftetare kane pasure gjith jetene deshire te madhe per lufte e luften’ e kane quajture 
nje pun’ e nje fitim per vetehe te tyre.(20) 
70 Tyrqia e ka ngriture besene nga Shqipetarete…kerkon t’i mesonje diturin’ e luftese, te cilene ay vete s’e di e te 
cilene Shqipetari e ka mesuare duke thethiture qumeshtit’ e s’emese. (44) 
71 qeveri e Tyrkut dite me dite po I rrethon me s’afferi; rahene t’u marine armete, qe ti bejne edhe ata (46) 
72 Sot Shqipetaret jane rober, te poshtuar’ e t’unjure, te shkelu’ e te cperndere. (44) 
73 O c’turp i math! O c’e madhe e keqe! Mos e durofsh o Perendi! (44) 
74 historiografia dhe etnografia shqiptare filloi më 1950 të studjojë “të kaluarën kulturore”… studimi i zakoneve 
vendore dhe mbledhja e miteve, ritualeve dhe zakoneve të malësorëve. (152) 
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